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I Introduction 
What is the scope of this thesis? 
In past decades, risk management has been implemented in a majority of companies across 
all sectors. The main reason for this is that risk management directly contributes to 
shareholder value (Gay and Nam 1998; Bartram 2000; Beasley 2005), and thus, supports the 
basic idea of value-based management, which can be attributed to Rappaport (1986). In 
addition, risk management is driven by a number of regulatory requirements. For instance, 
in the United States, the New York Stock Exchange requires the audit committee of each 
listed company to “discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management” 
(Ittner and Keusch 2015). In Germany, the “Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG)” requires every listed company to implement an early risk 
warning system and to include a statement regarding its risk structure within their financial 
statements. In addition, companies within the financial sector are obligated to fulfill the 
requirements of the “Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement (MaRisk)”. Thereby, 
MaRisk also requires the implementation of a risk management process. Such a risk 
management process is also proposed by various contributors in economic research 
(Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999; Stoneburner et al. 2002; Huther 2003; Wolf 2003; Hallikas et 
al. 2004; Merna and Al-Thani 2010; Beech and Chadwick 2013; and PMI 2013). Other than 
small differences in denominations and delimitation, there is a broad consensus (e.g., 
Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999; Harland et al. 2003; Hallikas et al. 2004) that the risk 
management process is a continuous loop rather than a linear process, and that it can be 
subdivided into four separate phases, similar to the basic idea of the strategic management 
process: (1) risk identification, (2) risk assessment, (3) risk treatment, and (4) risk 
monitoring. Each of the process phases is essential for a holistic risk management within a 
company and thus for an increase in corporate value. Nevertheless, the phases of “risk 
identification” and “risk treatment” are of particular interest, as – at least for German 
companies – these two phases contain the biggest potential for risk management 
optimization (BDI 2011). This empirical finding is strengthened by Wolf (2003), who 
characterizes the risk identification phase as the basis of the risk management process, thus 
determining its efficiency. This is in line with Wolz (2001), who shows that in practice, risk 
identification is one of the major challenges for firms with respect to risk management. In 
addition, Hallikas et al. (2004) describe risk identification as a “fundamental phase in the 
risk management practice”. The relevance of risk treatment is emphasized by Aebi et al. 
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(2012), who denote the improvement of the treatment of risks as the main focus in 
quantitative risk management. Consequently, this doctoral thesis focuses on the 
identification and treatment of risks and provides empirical evidence regarding both phases. 
Figure I-1 displays the aforementioned risk management process as a cycle, and the content-
related focus of the doctoral thesis at hand: 
 
Figure I-1: Risk management process and focus of the doctoral thesis 
Risk is a very broad field of research, and risk in economics in particular. This starts with 
the definition of risk and does not end with the classification of various types of risk. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive and detailed overview of 
risk management, but rather to address selected topics from distinct areas within risk 
management.
1
 However, in order to achieve a common understanding for this thesis, some 
basic definitions are provided briefly hereafter.  
What is “risk”? 
This thesis follows the generally accepted definition of risk as an uncertain positive or 
negative outcome (e.g., return, credit repayments, or availability of a commodity) by 
simultaneously available subjective or objective probabilities for this outcome (Huther 2003; 
Hull 2010). This is in line with the definition of risk in classical decision theory, which 
conceives risk as “reflecting variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their 
                                            
1
 For a detailed overview of risk management, please refer to the respective standard literature on risk 
management; e.g., Wolf (2003), Gleißner and Romeike (2005), Albrecht and Maurer (2008), Gleißner (2008), 
Wolke (2008), Hull (2010), Merna and Al-Thani (2010), and Rejda and McNamara (2014). 
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likelihoods, and their subjective values” (March and Shapira 1987). In this context, risk can 
be measured by (1) nonlinearities in the revealed utility for money or (2) by the variance of 
the probability distribution of possible profits and losses related to a particular alternative 
(Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965).
2
 
How can different types of risk be classified? 
Risk can be classified in different categories. Regarding the classification of risks, this thesis 
follows the widely accepted classification scheme of, e.g., Albrecht and Maurer (2008) or 
Hull (2010), who subdivide risk as: (1) credit risk, (2) market risk, (3) liquidity risk, and (4) 
operational risk. Thereby, credit risk includes all risks associated with a potential default of 
a borrower, bond issuer, or counterparty in a derivative transaction (Hull 2010). In other 
words, credit risk is the risk that one of the aforementioned counterparties is unable, or 
unwilling, to make required payments; e.g., coupon payments or redemption payments. 
Credit risks can be related to private, institutional, and sovereign borrowers or investors. 
Market risk includes all kinds of risks that occur due to movements in market prices. This 
includes, for instance, the volatility of stock prices, or equity risk, but also currency risks 
and interest rate risks. In addition, market risks also include commodity risks, i.e., the risk 
that arises from the volatility of commodity prices. Liquidity risks can be subdivided into 
liquidity funding risks as well as liquidity trading risks. While the former comprises the 
inability of a financial or non-financial firm to service its liabilities, i.e., to meet its cash 
needs as they arise (Hull 2010), the latter relates to the inability to trade an asset at a fair 
price with immediacy due to a lack of liquidity in the market (Nikolaou 2009; Hull 2010). In 
case a liquidity risk becomes striking on a firm level, and particularly a liquidity funding 
risk, this may lead to illiquidity and finally to insolvency. Both types of liquidity risks are 
co-related, as funding is the prerequisite of trading, which is in turn the prerequisite of 
market liquidity. However, funding depends on an asset’s market liquidity (Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen 2009). While the three aforementioned types of risk primarily refer to the 
“financial risk” category, the fourth type of risk, operational risk, comprises all risks 
occurring in daily business. According to the widely accepted definition of operational risk 
provided by the Basel Committee, operational risk is “the risk of direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events” (BIS 2001). Consequently, this includes, among others, IT risks (e.g. system 
                                            
2
 In addition (and in contrast to the introduced definition of risk), uncertainty exists in case probabilities for 
uncertain outcomes are not available at all (e.g., Merna and Al-Thani, 2010). Uncertainty will not be in the 
scope of this thesis. For a detailed description of risk and uncertainty, please refer to Perridon et al. (2012). 
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failures), process risk (e.g., inadequate reporting arrangements), or personnel risks (e.g., 
fraud). In addition, beyond the financial sector, operational risk also comprises supply chain-
related risks (such as the risk that a specific commodity is not available for the production 
process) or several risks regarding the success of research and development (R&D) activities 
– such as the risk that the product fails to achieve the projects’ technical objectives or risks 
occurring due to insufficient project planning. 
Why does this thesis focus on credit risk and operational risk? 
This thesis examines credit risks and operational risks for the following reasons: the need for 
managing credit risks has strongly increased in the course of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
which was primarily caused by a lack of credit risk management such as insufficient credit 
assessments, particularly in the financial sector (Sabato 2010). Due to spillover effects and 
the increasing globalization of supplier networks, the financial crisis escalated to a 
worldwide economic crisis (Claessens et al. 2012). According to Soin and Collier (2013), 
the financial crisis further unveiled the consequences that may arise in case operational 
risks, arising from the actions of people, systems, and processes, are ignored. Against the 
particular assertion that operational risks are difficult to hedge (Nocco and Stulz 2006), the 
management of operational risks (such as the development of appropriate early warning 
indicators) is of major importance. Consequently, the focus in modern managerial practice 
has shifted to operational risk management (EY 2013). For instance, in manufacturing firms, 
a relevant operational risk topic is the availability of scarce commodities, or the 
management of commodity risks. This is justified by both increased industrial metal 
production and consumption in the past decade, especially caused by rapid growth in 
emerging markets, as well as an increased commodity price volatility. The latter results from 
a growing financialization of commodity markets (Creti et al. 2013; Henderson et al. 2014) 
and an increasing cross-linkage of production processes (e.g., Harland et al. 2003). The 
effect of this is that the availability risk of economically very important industrial metals can 
easily increase to a critical level in the future (European Commission, 2010) and, in a worst 
case scenario, cause further economic crises. Hence, appropriate tools for the management 
of operational commodity risks are required.  
What is “risk identification” and how can risks be identified? 
The risk identification phase as the first phase of the continuous risk management process 
primarily aims to determine which internal and external risks are likely to affect a company 
at its whole or a particular project (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999; Merna and Al-Thani 2010). 
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Risk identification should provide a holistic, consistent, and systematic overview of 
potential risks before they occur. In other words, “the focus of risk identification is to 
recognize future uncertainties [and] to be able to manage these scenarios proactively” 
(Hallikas et al. 2004). Risks should be identified not only as “stand-alone” but also with 
consideration of the interdependencies among different risk factors. In addition, risks should 
be identified “bottom-up” and “top-down”; i.e., risks should be derived from the business’ 
objectives (Wolf 2010). Adequate tools for risk identification are, for instance, SWOT 
analyses, portfolio analyses, scenario analyses, or early warning systems.
3
  
One major research strand that can be related to the identification of risks examines the 
determinants of corporate hedging behavior. But why does this particular research strand 
contribute to risk identification? In line with similar learning spillover effects, for instance in 
terms of investment decisions (e.g., Foucault and Fresard 2014; Dougal et al. 2015; Raff and 
Verwijmeren 2015) or capital structure choice (e.g., Leary and Roberts 2014), the 
knowledge about why other firms hedge their risks makes it possible to draw conclusions 
about risk factors within one’s own company. For instance, numerous existing studies 
provide evidence that firms tend to increase their hedging activities with increasing expenses 
for research and development (R&D) activities. There are several reasons for this 
correlation. First, R&D activities are risky as they are characterized by high expenses and 
low cash inflows in the present, as well as uncertain benefits in the future (Hall 2002; 
Carlsson et al. 2007). Second, another widely accepted explanation for this correlation is the 
underinvestment problem (Nance et al. 1993; Gay and Nam 1998), which occurs when 
external financing for a company is expensive and internally generated cash flows are not 
sufficient to finance value-adding projects with a positive net present value. Therefore, the 
company must reduce its investment spending. R&D activities may enforce the presence of 
this phenomenon in several ways. Among others, as aforementioned, R&D activities may 
not generate sufficient internal cash flow. Further, information asymmetries may exist 
between managers and lenders regarding the quality of new projects, leading to high costs 
for external financing. Consequently, conducting risk management in a situation with high 
R&D activities adds value, as it provides the company with sufficient funds in order to take 
advantage of attractive investment opportunities with a positive net present value. Less 
obvious examples are the number of institutional investors or the number of intangible 
assets.
4
 To express this concept differently, the knowledge about why other firms may hedge 
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 For a detailed description of the various risk identification tools, please refer to, e.g., Wolf (2003). 
4
 For a detailed overview, please refer to section II-1. 
I Introduction 6 
helps to identify potential risks in one’s own firm in terms of a bottom-up identification. 
Nevertheless, the sheer number of studies analyzing corporate hedging behavior and their 
strong heterogeneous results complicate this method of risk identification. 
Another constraint, other than the discovery that this way of bottom-up risk identification is 
complicated by the number of studies and their heterogeneous results, is its’ adaptability for 
different sectors. Most of the studies analyzing the reasons for corporate hedging focus on 
the industrial or financial sector. However, some new industries are underrepresented in 
these studies. As firms in emerging industries often show other additional risks compared to 
“traditional” industries (e.g., Harvey 1995), existing findings on hedging behavior may only 
be applicable to a limited extent. An example is the sports sector in general and the soccer
5
 
sector, which was established as an important industry in the 1980s, in particular (Sevil et al. 
2014). First, the financial ratios of a soccer club can easily be compared to those of a 
traditional company (e.g., the turnovers of Real Madrid CF and the FC Bayern Munich AG 
in the fiscal year 2013/14 were 550 million € and 480 million €, respectively). Second, the 
financial success of a soccer club is predominantly driven by uncertain sporting success, as 
the club’s success is the basis for the economic success of a soccer company (FCB 2014). 
This makes it necessary to identify and treat particular risks referring to the club’s sporting 
success (Huth and Breuer 2011). Although risk management is in fact conducted in soccer 
clubs (e.g., Kupfer 2006, Beech and Chadwick 2013; Duff and Jones 2015, Szymanski 
2015), corresponding financial research on hedging behavior in the general sports sector, 
and in soccer clubs in particular, is only available to a limited extent, consequently leading 
to a research gap. 
What is “risk treatment” and how can risks be treated? 
After the identification of risks as outlined above and the assessment of risk
6
, which aims to 
monetarily evaluate risks and their correlations in order to identify those risks that should be 
addressed, the third phase of the continuous risk management process is the phase of “risk 
treatment”. This phase aims to identify and conduct concrete responses to threats (Hillson 
2002; Merna and Al-Thani 2010). According to Hallikas et al. (2004), or Dorfmann and 
Cather (2012), among others, measures in response to threats can be categorized as follows: 
(1) risk avoidance, or the elimination of a particular risk source such as a business entity, a 
project, or an investment; (2) risk reduction, or lowering the probability for a risk 
                                            
5
 In several countries, e.g., the USA, “football” is termed as “soccer” in order to avoid mix-ups with “American 
football”. Thus, in order to avoid misunderstandings, this thesis consistently uses the expression “soccer”. 
6
 For a description of appropriate measures in order to assess risks, please refer to McNeil et al. (2015).  
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respectively its expected financial impact; (3) risk transfer, or outsourcing the potential 
financial consequences of a risk by means of, for example, an insurance contract or 
alternating hedging instruments, such as derivatives which can be used in order to transfer 
credit risks, currency risks, interest rate risk, and commodity risks, among others; and (4) 
intentionally risk retention, as possible returns increase with increasing risk (Hull 2010).  
The most discussed category for risk treatment in both economic research and recent public 
coverage is risk treatment by means of risk transfer, and specifically, by means of financial 
hedging instruments. Hedging instruments in terms of credit derivatives were one of the 
main triggers for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and thus, for the subsequent economic 
crises (e.g., Acharya et al. 2009; Bartmann et al. 2009; Crotty 2009; Roe 2011). Although 
the functionality of many hedging instruments is well explained by financial research and 
consequently rather transparent (e.g., hedging by means of futures, forward contracts, or 
options), many structured hedging instruments are less transparent and thus subject to 
controversial discussion in financial research and public opinion. For example, credit default 
swaps (CDS) were voted Europe’s “most dangerous financial product” in 2013 (DFP 2013). 
The idea of structured products like CDS or the similar Credit Linked Notes (CLN) is to 
allow the issuing bank to securitize its credit risk. According to Neil (1996), or Rathgeber 
and Wang (2011), the mechanism of a CLN contract is as follows: the buyer of the product 
receives payment for the notes only when the reference entity - another debtor of the CLN 
issuer, such as a company or a country - does not go into default. As a premium for taking 
the risk, the buyer receives an attractive coupon. In the instance of the reference entities’ 
default, the buyer receives only the recovery rate of the CLN. CLN contracts are popular 
among retail investors, and as a CLN can also be interpreted as a “coupon paying security 
with an embedded credit derivative” (Schlösser 2011) among institutional investors who are 
not allowed to directly invest in credit derivatives due to, for example, regulatory restrictions 
or internal investment policies. Such institutional investors may aim to use CLN as a 
counterpart for their own risk exposure. The main research gap and point of criticism 
regarding structured financial products like CDS or CLN is their lack of transparency 
regarding their inherent risk structure and, consequently, regarding their fair and risk-
adequate pricing (Stulz 2010; Rathgeber and Wang 2011). This may hamper their 
applicability as hedging instruments for both issuers as well as investors. First, for the issuer, 
CLN may no longer serve as an appropriate measure to hedge credit default risks, as the 
demand for CLN contracts may decrease with increasing lack of transparency. Second, retail 
or institutional investors may switch to hedging instruments that are more transparent and 
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fairly priced in case CLN market prices turn out to be “unfair” relative to the inherent risk 
structure. Further, financial research still lacks evidence on the influence of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, as it pertains to the applicability of hedging instruments. 
Other than the financial sector, risk treatment is also important in the industrial sector. For 
instance, the management of commodity supply risks is of high priority, justified by the 
increasing supply risk of economically important industrial metals (European Commission 
2010). In order to manage commodity supply risks, adequate indicators are required. 
Existing literature provides a variety of such indicators, such as the inventory level, the spot 
price, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or production volume (Rosenau-Tornow et al. 2009; 
Graedel et al. 2012). Nevertheless, as commodity supply is a critical success factor for a 
company in the industrial sector, good indicators should provide managers with appropriate, 
easy, and continuously accessible information on supply risk (research paper 4). For 
instance, there is no indicator that is (1) available with a sufficiently high frequency (e.g., 
daily), (2) forward-looking to a certain extent, and at the same time (3) easily accessible to 
avoid delays due to data acquisition. Consequently, this results in a research gap.  
In summation, there are several research gaps with respect to both the risk identification 
phase as well as the risk treatment phase, with both phases of high priority for a successful 
risk management, as outlined above. In terms of the identification of risk, section I shows 
that while several studies may exist on the determinants of corporate hedging, these studies 
provide heterogeneous results, thus hampering the usability of these results for holistic risk 
identification. In addition, there is a research gap regarding systematic risk identification 
within the sports sector. In terms of risk treatment, section I derives a research gap regarding 
the pricing of hedging instruments with respect to structured financial products in general, 
and particularly the influence of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the pricing of hedging 
instruments. Regarding the industrial sector, literature lacks an appropriate indicator for the 
assessment of a commodity’s future supply risk. Consequently, derived from the research 
gaps outlined above, Figure I-2 summarizes the key components of this doctoral thesis. 
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Figure I-2: Key components of the doctoral thesis 
The following section I.1 substantiates the objectives and structure of this doctoral thesis. In 
the subsequent section I.2, the corresponding research papers are embedded in the research 
context and fundamental research questions are highlighted. 
I.1 Objectives and Structure of this Doctoral Thesis 
The main objective of this doctoral thesis is to contribute to the field of risk management 
with a particular focus on the identification and treatment of risks. Figure I-3 provides an 
overview of the objectives and structure pursued in this doctoral thesis. 
I Introduction 
Objective I.1: Outlining the objectives and the structure of the doctoral thesis. 
Objective I.2: Embedding the included research papers into the research context of the 
doctoral thesis and motivating the fundamental research questions. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence (Research Papers 1 and 2) 
Objective II.1: Providing a comprehensive overview of existing empirical evidence in 
the field of corporate hedging research. 
Objective II.2: Applying a multivariate meta-analysis in corporate finance. 
Objective II.3: Providing guidance for the handling of different types of biases 
(publication bias, data mining bias) in corporate finance-related meta-
analyses. 
Objective II.4: Identifying the key drivers for corporate hedging by aggregating 
empirical evidence on the four major corporate hedging hypotheses. 
Risk
Identification ...
Risk
Assessment
Risk
Treatment ...
Risk
Monitoring
… on an overall Level
… in the Sports Sector
… in the Financial Sector
… in the Industrial Sector
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Objective II.5: Identifying the key sportive-success-related risk drivers for a soccer club 
by analyzing the impact of soccer matches and competitions on stock 
markets (with respect to returns and volatility).  
Objective II.6: Challenging the presence of market efficiency in terms of soccer stocks. 
Objective II.7: Deriving implications for future research in the field of soccer and its 
influence on stock markets. 
III Risk Treatment – Recent Empirical Evidence from the Financial and Industrial 
Sector (Research Papers 3 and 4) 
Objective III.1: Challenging the adequacy of daily prices of CLN contracts with respect 
to the related credit risk for the German secondary market. 
Objective III.2: Analyzing the influence of the financial crisis on the pricing of credit 
derivatives. 
Objective III.3: Identifying the main drivers for mispricing on the German CLN 
secondary market. 
Objective III.4: Evaluating the presence of a product life cycle in the CLN secondary 
market in Germany. 
Objective III.5: Deriving key requirements for a feasible indicator of short-term 
commodity supply risks. 
Objective III.6: Evaluating the practicability of the convenience yield as indicator for 
short-term supply risk for five major industrial metals. 
IV Summary and Future Research 
Objective IV.1: Summarizing the key findings of the doctoral thesis. 
Objective IV.2: Highlighting starting points for future research. 
Figure I-3: Objectives and structure of the doctoral thesis 
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I.2 Research Context and Research Questions 
The research papers included in this doctoral thesis are embedded in the research context in 
the following section with respect to the above-stated objectives (cf. Fig. I-4). The 
respective research questions are motivated accordingly.  
 
Figure I-4: Research papers embedded in the research context 
The research papers in section II address different research gaps in terms of risk 
identification. In line with the identified research needs in this particular phase of the risk 
management process, the research papers in section II address both an overall level as well 
as the sports sector in particular. Specifically, research paper 1 focuses on why non-financial 
firms hedge their risks.
7
 Therefore, the paper conducts, in all conscience, one of the first 
multivariate meta-analyses in corporate finance, thus providing a type of “meta-risk 
identification” applicable for non-financial companies in different sectors. Research paper 2 
focuses on the sports sector and particularly on the soccer sector. Specifically, the paper 
contributes to the high impact of sporting performance risk on stock markets, by identifying 
the main risk drivers in terms of soccer matches and competitions on stock markets. To draw 
a comprehensive picture, the paper conducts a systematic literature review and aggregates 
existing findings by means of the vote counting method (Aretz and Bartram 2010). 
The papers embedded in section III deal with the treatment of risks. Both research papers in 
this section provide original empirical evidence on risk treatment measures with respect to 
different sectors. In particular, research paper 3 focuses on the financial sector, analyzing the 
                                            
7
 Research paper 1 solely investigates non-financial firms, as firms from the financial sector do not use 
derivatives exclusively for hedging purposes, but also for trading or speculative activities (e.g., Gay and Nam, 
1998). 
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pricing on the German secondary market. Further, the paper examines how the pricing of 
structured financial products as an instrument for credit default risk treatment (as proposed 
by, e.g., Neal 1996) changed during and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Finally, 
research paper 4 focuses on the industrial sector, proposing the convenience yield, which is 
derived from the term structure of commodity futures as an indicator of future supply risk. 
Connecting both financial instruments, such as futures contracts, and commodity risk 
management, the paper examines whether the convenience yield can be used as an early 
warning regarding a commodity’s future supply risks. 
I.2.1 Section II: Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 
Research Paper 1: “What do we really know about corporate hedging? A multimethod 
meta-analytical study” 
Numerous studies in financial research have empirically investigated the theoretical 
explanations and sound theories for corporate hedging. Despite the large number of studies 
performed, or perhaps because of this number, the empirical evidence is mixed (Aretz and 
Bartram 2010; Bartram et al. 2009; Fauver and Naranjo 2010). This inconsistency in 
empirical findings can arise from the fact that results of a single empirical study are 
inherently restricted to a certain study design, observation period, country-specific attributes, 
and various variable selections and variable definitions. For instance, some studies 
particularly claim the reduction of bankruptcy financial distress costs (e.g., Judge 2004) as 
central for risk management, while some other studies note the reduction of agency cost of 
debt (e.g., Berrospide et al. 2008), and some papers find no evidence at all (e.g., Sprčić and 
Šević 2012). In order to obtain a clear picture from the existing literature, research paper 1 
aims to provide new evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging by conducting three 
different approaches from the category of quantitative meta-reviews: (1) vote counting, (2) 
univariate meta-analysis, and (3) multivariate meta-analysis. Each of the analyses in 
research paper 1 tests the following hypotheses in order to identify determinants of hedging 
behavior and various sources of risk: corporate tax; bankruptcy and financial distress costs; 
asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity; coordination of financing and 
investment policy and agency conflicts of debt. With this, the research paper addresses the 
following research questions: 
 Which determinants influence corporate hedging behavior? 
 How can the research method of multivariate meta-analyses be applied in the context of 
financial research? 
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Research Paper 2: “How do soccer matches and competitions really influence stock 
markets? A review of recent empirical evidence.” 
The era is long gone in which soccer was solely a type of sport. The meaning of soccer for 
the global economy has significantly broadened over the past decades. Soccer clubs’ 
economic relevance has particularly increased in the past decade. To pick up the example 
from section I, the revenue of the FC Bayern Munich AG increased from 166.3 million € in 
the fiscal year 2003-2004 to 480 million € in 2013-2014, an increase of approximately 290% 
in ten years. This increase is strongly driven by the club’s enormous sporting success during 
this decade, with six national championship titles, six wins in the domestic cup, and one win 
of the UEFA Champions League. Although Bayern Munich is an example of a club that is 
not market-listed, there are 22 soccer clubs listed across European stock markets. In 
literature, numerous studies have been conducted to explore the influence of soccer clubs’, 
and even the national team’s, sporting success on stock markets. Despite, or perhaps because 
of, a vast number of studies, empirical findings are still quite mixed. Analogous to research 
paper 1, the heterogeneous findings are predominantly reasoned in differing data samples, 
objects of study, and differing methodological approaches. In order to obtain a clearer and 
aggregated picture from the existing literature and thus on the influence of operational risks 
related to sporting success on stock markets, research paper 2 predominantly aims to provide 
a systematic review of the different studies by means of the vote counting method. Due to 
the heterogeneity of study designs and the lack of data sets provided in the different studies, 
the conduction of a meta-analysis in line with research paper 1 was not applicable. In 
particular, research paper 2 covers and analyzes 42 studies in detail. In addition, facilitated 
by soccer’s characteristic that information about matches becomes available for all market 
participants simultaneously, and that soccer strongly influences investors’ sentiments and 
thus their investment decisions (Lucey and Dowling 2005), soccer is an adequate subject to 
test the efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral alternative hypothesis, respectively. 
In accordance with this, soccer club matches as well as national teams in the course of 
soccer events are considered (e.g., the FIFA World Cup), as these events also affect a 
multitude of people and their sentiments. With this, the research paper addresses the 
following research questions: 
 Referring to the current state of the art, are stock markets generally influenced by 
soccer, and what are the main sport-related drivers for this influence? 
 Are stock markets in the context of soccer efficient, or driven by moods?  
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 Referring to the current state of the art, which methodological approaches and data 
sets have been examined in order to analyze the impact of soccer on stock markets? 
 Concerning the impact of soccer on stock markets, are there any research gaps that 
can be identified and that lead to recommendations for further research? 
I.2.2 Section III: Risk Treatment – Recent Empirical Evidence from the Financial 
and Industrial Sector 
Research Paper 3: “Market pricing of Credit Linked Notes - the influence of the financial 
crisis.” 
The popularity of structured financial products like CLN has strongly increased in recent 
years. For instance, the gross sales of structured retail investment products in 2010 
accounted for 174.2 billion € in Europe, 179.8 billion USD in the Asia-Pacific market, and 
65.1 billion USD in North America (Jørgensen et al. 2011). Although the aforementioned 
figures show that CLN contracts are very popular for investors, as they provide the 
opportunity for a high coupon payment, they are subject to controversial discussions in 
financial research and the public opinion. As already outlined in section I, one major point 
of criticism regarding such structured products is their lack of transparency regarding 
whether the coupon payments for, and the prices of, these instruments are fair and adequate 
compared with the related risk. This lack of transparency can have a direct impact on the 
demand for such products, and thus on the applicability as instruments for the treatment of 
credit default risks. Consequently, and thus enhancing the study by Rathgeber and Wang 
(2011), which focused on the market pricing of CLN in the primary market, research paper 3 
aims to test the presence of and reasons for CLN mispricing (i.e., the difference between a 
fair price and a quoted price) in the secondary market using a random effects panel 
regression model. In addition, research paper 3 analyzes how the mispricing of CLN 
changed during and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The financial crisis revealed the 
enormous complexity and inherent risks of structured financial products like CDS and CLN. 
Thus, investors’ behavior may have changed from risk-loving and only bounded-rational to 
more reflective, leaving CLN issuers less space for overpricing, and thus for an 
overcompensation of credit default risks. Therefore, this may have induced a decline in 
demand for such products. By testing the change in mispricing during and after the financial 
crisis, research paper 3 simultaneously examines the validity of the product life cycle 
hypothesis for CLN. With this, the research paper addresses the following research 
questions: 
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 Are daily prices of CLN contracts fair and adequate compared with the related risk? 
 If daily prices of CLN contracts are not fair, what are the reasons for the mispricing?  
 How did the pricing of CLN contracts change during and after the 2007-2009 
financial crisis? 
 Is a product life cycle observable for CLN contracts? 
Research Paper 4: “Is the convenience yield a good indicator of a commodity’s supply 
risk?” 
Due to the high relevance of industrial metals for the production of almost all industrial 
goods, such as cars and electronic devices, it is of high priority for companies from the 
industrial sector to treat potential supply risks adequately in regard to these commodities. 
Otherwise, disruptions in the production process are possible. In the occurrence of low stock 
levels, and particularly in just-in-time production strategies, a short delay in supply can 
cause production disruptions and financial losses for a single company, or, due to the 
increasing global cross-linking of supplier networks, even for the economic system as a 
whole (Hallikas et al. 2002; Harland et al. 2003). The threat of disruptions in the production 
process, combined with increasing production and consumption of industrial metals as well 
as the increasing financialization of commodity markets in recent years (European 
Commission 2010), makes manufacturers’ assessment of the future availability of 
commodities increasingly important. As already outlined in section I, indicators for the 
future availability of a commodity should provide managers and policy makers with 
appropriate, easy, and continuously accessible information. As the literature lacks such an 
indicator, research paper 4 proposes the convenience yield, which is derived from the term 
structure of commodity futures as an early warning indicator of future supply risk. 
According to literature, the convenience yield can be interpreted as the benefit of having the 
commodity physically in stock (Copeland et al. 2004; Geman 2005). In order to check the 
applicability of this benefit as a short- to medium-term forward-looking indicator for future 
supply risk, research paper 4 examines the relationship between the convenience yield and 
the future inventory level respectively spot price by means of various regression models. 
Thereby, this research paper refers to convenience yields calculated from trading prices and 
inventory data of the London Metal Exchange (LME) for five major industrial metals 
(aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc) with different maturities (3, 15, and 27 months). 
With this, the research paper addresses the following research questions: 
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 What are the general indicators for a commodity’s future supply risk, and what are 
the requirements for a feasible indicator of short-term supply risks in particular? 
 Is the convenience yield (i.e., the benefit derived from having the commodity 
physically in stock) a good indicator of a commodity’s future supply risk? 
After this introduction, which aims at outlining the objectives and the structure of this 
doctoral thesis as well as at motivating the research context and formulating the fundamental 
research questions accordingly, the respective research papers are presented in sections II 
and III. Subsequently, the key findings are summarized and starting points for future 
research are highlighted in section IV.  
I Introduction 17 
I.3 References 
Acharya V, Philippon T, Richardson M, Roubini N (2009) The Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009: Causes and Remedies. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 18, 89-137. 
Aebi V, Sabato G, Schmid M (2012) Risk management, corporate governance, and bank 
performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance 36, 3213-3226. 
Albrecht P, Maurer R (2008) Investment- und Risikomanagement: Modelle, Methoden, 
Anwendungen. Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart. 
Aretz K, Bartram SM (2010) Corporate hedging and shareholder value. Journal of Financial 
Research 33, 317-371. 
Arrow KJ (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing. Yrjo Jahnssonis Saatio, Helsinki. 
Bandyopadhyay K, Mykytyn PP, Mykytyn K (1999) A framework for integrated risk 
management in information technology. Management Decision 37, 437-445. 
Bartmann P, Buhl HU, Hertel M (2009) Ursachen und Auswirkungen der Subprime-Krise. 
Informatik-Spektrum 32, 127-145. 
Bartram SM (2000) Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation. 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 9, 279-324. 
Bartram SM, Brown GW, Fehle FR (2009) International Evidence on Financial Derivatives 
Usage. Financial Management 38, 185-206. 
BDI (2011) Risikomanagement 2.0 –Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen aus einer Befragung in 
mittelständischen deutschen Unternehmen. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers AG, Berlin Frankfurt am Main. 
Beasley MS, Clune R, Hermanson DR (2005) Enterprise risk management: An empirical 
analysis of factors associated with the extent of implementation. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy 24, 521-531. 
Beech J, Chadwick S (2013) The Business of Sport Management. 2nd ed. Pearson 
Education, Essex. 
Berrospide JM, Purnanandam A, Rajan U (2008) Corporate Hedging, Investment and 
Value. 35th Annual Meeting of the European Finance Association, Athens, Greece. 
Birkenhäuser S, Kaserer C, Urban D (2015) Investor Presence and Competition in Major 
European football Leagues. Working Paper, Technische Universität München. 
BIS (2001) The New Basel Capital Accord. Bank for International Settlements, Basel. 
Brunnermeier M, Pedersen LH (2009) Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of 
Financial Studies 22, 2201-2238. 
I Introduction 18 
Campello M, Graham JR, Harvey CR (2010) The real effects of financial constraints: 
Evidence from a financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 97, 470-487. 
Carlsson C, Fullér R, Heikkilä M, Majlender P (2007) A fuzzy approach to R&D project 
portfolio selection. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 44, 93-105. 
Claessens S, Tong H, Wei S-J (2012) From the financial crisis to the real aconomy: Using 
firm-level data to identify transmission channels. Journal of International Economics 
88, 375-387. 
Copeland T, Weston JF, Shastri K (2004) Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. 4th ed. 
Addison-Wesley Longman, Amsterdam. 
Creti A, Joëts M, Mignon V (2013) On the links between stock and commodity markets' 
volatility. Energy Economics 37, 16-28. 
Crotty J (2009) Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the 
‘new financial architecture’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, 563-580. 
DFP (2013) Dangerous Financial Products. Retrieved from http://www.dangerous-
finance.eu/. 
Dorfmann MS, Cather D (2012) Introduction to Risk Management and Insurance. 10th ed. 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Dougal C, Parsons C, Titman S (2015) Urban vibrancy and corporate growth. Journal of 
Finance 70, 163-210. 
Duffie D (2007) Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability. 
Working Paper, Stanford University. 
European Commission (2010) Critical raw materials for the EU - report of the ad-hoc 
working group on defining critical raw materials. Brussels. 
EY (2013) Remaking financial services: risk management five years after the crisis – A 
survey of major financial institutions. EY Global Banking & Capital Markets Center, 
New York London. 
Fauver L, Naranjo A (2010) Derivative Usage and Firm Value: The Influence of Agency 
Costs and Monitoring Problems. Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 719-735. 
FCB (2014) Konzernabschluss zum Geschäftsjahr vom 01.07.2013 bis zum 30.06.2014. FC 
Bayern München AG, München. 
Foucault T, Fresard L (2014) Learning from peers’ stock prices and corporate investment. 
Journal of Financial Economics 111, 554-577. 
Gay GD, Nam J (1998) The Underinvestment Problem and Corporate Derivatives Use. 
Financial Management 27, 53-69. 
I Introduction 19 
Geman H (2005) Commodities and Commodity Derivatives: Modelling and Pricing for 
Agriculturals, Metals and Energy. 1st ed. John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex. 
Gleißner W, Romeike F (2005) Risikomanagement: Umsetzung - Werkzeuge - 
Risikobewertung. Haufe, Freiburg. 
Gleißner W (2008) Grundlagen des Risikomanagements im Unternehmen. Verlag Vahlen, 
München. 
Graedel T, Barr R, Chandler C, Chase T, Choi J, Christoffersen L, Friedlander E, Henly C, 
Jun C, Nassar NT (2012) Methodology of metal criticality determination. 
Environmental Science & Technology 46, 1063-1070. 
Hall BH (2002) The Financing of Research and Development. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 18, 35-51. 
Hallikas J, Virolainen V, Tuominen M (2002) Risk analysis and assessment in network 
environments: A dyadic case study. International Journal of Production Economics 78, 
45-55. 
Hallikas J, Karvonen I, Pulkkinen U, Virolainen V, Tuominen M (2004) Risk management 
processes in supplier networks. International Journal of Production Economics 90, 47-
58. 
Harland C, Brenchley R, Walker H (2003) Risk in Supply Networks. Journal of Purchasing 
& Supply Management 9, 51–62. 
Harvey CR (1995) Predictable Risk and Returns in Emerging Markets. The Review of 
Financial Studies 8, 773-816. 
Henderson BJ, Pearson ND, Wang L (2014) New Evidence on the Financialization of 
Commodity Markets. The Review of Financial Studies (forthcoming). 
Hillson D (2002) Extending the risk process to manage opportunities. International Journal 
of Project Management 20, 235-240. 
Hull JC (2010) Risk Management and Financial Institutions. 2nd ed. Pearson Education, 
Boston. 
Huth C, Breuer C (2011) Volatility problems in professional European soccer clubs. 19th 
Conference of the European Association for Sport Management, Barcelona, Spain. 
Huther A (2003) Integriertes Chancen- und Risikomanagement – Zur ertrags- und 
risikoorientierten Steuerung von Real- und Finanzinvestitionen in der 
Industrieunternehmung. Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Wiesbaden. 
Ittner CD, Keusch T (2015) The Influence of Board of Directors’ Risk Oversight on Risk 
Management Maturity and Firm Risk-Taking. Working Paper, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
I Introduction 20 
Jørgensen PL, Nørholm H, Skovmand D (2011) Overpricing and Hidden Costs of Structured 
Bonds for Retail Investors: Evidence from the Danish Market for Principal Protected 
Notes. Working Paper, University of Aarhus. 
Judge A (2004) The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging by UK Non-Financial 
Firms. Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management Association 2004, 
Basel, Switzerland. 
Leary MT, Roberts MR (2014) Do peer firms affect corporate financial policy? Journal of 
Finance 69, 139-178. 
Lucey BM, Dowling M (2005) The role of feelings in investor decision-making. Journal of 
Economic Surveys 19, 211-237. 
March JG, Shapira Z (1987) Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking. 
Management Science 33, 1404-1418. 
McNeil AJ, Frey R, Embrechts P (2015) Quantitative Risk Management: Conepts, 
Techniques and Tools. Revised 2nd ed. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Merna T, Al-Thani F (2010) Corporate Risk Management. 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester. 
Nance DR, Smith CW, Smithson CW (1993) On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging. 
Journal of Finance 48, 267-284 
Neal RS (1996) Credit Derivatives: New Financial Instruments for Controlling Credit Risk. 
Economic Review 81, 14-27. 
Nikolaou K (2009) Liquidity (Risk) Concepts - Definitions and Interactions. Working Paper 
Series No. 1008, Eurpean Central Bank. 
Nocco BW, Stulz RM (2006) Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 18, 8-20. 
Perridon L, Steiner M, Rathgeber AW (2012) Finanzwirtschaft der Unternehmung. 16th ed. 
Vahlen, München. 
Pratt JW (1964) Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometria 32, 122-136. 
Project Management Institute (2013) A Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK Guide). Project Management Institut, Inc, Newton Square. 
Raff K, Verwijmeren P (2015) Learning from Other Firms’ Investments: Corporate 
Governance and Firm Entry. Working Paper, Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus 
School of Economics. 
Rappaport A (1986) Creating Shareholder Value: A Guide for Managers and Investors: The 
New Standard for Business Performance. 1st ed. Free Press, New York. 
I Introduction 21 
Rathgeber A, Wang Y (2011) Market Pricing of Credit Linked Notes: The Case of Retail 
Structured Products in Germany. Journal of Credit Risk 7, 73-101. 
Rejda GE, McNamara M (2014) Principles of Risk Management and Insurance. 12th ed. 
Pearson Education, New Jersey.  
Roe MJ (2011) The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator. 
Stanford Law Review 63, 539-590. 
Rosenau-Tornow D, Buchholz P, Riemann A, Wagner M (2009) Assessing the long-term 
supply risks for mineral raw materials – a combined evaluation of past and future 
trends. Resources Policy 34, 161-175. 
Sabato G (2010) Financial Crisis: Where Did Risk Management Fail? International Review 
of Applied Financial Issues and Economics 2, 315-327. 
Schlösser A (2011) Pricing and Risk Management of Synthetic CDOs. Springer, Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
Sevil T, Kamişli S, Kamişli M (2014) Analyzing the Interactions between European Sport 
Indexes. International Journal of Business and Social Science 5, 57-62. 
Soin K, Collier P (2013) Risk and risk management in management accounting and control. 
Management Accounting Research 24, 82-87. 
Sprčić MD, Tekavčič M, Šević Ž (2008) A Review of the Rationales for Corporate Risk 
Management: Fashion or the Need? International Journal of Economic Sciences and 
Applied Research 1, 71-99. 
Stoneburner G, Goguen A, Feringa A (2002) Risk management guide for information 
technology systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special 
Publication 800(30), Washington. 
Stulz RM (2010) Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 24, 73-92. 
Szymanski S (2015) Money and Soccer: A Soccernomics Guide. Nation Books, New York. 
Wolf K (2003) Risikomanagement im Kontext der wertorientierten Unternehmensführung. 
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Wiesbaden. 
Wolke T (2008) Risikomanagement. Oldenbourg, München. 
Wolz M (2001) Zum Stand der Umsetzung von Risikomanagementsystemen aus der Sicht 
börsennotierter Aktiengesellschaften und ihrer Prüfer – Eine empirische Studie. Die 
Wirtschaftsprüfung 54, 789-801. 
 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 22 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 
The research papers in section II focus on different aspects regarding the identification of 
risks. Risk identification is one of the major challenges within corporate risk management. 
Without the knowledge and awareness of different internal or external threats, risk 
management can only be performed in a reactive way - i.e., loss limitation - instead of in a 
proactive way (Hallikas et al. 2004). Comparable with similar learning spillover effects, one 
instrument of risk identification is learning from other companies, i.e., to examine why other 
companies do hedge. As the existing empirical findings regarding the reasons for corporate 
hedging are rather heterogeneous, a question arises as to which determinants really influence 
hedging behavior. 
Consequently, the first research paper, “What do we really know about corporate hedging? 
A multimethod meta-analytical study”, provides aggregated evidence on the determinants of 
non-financial firms’ hedging behavior by conducting a multivariate meta-analysis. Thereby, 
the research paper uses a unique sample of 132 empirical studies, including more than 
100,000 companies. By doing so, strong evidence for the bankruptcy and financial distress 
hypothesis. Also, the meta-analysis reveals weak support for the corporate tax hypothesis 
and the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt 
hypothesis.  
Due to the lack of theoretical and empirical contributions regarding risk management in 
soccer clubs, the second research paper, “How do soccer matches and competitions really 
influence stock markets? A review of recent empirical evidence”, contributes to the closure 
of the research gap between the structured identification of risk and soccer teams’ sporting 
success. The research paper provides a comprehensive review of recent empirical evidence 
from 42 studies and aggregates the existing knowledge to an overall level. By doing so, the 
paper shows that (1) soccer in general influences stock returns, and (2) losses and draws 
especially seem to influence investor sentiments, and even stock markets, in a negative way. 
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II.1 Research Paper 1: “What do we really know about corporate 
hedging? A multimethod meta-analytical study” 
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Abstract: 
We provide new evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging by conducting the very 
first multivariate meta-analysis in corporate finance. Hereby we use a unique sample of 132 
empirical studies including more than 100,000 companies. Our results indicate a strong 
evidence for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis. Moreover, we find weak 
support for the corporate tax and the coordination of financing and investment policy and 
agency conflicts of debt hypotheses. Regarding the asymmetric information and agency 
conflicts of equity hypothesis, we find no explanatory power. 
JEL-classification: G30, C32 
  
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 24 
II.1.1 Introduction 
The motivation for non-financial firms to engage in corporate hedging has been one of the 
most intensively discussed topics in financial research. Although the use of hedging 
instruments cannot be explained in a Modigliani and Miller (1958) world assuming a perfect 
capital market, more recent financial theory shows that hedging may increase firm value 
when frictions are present in the capital market (Bessembinder 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie 
1991; Froot et al. 1993; Smith and Stulz 1985). In the meantime, many studies have 
empirically investigated the theoretical explanations for corporate hedging. However, 
despite or perhaps exactly because of the huge number of studies, the empirical evidence is 
quite mixed (Aretz and Bartram 2010; Bartram et al. 2009; Fauver and Naranjo 2010; Judge 
2006). This discordance in empirical findings can arise from the fact that results of a single 
empirical study are inherently restricted to a certain study design, observation period, 
country-specific attributes, and various variable selections and definitions. For example, 
some empirical papers particularly claim some or one of the following aspects to be central 
for risk management: corporate tax avoidance (e.g., Berkman and Bradbury 1996), reduction 
of bankruptcy financial distress costs (e.g., Judge 2004), reduction of agency cost of equity 
(e.g., Fok et al. 1997), and reduction of agency cost of debt (e.g., Berrospide et al. 2008). 
Contrarily, some papers find no evidence at all (e.g., Sprčić and Šević 2012). In order to 
obtain a clear picture from the existing literature, there are generally two opportunities 
imaginable:  
1. Conduction of a large sample study. However, because different data sources 
(even in different legal regimes and languages) are needed, it is relatively 
difficult to successfully complete this task.  
2. Conduction of a review. Here, secondary data from empirical studies on 
corporate hedging can be aggregated to condense the literature, which is 
otherwise hard to digest. 
In the second case, there are two classes of meta-reviews: qualitative and quantitative 
reviews. As the qualitative procedure for synthesizing the studies depends on the reviewer 
and not on objective criteria, qualitative reviews are highly subjective. In contrast, 
quantitative reviews provide a more objective approach based on statistical measures. A 
simple form of a quantitative review is vote counting, which compares the number of 
statistically significant results for and against a certain hypothesis.  
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Aretz and Bartram (2010) conduct this procedure to present the state of the art in empirical 
research concerning explanations for corporate hedging in 31 primary studies. The major 
finding of their study is that they state “surprisingly mixed empirical support for rationales 
of hedging with derivatives at the firm level” (Aretz and Bartram 2010, p. 318). Some 
evidence exists for the coordinated financing and investment hypothesis. In addition, most 
proxy variables used to test whether corporate hedging can lower agency costs and whether 
corporate risk management alleviates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
lead to fairly mixed results. Regarding the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis, 
there is some support regarding the long-term debt. Furthermore, they find weak support for 
the tax hypothesis. 
However, the main drawback of the vote counting method is the fact that each study 
receives an equally weighted vote, regardless of sample size and variance of the observed 
outcome. To circumvent this problem, Arnold et al. (2014) provide a univariate meta-
analysis on that topic. They synthesize 15 proxy variables used to test the hedging 
hypotheses across 37 primary studies, and conduct separate univariate meta-analyses for 
each of their proxies. Their main result is that financial distress costs induce firms to hedge, 
which is in line with Aretz and Bartram (2010). In addition, they find weak evidence that the 
underinvestment problem and the dependence on costly external financing influence 
hedging behavior, which is mainly consistent with Aretz and Bartram (2010). Furthermore, 
taxes and agency conflicts of equity do not show explanatory power at all. This result 
deviates from Aretz and Bartram (2010). As a consequence of using univariate meta-
analysis, they do not take into account interactions between the examined proxy variables. 
For example, in the case of existing corporate taxes, a combination of several influencing 
factors determines corporate hedging’s firm value creation, such as volatility of pre-tax 
income, convexity of the tax function, and amount of tax payments. Riley (2009) shows that 
ignoring these dependencies in a meta-analysis can lead to a heavily biased estimation of the 
aggregated results. Furthermore, independent testing of correlated effects increases the 
chance of finding spuriously significant results (Bender et al. 2008). 
In contrast, a multivariate meta-analysis offsets these shortcomings. It simultaneously 
integrates all outcomes from a sample of primary studies and accounts for their interactions 
in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the topic (Jackson et al. 2011; Mavridis and 
Salanti 2013; Nam et al. 2003).  
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Therefore, the aim of this paper is as follows: we provide new evidence on the determinants 
of corporate hedging by conducting the first multivariate meta-analysis in this research area. 
In our analysis we test the following specific hypotheses (and corresponding proxy 
variables): corporate tax (proxy: tax-loss carryforwards (binary)), bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs (proxies: dividend yield (continuous), interest coverage ratio, leverage ratio, 
liquidity, profitability, size, tangible assets), asymmetric information and agency conflicts of 
equity (proxies: institutional investors, option ownership (continuous), share ownership), 
and coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt (proxies: 
Capex, research and development, sales growth rate, Tobin's Q). Thereby, we significantly 
extend the sample of 37 studies analyzed by Arnold et al. (2014) to a total of 132 studies, 
including published as well as unpublished literature. In addition, we apply vote counting 
and the univariate meta-analysis as robustness tests. In this combination, we can take more 
proxy variables into account amongst many others, because these methods have fewer 
requirements, especially regarding necessary data. Last but not least, we emphasize different 
biases that can appear in quantitative reviews. In particular, we deal with the so-called 
publication and data mining biases. In case of the latter, we follow the concept of multiple 
testing, introduced by Harvey et al. (2014). For the conduction of a high-quality review, we 
follow the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions as a general 
framework for our analyses (Higgins and Green 2011).  
Our multivariate findings indicate strong evidence for the bankruptcy and financial distress 
hypothesis. In this respect, we find positive signs regarding the proxy variables dividend 
yield (continuous) and liquidity (each at a significance level of 5%) as well as size (at a 
significance level of 1%). In addition, we find some support for the corporate tax hypothesis, 
as well as weak support for the theory that the underinvestment and asset substitution 
problem, as well as the lack of internal funds for investing in profitable investments, induce 
firms to hedge. In this context, there is a positive sign for the proxy variable research and 
development at a significance level of 10%. Moreover, regarding the corporate tax 
hypothesis, there is a positive relationship between the use of hedging instruments and the 
tax-loss carryforwards (binary) at a significance level of 10%. However, we cannot provide 
consistent evidence for the hypothesis that hedging alleviates asymmetric information and 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Hence, our results partly contradict 
the outcomes from previous vote counting and univariate reviews by Aretz and Bartram 
(2010) and Arnold et al. (2014). 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II.1-2 provides an overview of 
the four basic hypotheses of firm value creation by corporate hedging. Section II.1-3 serves 
as a short introduction to the methodology of (multivariate) meta-analysis. Section II.1-4 
covers literature search and data preparation. Section II.1-5 reports empirical findings, which 
thereupon are discussed in Section II.1-6. Section II.1-7 concludes the paper. 
II.1.2 Determinants of Corporate Hedging 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management and thus corporate hedging 
activities add no value to the firm as they can be fully replicated by shareholders’ own 
transactions in the capital market. However, this proposition only holds under the 
assumption of a perfect capital market. By incorporating capital market imperfections, 
scholars have developed several hypotheses explaining why hedging at the firm level can 
add value to shareholders (e.g., Bessembinder 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Froot et al. 
1993; Smith and Stulz 1985).  
These theoretical hypotheses can be classified into two major theories, depending on the 
general meaning of corporate hedging, which is either the maximization of shareholder 
value or the maximization of manager’s private utility (Sprčić et al. 2008). In this study, we 
focus on the shareholder value maximization theory. The small number of empirical studies 
examining hypotheses related to the managerial utility maximization theory indicates that 
this is in line with the majority of previous literature (e.g., Aretz and Bartram 2010; Arnold 
et al. 2014; Guay and Kothari 2003). Within the shareholder value maximization theory, we 
review four hypotheses which explain how corporate hedging increases firm value by (1) 
reducing the corporate tax burden, (2) lowering bankruptcy and financial distress costs, (3) 
mitigating asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity, as well as (4) improving 
the coordination of financing and investment policy and alleviating agency conflicts of debt. 
As these hypotheses are similar to those reviewed by Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold 
et al. (2014), we can later compare results on a hypothesis-level. 
Hereinafter, we give a short review of the four hypotheses mentioned above. Furthermore, 
we report the proxy variables
8
 used to test whether firms with properties according to the 
hedging hypotheses are more likely to hedge. In addition, for each of the hypotheses we 
report the hypothetical sign for the different proxy variables as well as their definitions. The 
variable descriptions are therefore similar to those in Aretz and Bartram (2010), with 
differences remarked on accordingly. Further, to gather a comprehensive overview of the 
existing empirical body of knowledge regarding the four aforementioned corporate hedging 
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 See Section 4 for the selection criteria of the proxy variables. 
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hypotheses in reference to each of the corresponding proxy variables, we present a schedular 
overview of the primary studies providing (in)significant positive or negative statistical 
evidence, with respect to a probability level of 5%. 
 Corporate Taxes II.1.2.1
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that if a firm faces a convex tax function (i.e., taxes increase 
overproportionally with taxable income) corporate hedging can increase post-tax firm value 
by reducing volatility of pre-tax income. This is due to Jensen’s inequality as less volatile 
cash flows lead to a lower expected tax liability. Thus, we receive the following hypothesis 
H1: 
- Hypothesis H1: There is a relationship between corporate taxes and the firm’s 
hedging decision. 
Appendix I provides an overview of the relevant proxy variables used to test the corporate 
tax hypothesis, the corresponding hypothesized signs, variable descriptions as well as the 
empirical findings of the primary studies examining the respective relations. 
Accordingly, we estimate the relative convexity of the tax functions through two variables: 
tax-loss carryforwards and tax credits (Graham and Smith 1999; Zimmerman 1983). Both 
extend the convex portion of the tax function and thus we expect that firms with higher tax 
credits, tax-loss carryforwards (binary) and tax-loss carryforwards (continuous) have greater 
incentives to hedge (Nance et al. 1993).  
 Bankruptcy and Financial Distress Costs II.1.2.2
Volatile future cash flows and a high leverage may induce situations in which a firm’s 
liquidity is insufficient to fully meet its contractually fixed payment obligations. This 
increases the risk of bankruptcy and the firm encounters direct and indirect costs of financial 
distress (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Since corporate hedging lowers cash flow volatility 
and thus the probability of the company’s default, it reduces expected costs of financial 
distress and thus adds value to the firm (Smith and Stulz 1985). Thus, we receive the 
following hypothesis H2: 
- Hypothesis H2: There is a relationship between bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs and the firm’s hedging decision. 
We test the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis with thirteen different proxy 
variables, which are subsequently presented in Appendix J. 
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First, we use the firm’s leverage ratio, debt maturity and interest coverage ratio, since they 
indicate probability of financial distress. As explained in the passage above, we assume a 
positive relation between the firm’s leverage ratio and its hedging behavior. The same trend 
should appear for firms with more debt maturation in the short-term. The interest coverage 
ratio is expected to have a negative association with corporate hedging, since a higher 
interest coverage ratio implies that more pretax income is necessary to satisfy fixed payment 
obligations (Bartram et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, we use availability of short-term funds represented by cash flow availability 
and liquidity as proxies for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis. Liquid firms 
should have a lower risk of financial distress and thus both variables are assumed to be 
negatively correlated with the firm’s hedging activity (Froot et al. 1993).  
Convertible debt and preferred stocks constrain a firm financially (Géczy et al. 1997). 
However, at the same time, they lower agency conflicts of debt (Nance et al. 1993). Thus, 
we cannot predict a relationship between these two variables and the firm’s hedging 
behavior. The influence of the dividend yield on corporate hedging is also conceivable in 
both directions. It can be argued that firms with higher dividend payouts are more liquid and 
thus have less incentive to hedge (Nance et al. 1993). In contrast, firms exhausting their 
liquidity by paying dividends may be more likely to engage in corporate hedging, as they 
have additional financial constraints from their shareholders (Haushalter 2000). We measure 
a firm’s dividend policy with a binary and a continuous variable.  
More profitable firms are expected to encounter fewer situations of financial distress and 
thus should have fewer incentives to hedge. Furthermore, as indirect costs of financial 
distress are disproportional to size (Myers 1977), we hypothesize that larger firms are less 
likely to protect against bankruptcy. Moreover, as tangible assets can be easily sold in the 
case of bankruptcy, firms with a higher level of tangible assets should have a lower 
probability of financial distress (Aretz and Bartram 2010). Finally, we use tax-loss 
carryforwards as a proxy for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis. Since tax-loss 
carryforwards arise from past losses, this proxy variable indicates financial distress and we 
thusly assume a positive influence on a firm’s hedging behavior. 
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 Asymmetric Information and Agency Conflicts of Equity9 II.1.2.3
DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1991) model states that information asymmetries can arise from a 
manager’s proprietary information on the firm’s dividend stream. Due to such preferred 
access to corporate information, shareholders cannot fully replicate the firm’s hedging 
decision, thus allowing the firm to hedge more effectively than its shareholders. Since 
corporate hedging reduces the variability of the corporate cash flow and resulting “noise” in 
the firm’s dividend stream, shareholders have fewer costs for monitoring the firm and to 
rebalance their portfolios (DeMarzo and Duffie 1991). Thus, we receive the following 
hypothesis H3: 
- Hypothesis H3: There is a relationship between asymmetric information and 
agency conflicts of debt and the firm’s hedging decision. 
The proxy variables used to measure information asymmetry and agency conflicts of equity 
are presented in Appendix K. 
We measure information asymmetry by the number of shares held by institutional investors 
and the number of analysts following the firm, because both groups have privileged access 
to information and both bring this information into the market (Graham and Rogers 2002). 
Accordingly, firm earnings can be predicted with greater accuracy and lower dispersion; 
therefore, firms should be less likely to hedge (DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Dadalt et al. 
2002). Furthermore, as costs of information verification are very high for firms with more 
intangible assets, we use this as further proxy variable indicating information asymmetries 
(Baker and Gompers 2003) and expect firms with more intangible assets to have greater 
incentives to hedge (Choi et al. 2013). 
Moreover, in contrast to shareholders, managers cannot completely diversify their personal 
risk position (e.g., through future salaries, reputation or career opportunities). Whereas 
shareholders diversify their individual portfolio in the capital market, managers control their 
human capital only on a corporate level. This provides incentives for managers to hedge 
their individual human capital against risks that are diversifiable for shareholders (Amihud 
and Lev 1981). As corporate hedging decreases the variability of the firm value, it lowers 
the underlying risk imposed on the manager’s human capital. Consequently, firm value 
increases as managers demand less extra compensation for their non-diversifiable risk 
exposures (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995; Smith and Stulz 1985).  
                                            
9
 The agency conflicts of equity hypothesis can also be derived from the maximization of manager’s private 
utility theory. However, we follow Aretz and Bartram (2010), Arnold et al. (2014) and Guay and Kothari 
(2003), and classify this hypothesis under the shareholder value maximization theory. 
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We measure a manager’s personal risk position by the amount of CEO cash, which is the 
sum of CEO salary and bonus. We assume a negative relationship, since more CEO cash 
means that managers have more money available to invest in assets outside of the firm 
(Guay 1999). 
Moreover, an incentive for hedging can be given by manager incentive structures, which are 
typically tied to the firm’s market value. The positive effect of corporate hedging depends 
on the shape of the function between a manager’s expected utility and firm value. If this 
function is convex, which is the case when managers own stock options, there is no 
incentive to hedge, as a more volatile firm value increases the option price value (Black and 
Scholes 1973). Consequently, we use the manager’s option ownership (binary) and option 
ownership (continuous) as proxies with an unspecified predicted hypothesis sign. Most 
authors hypothesize a negative relation between managerial ownership and corporate 
hedging (see, e.g., Haushalter 2000; Tufano 1996). However, Gay and Nam (1998) argue 
that option ownership induces firms to hedge, as managerial stock option payoffs are often 
close to normal stock payoffs and thus (almost) linearly related to firm value. On the other 
hand, if the manager’s utility function is concave, which is usually the case when 
compensation is based on the stock price, every stock price movement directly leads to 
changes in the manager’s wage. A risk-averse manager has thus an incentive to hedge 
(Smith and Stulz 1985). Accordingly, we use the manager’s share ownership as a proxy for 
the agency conflicts of the equity hypothesis, and therefore expect a positive hypothesis 
sign.  
We also measure blockholder’s ownership, as large shareholders are usually well diversified 
and thus less likely to hedge than poorly diversified managers (Haushalter 2000; Tufano 
1996). However, the relationship may also be positive, as a greater percentage of large 
shareholders probably reduces agency conflicts and leads to fewer incentives to hedge 
(Marsden and Prevost 2005). Finally, according to May (1995), CEOs with a longer tenure 
are more risk averse and thus more likely to hedge, as they develop skills unique to the firm. 
In contrast, career concerns would suggest that younger managers have more incentive to 
hedge (Croci and Jankensgård 2014). Thus, the predicted sign of the proxy variable CEO 
tenure remains ambiguous. 
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 Coordination of Financing and Investment Policy and Agency Conflict of Debt II.1.2.4
High leverage and a low present value of the firm may give rise to the following agency 
conflicts of debt, as management has incentives under these conditions to transfer wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. Thus, we receive the following hypothesis H4: 
- Hypothesis H4: There is a relationship between coordination of financing and 
investment policy and agency conflicts of debt and the firm’s hedging decision. 
The proxy variables used to measure this hypothesis are presented in Appendix L. 
First, managers may forego positive net present value projects if the expected project gains 
must be used mainly to satisfy fixed payment obligations to the bondholders (Myers 1977). 
Corporate hedging can relieve this problem, as a reduction of cash flow variability increases 
the probability that shareholders are residual owners after reimbursing bondholders. This 
reduces the incentive to underinvest in profitable projects (Bessembinder 1991; Myers and 
Majluf 1984). As a result of corporate hedging activities, positive net present value projects 
are more often accepted, thereby increasing firm value. Moreover, when external financing 
is more costly than internal financing (Myers and Majluf 1984), firms may forgo profitable 
investments due to a lack of internal funds. Froot et al. (1993) show that under this 
condition, corporate hedging may be used as an instrument to coordinate the availability of 
internal funds. This ensures that firms have sufficient capital available to invest in value-
enhancing projects. 
Secondly, managers acting in the best interest of shareholders may replace low-risk assets 
with high-risk investments (Smith and Warner 1979). This is due to the fact that 
shareholders’ equity positions are a call option on the company’s assets, and high variance 
projects enlarge the option value (Mason and Merton 1985). However, this exchange of 
assets raises additional risk for fixed payment receivers. Hence, bondholders anticipating the 
opportunistic behavior of management claim higher returns or protective bond covenants, 
due to this increasing risk and higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Corporate 
hedging adds value to the firm by lowering the project’s risk and accordingly diminishing 
agency costs which arise from the managerial incentive of asset substitution (Campbell and 
Kracaw 1990).  
Underinvestment and asset substitution problems are more likely to occur in firms with 
significant growth opportunities and high leverage. Thus, we use the firm’s asset growth 
rate, capex, research and development expenses as well as sales growth rate as direct 
measures for the existence of available growth opportunities. The price-earnings-ratio and 
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Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) are indirect measures (Aretz and Bartram 2010). 
Moreover, firms with growth opportunities are expected to have market values far in excess 
of their book values and share prices higher than their earnings (Berkman and Bradbury 
1996; Mian 1996). Finally, as convertible debt resolves debt-related agency problems 
(Nance et al. 1993), we expect firms with more convertible debt to hedge less.  
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II.1.3 Methodology 
The objective of this meta-analysis is to comprehensively test the four above-mentioned 
hedging hypotheses on an aggregated empirical level across a broad set of primary studies. 
This allows drawing more powerful and generalized statements than any single empirical 
study could. In order to do so, we investigate the relationship between the proxies described 
in the previous section and the corporate hedging behavior, which is modeled by a dummy 
variable (“1” for the Hedgers and “0” for the Non-Hedgers)10. As an effect size for this 
relationship, we use the Pearson correlation coefficient. Due to the fact that the variance of 
the raw correlation strongly depends on the correlation coefficient itself, all computations 
are performed in the variance-stabilizing Fisher’s z-scale and are later transferred back into 
the correlation metric for interpretation.  
In order to aggregate these effect sizes across studies, we briefly present the core concepts of 
univariate meta-analysis according to Borenstein et al. (2009) and multivariate meta-analysis 
according to Becker (1992). The latter additionally accounts for the fact that when several 
proxy variables are extracted from the same study, dependencies must be taken into account. 
A more detailed insight into the methodology is presented in the numerical example in 
Appendix A. Besides the classical meta-analysis approach, we apply vote counting similarly 
to Aretz and Bartram (2010), which simply counts the number of statistically significant 
results for each proxy variable. 
Univariate Meta-Analysis 
Meta-analysis aims to derive the best estimate for the unknown population effect size by 
calculating a weighted mean correlation across all studies in the analysis. Hedges and Olkin 
(1985) show that the optimal weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗 for effect size 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝 from study 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘 
are given by the inverse sum of the within-study variation 𝜈𝑖𝑗 (which captures the sampling 
error) and the between-study variation 𝑇𝑗² (which captures the variance of the effect size 
parameters across the population of studies): 
                                                                 𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
1
𝜈𝑖𝑗+𝑇𝑗
2  
 (1) 
                                            
10 
In contrast, other studies (e.g., Belghitar et al. 2013; Graham and Rogers 2002; Knopf et al. 2002) propose a 
continuous hedging variable to measure the extent of hedging (e.g., the gross notional derivative value or the 
fair value of derivative contracts). However, studies using a hedging dummy variable routinely report the 
descriptive statistics for Hedgers and Non-Hedgers or a mean difference test between both groups, 
consequently providing us with sufficient information to extract correlations. In contrast, studies examining a 
continuous hedging variable do not usually present this information. Moreover, the number of studies using a 
dummy instead of a continuous hedging variable is much higher, and therefore a meta-analysis based on these 
studies yields more meaningful results. 
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Accordingly, study weights are assigned with the goal of minimizing both sources of 
variance. As 𝑇𝑗² is unknown, we apply a method of moments estimator (DerSimonian and 
Laird 1986). Using these weights, the transformed mean correlation ?̂?𝑗 is simply the 
weighted average of the transformed correlations 𝑧𝑖𝑗 observed from each study: 
                                                     ?̂?𝑗 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
  (2) 
Multivariate Meta-Analysis 
Usually, primary studies on corporate hedging test their hypotheses through multivariate 
analyses. For example, in the case of corporate taxes, a combination of several influencing 
factors like volatility of pre-tax income, convexity of the tax function, and amount of tax 
payments determines the value contribution of corporate hedging. Consequently, a 
multivariate analysis in primary studies also requires a multivariate aggregation of these 
effect sizes on a meta-level. Thus, in addition to 𝑝 correlations between the hedging variable 
and each proxy variable, correlations among the proxy variables themselves must also be 
considered. In the case that all proxy variables are available from the primary studies, we 
extract 𝑝∗ = 𝑝(𝑝 + 1)/2 correlations from each study of interest.  
Instead of the inverse variance from equation (1), the weights for the observed study effect 
sizes from study i are accordingly given by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix 𝑺𝑖, 
where the diagonal elements capture the study specific effect size variation and the off-
diagonal elements are the estimated
11
 covariances between them. Again, we estimate the 
between-study variation for each effect size using a method of moments estimator for each 
set of transformed correlations (Raudenbush, 2009), which leads to the 𝑝∗ × 𝑝∗-matrix 𝑻𝟐. 
The weights can be calculated by adding 𝑻𝟐 to each study-specific covariance-matrix 𝑺𝑖. 
The multivariate weights are used in a GLS estimator for the z-transformed mean correlation 
vector ?̂?, which is, according to Raudenbush et al. (1988), given by 
                            ?̂? = (𝑿′𝑺−1𝑿)−1𝑿′𝑺−1𝑧. (3) 
Here, ?̂? is a 𝑝∗ ×  1 column vector, whose elements are the effect size parameters to be 
estimated. X is an indicator matrix with k stacked 𝑝∗ × 𝑝∗ identity matrices that show which 
correlations are given in each study. 𝑺 is a block-diagonal variance-covariance matrix 
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 To estimate the covariances, we apply the large sample approximation according to Olkin and Siotani 
(1976). 
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containing the k study specific variance-covariance matrices 𝑺𝑖 + 𝑻
𝟐 on its diagonal. 𝑧 is a 
𝑘𝑝∗ column vector storing the observed effect sizes 𝑝∗ from all k studies.  
Finally, we use the estimated mean correlations ?̂? for multiple regression model with the 
proxy variables as predictors and the hedging dummy as dependent variable. The 
standardized regression slopes in this linear model are given by  
                                        𝑏 = 𝑹𝑋𝑋
−1𝑹𝑋𝑌, (4) 
with 𝑏 as a 𝑝 × 1 vector of standardized regression coefficients, and 𝑹 as the GLS 
estimator ?̂? from equation (3), transformed back into the correlation scale and organized as a 
matrix. 𝑹𝑌𝑋 (=𝑹𝑋𝑌) is a 𝑝 × 1 matrix with the correlations between the hedging variable Y 
and each proxy variable X, where p is the number of proxies used as predictors. 𝑹𝑋𝑋 is a 
𝑝 × 𝑝 matrix with the correlations between the proxy variables themselves. 
II.1.4 Data 
We employ multiple search techniques to identify prior empirical literature examining the 
determinants of corporate hedging. Our search process consists of the following six steps, 
outlined briefly
12
: definition of the inclusion criteria, search in electronic databases for 
published literature, search for gray literature, backward search, search in author’s 
publication lists, and forward search.  
Studies included in the meta-analysis met the following criteria: (1) As argued before, we 
require the hedging decision to be modeled as a dummy variable in the primary studies. (2) 
The correlation coefficient between the proxies and the hedging dummy should either be 
reported directly in the study, or there must otherwise be sufficient data from the descriptive 
statistics (e.g., t-statistic from a test with independent groups or the standardized mean 
difference between the Hedgers and Non-Hedgers group) to replicate the correlations
13
. If 
this is not given, the authors of the study must provide us with the required effect size data 
in order to be included in the analysis. (3) Additionally, for multivariate meta-analysis the 
correlations among the proxy variables should be stated in the primary study. However, this 
is not a necessary requirement to be included, as the relationship between the dummy and 
the proxies also carries information usable in a multivariate meta-analysis
14. (4) The study’s 
sample size must be extractable in order to calculate the effect size variation and the study 
weight. (5) Only studies investigating non-financial firms were included, as firms from the 
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 A summary of the literature search process can be found in Appendix B. 
13
 The conversion of effect sizes is presented by Borenstein et al. (2009). 
14
 Of course, if none of the studies provide correlations between the proxies, the multivariate analysis equals 
the univariate analysis. 
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financial sector do not use derivatives exclusively for hedging purposes, but also for trading 
or speculative activities (e.g., Allayannis and Weston 2001; Gay and Nam 1998; Heaney and 
Winata 2005). However, we do not exclude studies containing both financial and non-
financial firms, if the sample was taken from a broad stock market index.  
We searched for English and German studies in four
15
 major electronic databases of 
academic financial literature by adopting the search command from Arnold et al. (2014)
16
. 
For each source of literature, the title, the abstract, and then the content were screened with 
regard to the inclusion criteria. In summary, we reached a total number of 2,790 studies, 
with 757 resulting from ABI/INFORM Complete, 1,300 from Business Source Premier, 593 
from EconBiz and 140 from ScienceDirect. After sorting the results by the inclusion criteria, 
we cut the sample to 67 relevant studies. 
Furthermore, we explicitly searched for gray literature to reduce the threat of publication 
bias. By screening the electronic working paper database SSRN (via ProQuest) and using 
the same search strategy as for published articles, we received another 18 relevant studies 
(from an initial sample of 808 studies). Additionally, we found 216 dissertations
17
 in the 
Dissertations and Theses database (via ProQuest), which provided us with 6 relevant studies 
from 5 doctoral theses.  
In the following step, we performed a backward search by screening the reference lists of the 
91 studies identified as relevant to the sample from the search in the above-mentioned 
databases. Furthermore, we screened the publication lists of the authors appearing more than 
twice in our interim list from the database search. Finally, we conducted a forward search 
for all studies on the interim list via the “cited by”-option in Google Scholar. Another 76 
relevant studies were identified in this step.  
At the end of the search process, we reached a sample of 167 relevant primary studies
18
 
meeting the inclusion criteria – with 54 of them providing all required data for univariate 
                                            
15
 We also screened the search results in JSTOR and the Wiley Online Library. However, the number of 
duplicates and irrelevant studies rapidly increased by adding more databases. Due to very low precision, we 
decided to stop the database search for published literature after sorting search results from the four databases 
named above, where we focused on peer-reviewed studies to yield an appropriate precision for the list of 
results. 
16
 Arnold et al. (2014) derived a search command for electronic databases from a sample of thirty relevant 
primary studies. The search command consists of nineteen search terms linked by Boolean operators. See 
Appendix B. 
17
 We also found 7 master theses with sufficient data. However, as the quality of student theses is hard to 
evaluate, and to reduce potential bias via the “garbage in, garbage out”-problem, we excluded them from our 
sample. 
18
 The list of excluded studies from the initial sample of 167 relevant studies is available on request from the 
authors. 
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and multivariate meta-analysis, 69 studies reporting at least the data required for the 
univariate meta-analysis and 44 studies with none of the required data published. Thus, we 
finally sent a study-specific request mail
19
 to the authors of all studies with missing data. In 
response, 12 authors provided us with additional data on their respective studies. All in all, 
our literature search produced a sample of 135 primary studies. However, we had to exclude 
3 studies due to insufficient data or dependencies in the sample
20
. Consequently, our final 
sample consists of 132 primary studies, which are listed in Appendix C. The basic statistics 
describing our sample are summarized in Appendix H. 
Whereas numerous effects have been studied multiple times, the inclusion of variables 
analyzed only in few studies would result in an unreliable estimation of the population effect 
size. Thus, we follow Fu et al. (2011), who recommend integrating only those proxy 
variables in the univariate meta-analysis that appear in at least six studies. As information 
about the dependencies between the proxy variables improves our population effect size 
estimate compared to the univariate meta-analysis, we consider all proxy variables for which 
each correlation with the other proxies is reported in at least one study. However, as several 
of these correlations are not given in any of the primary studies, we can calculate the 
multivariate results for only fourteen proxy variables. The variables covered by the 
multivariate analysis are shown in Table II.1-1. 
In some studies, we had to do some adjustment in order to incorporate their findings in our 
meta-analysis. Some authors use the opposite assignment for the hedging dummy, i.e., “0” 
for the Hedgers group and “1” for the Non-Hedgers group. In these cases, we adjusted the 
sign of the correlations and the t-statistics. As sample size for the Hedgers and Non-Hedgers 
subgroup, we use the number of firms investigated in the primary study instead of the firm 
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 We sent a request mail to the authors of 113 studies with missing data and two weeks later a reminder mail 
to the authors and co-authors. From 10.62% of the contacted authors we received additional data. 22.12% 
rejected to provide us with the correlational data from their study, and from the remaining 67.26% we did not 
receive a response to our request. 
20
 If studies use an identical sample of firms, we use each proxy variable from this sample only once. However, 
we do not control for overlapping samples, as the aim of meta-analysis is to aggregate propositions made in 
primary studies; despite their overlapping samples, each study reports an individual result. Beside the studies 
from Bartram (Bartram et al. 2009; Bartram et al. 2011; Bartram 2012) and Lin et al. (Lin et al. 2007; Lin et al. 
2010), the studies from Nguyen and Faff (Nguyen and Faff 2002; Nguyen and Faff 2006; Nguyen and Faff 
2007; Nguyen and Faff 2010) are also based on the same data sample. As the studies by Nguyen and Faff 
additionally investigate nearly the same variables, we had to exclude Nguyen and Faff (2006) and Nguyen and 
Faff (2010) from our sample as they do not contain additional variables. Furthermore, dependencies also arise 
when a study reports results for different groups dependent on each other (e.g., for disjoint observation periods, 
different hedging intensities, etc.). As some firms could be in several groups, as in the case of dependent 
results within one study, we include the subsample with the largest sample size. 
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year observations
21
. Seven studies do not contain any measures for the estimation of 
correlations. In these cases, we use statements from the article’s text to extract the direction 
and magnitude of the proxy variable
22
. Moreover, some studies report the reciprocal value of 
the proxy variables in the same manner we defined (e.g., book-to-market value instead of 
market-to-book value). In this case, we use the reciprocal means and estimate the variance 
approximation of the reciprocal elements. Afterwards, we calculate the mean differences and 
convert the values to the Pearson correlation coefficient.
 
 
II.1.5 Empirical Results 
Empirical literature tests the hedging theories by the firm-specific proxy variables presented 
in Appendix I through L of the paper with the corresponding definitions. We aggregate the 
effect size measures for these proxies across our sample of 132 primary studies using 
multivariate meta-analysis and carry out the univariate meta-analysis and vote counting as a 
robustness test. For each proxy variable we examine the underlying null hypothesis of no 
relationship with the hedging dummy variable. In the following, we first deal with 
heterogeneity in more detail, because this is important for the question of using a fixed or 
random effects model in our analysis. Afterwards, we present our main results for each of 
the four tested hypotheses including the respective results of the robustness checks. Last but 
not least, we deal with potential biases when applying meta-analyses.  
One main aspect of meta-analysis is the detection and consideration of heterogeneity among 
study-specific effect size estimates. The corresponding heterogeneity statistics can be found 
in Appendix E. As Arnold et al. (2014, p. 4) have pointed out, “we cannot assume one true 
effect size for the reviewed proxy variables in all studies”. Country-specific regulations or 
firm characteristics influence the true effect size, although the initial decision to hedge is the 
same. We consider these deviations by applying a random effects model, which is not 
comparable to a random effects model, as known in panel data analysis. In our case, the true 
effect size is random. To verify the assumption of random effects, we apply Cochran’s Q-
test resulting in a Q-statistic of 41056.49, which is under the null hypothesis approximately 
chi-square distributed with 1,522 degrees of freedom and thus highly significant at the 1% 
level. As the Q-statistic is a sum and as such strongly depends on the number of studies, we 
                                            
21
 In case a study observes more than one year and does not provide the number of firms, we divide the total 
firm year observations by the years of observation. Moreover, some primary studies report the statistics for the 
proxy variables based on different samples. In this event we use the median sample size to create one single 
sample size for each study. 
22
 If a significant relationship is stated in the text, we assigned a p-value of 0.05. If a weak relationship is 
reported, we assign a p-value of 0.10 and if the study concludes no relationship in the text, we assigned a p-
value of 0.5 and a t-value of 0. 
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also look at the between-study variance 𝑇𝑗², which is in the same (squared) metric as the 
effect sizes. The largest variation of effect sizes is observable for tax credits with a between-
study variance of 0.4572. The same holds for the univariate case
23
. As the results show, all 
proxy variables are significant at the 1% level and consequently vary strongly across 
primary studies in the univariate case, except for blockholders with a p-value of 0.078. 
Heterogeneity is also graphically confirmed by a forest plot
24
 for each proxy variable, as the 
confidence intervals of the study-specific effect sizes mostly do not contain the true effect 
size from the fixed effects model.  
A summary of the multivariate results is displayed in Table II.1-1. In the following, we 
present our result for each of the four hypotheses in detail. The corresponding random 
effects mean correlations matrix across the whole sample of studies calculated by equation 
(3), which then serves as input for the linear model, can be found in Appendix E. 
  
                                            
23
 Heterogeneity of effect sizes cannot be integrated in the vote counting method. 
24
 The forest plots are available on request from the authors. 
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Table II.1-1 Summary of multivariate results 
Proxy variable 
Number of different variable 
operationalizations in the 
primary studies for each proxy
a 
Hyp. sign 
Multivariate results 
Emp. 
sign p-value 
Adjusted p-
value with 
a(PF)=0.05
bc
 
CORPORATE TAXES (H1) 
Tax-loss carryforwards 
(binary) 
1 definition in 18 studies + + 0.0956*  
BANKRUPTCY AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS COSTS (H2) 
Dividend yield (continuous) 7 definitions in 41 studies ? + 0.0202**    0.0217 
Interest coverage ratio 5 definitions in 30 studies − − 0.7530 0.0361 
Leverage ratio 9 definitions in 108 studies + + 0.2607 0.0401 
Liquidity 6 definitions in 72 studies − − 0.0108**  
Profitability 8 definitions in 68 studies − + 0.2135 0.0387 
Size 7 definitions in 115 studies − + 0.0002***  
Tangible assets 3 definitions in 11 studies − + 0.2425 0.0302 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND AGENCY CONFLICTS OF EQUITY (H3) 
Institutional investors 5 definitions in 22 studies − +     0.1203    0.0242 
Option ownership 
(continuous) 
7 definitions in 19 studies ? − 0.5275 0.0087 
Share ownership 6 definitions in 44 studies + − 0.2091 0.0352 
COORDINATION OF FINANCING AND INVESTMENT POLICY AND AGENCY CONFLICTS OF DEBT (H4) 
Capex 5 definitions in 35 studies + −     0.3169     0.0420 
Research and development 3 definitions in 37 studies + + 0.0541*  
Tobin's Q 3 definitions in 79 studies + + 0.1856  
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the multivariate analysis in the paper at hand. The second column contains the number of different 
variable operationalizations that we aggregated in our proxy variable definitions. The following columns include their hypothetical sign for the impact on 
the corporate hedging decision as well as the empirically revealed results and the corresponding p-value. *, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null 
hypotheses at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 
a If one study uses several variations for a specific proxy variable, we only considered the definition with the least deviation related to the other studies 
testing the same proxy variable. A spot check revealed that the underlying sample covers most variations in the proxy-specific definitions.  
b To account for the different variable definitions and the possible data mining bias we adjusted the p-values similar to Harvey et al. (2014). Therefore, we 
used the Bonferroni correction respectively its exact version (the Sidak correction), both adjusting for the fact, that the probability of a type I error in a 
multiple test differs from that in a single test. However, in this connection we had to account for two facts (for details see for example Abdi, 2007).  
First, there are ns number of studies applying the same variable definition. This effect leads to a change in the probability of the type I error in ns trials. 
Second, there are the number of variable definitions nv leading to an increase in the probability of a type I error. Altogether, this results in a probability 
a(PF) of making as least one type I error, which depends on the probability of making a type I error a(PT), when only dealing with a specific test. 
Consequently, the adjusted probabilities can be expressed as follows:  
𝑎(𝑃𝑇) = 1 − (1 − 𝑎(𝑃𝐹))
𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑣 
In case ns=nv there is no probability adjustment, because both effects equalize. However, we think that different studies applying the same definition 
leading to similar results due to similar samples, etc. Hence, the probability of making a type 1 error in the first study depends on the probability in the 
second study. We model this dependence structure by applying a binary variable (0=to reject the null hypothesis; 1=to accept the null hypothesis). Due to 
the fact, that we used a binary variable, the correlation coefficient can be easily calculated and emprises the complete dependence structure of the variables. 
𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑟 =
1 − 𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 − (1 − 𝑎)
2
(1 − 𝑎) − (1 − 𝑎)2
 
Inverting the equation the correlation structure can be fixed and the joint probability of making a type I error can be calculated as follows: 
𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1 − 𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑟((1 − 𝑎) − (1 − 𝑎)
2) + −(1 − 𝑎)2 
After taking the calculation of the probability for a quasi independent event 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1 − √1 − 𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡, the formula changes to 
𝑎(𝑃𝑇) = 1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔)
𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑣  
A look at the different studies showed a high dependency between the p-values of different studies having the same variable definition. Hence, we decided 
to use a high correlation Korr=0.8 in order to adjust for the correlation effect.  
c Only those values were depicted, for which a(PT)<0.05. 
For the corporate tax hypothesis (H1), we reveal some empirical evidence, seen below in 
Table II.1-2.
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence  42 
Table II.1-2 Statistical results for the corporate tax hypothesis (H1) 
Proxy variable Hyp. sign No. of firms 
Multivariate meta-analysis Univariate meta-analysis Vote counting 
𝛼 = 0.50 𝛼 = 0.05 
b SE(b) p-value 𝑟 SE(𝑧) p-value 
Eggers’s 
regression test 
p-value - + - 0 + 
Tax credits + 10,198 na na na -0.7435
†
 0.2992 0.0014*** 0.0000*** 1 4* 1 2 3* 
Tax-loss carryforwards (binary) + 12,529 0.0711 0.0427 0.0956* 0.0828 0.0270 0.0021*** 0.0520* 3 16* 1 15* 3 
Tax-loss carryforwards (continuous) + 9,050 na na na 0.0625 0.0423 0.1386 0.0381** 9 11* 4 11* 5 
This table shows the results for the proxy variables related to the corporate tax hypothesis. Names of the proxy variables are listed in the first column, and the second column shows the specific hypothesized sign; the third column shows the number 
of firm observations summed up from the primary studies testing the respective proxy variable. Next, the results from multivariate meta-analysis are presented. Using the standardized regression slopes b from the multivariate linear model and their 
standard deviations SE(b) for each proxy variable, we calculate the z-statistic and the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑏𝑖 = 0. The table additionally provides the results from univariate meta-analysis. They contain the summary 
effect size 𝑟 (back-transformed in the correlation metric for an easier interpretation) and the standard deviation SE(𝑧) of the z-transformed values (as within the calculations in Appendix A). We calculate the z-statistic and the corresponding p-value to 
test the null hypotheses of 𝑟 = 0. The Egger’s regression test indicates the existence of publication bias for the respective proxy variable. Finally, the results from the vote counting procedure are displayed for 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.50. In the first case, 
“+” (“-”) indicates the number of significantly positive (negative) results from the primary studies and “0” shows the number of insignificant results. The second case corresponds to a t-statistic of zero, which means that only the negative and positive 
directions of the relationships are counted as shown in column two and three. The asterisks (*) show the respective “winner category” for each proxy variable, i.e. the most reliable relationship due to the unique majority of entries, if the others have at 
least one entry fewer. In the case of equality between two or more winner categories, no statement can be made. *, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null hypotheses at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 
† The underlying sample of this proxy variable is adapted by the trim-and-fill method in the univariate meta-analysis to account for the detected publication bias. 
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The only proxy variable considered in the multivariate meta-analysis for this hypothesis is 
tax-loss carryforwards (binary). Here we find a weakly significant relation with a 
standardized regression slope of 0.0711 and a corresponding p-value of 0.0956. Hence, if 
companies face higher tax-loss carryforwards (binary), they clearly tend to increase their 
hedging activities to take as much advantage as possible of higher profits in the current 
period, which is in line with the hypothesized positive direction.  
As robustness check, we conducted a univariate meta-analysis as well as vote counting. 
Regarding tax-loss carryforwards (binary), the univariate meta-analysis leads to a correlation 
of 0.0828 and a p-value of 0.0021. Hence, we confirm an unreasonably high significance for 
the correlation with corporate hedging behavior in the (hypothesized) positive direction for 
this proxy variable. Additionally, vote counting shows a positive although insignificant 
relation for this proxy variable. Thus, we can clearly conclude that the intensity of corporate 
hedging increases with existence of tax-loss carryforwards (binary), as companies try to 
secure a compensation for them in the following years. Contrarily, we find for tax credits a 
highly significant correlation of -0.7435 in the univariate meta-analysis with a p-value of 
0.0014. However, this contradicts our vote counting results and also the hypothesized 
positive direction. For tax-loss carryforwards (continuous) we again do not observe a 
significant relationship in the results from vote counting, which is in line with our findings 
from univariate meta-analysis.  
Altogether, this means that the existence of tax-loss carryforwards is an indicator for the 
extent of corporate hedging, although the effect of the total amount of tax-loss carryforwards 
is uncertain. 
In addition to the tax hypothesis, strong empirical evidence is also found for the bankruptcy 
and financial distress costs hypothesis (H2), as presented in Table II.1-3. 
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Table II.1-3 Statistical results for the bankruptcy and financial distress costs hypothesis (H2) 
Proxy variable Hyp. sign No. of firms 
Multivariate meta-analysis Univariate meta-analysis Vote counting 
𝛼 = 0.50 𝛼 = 0.05 
b SE(b) p-value 𝑟 SE(𝑧) p-value 
Eggers’s 
regression test 
p-value - + - 0 + 
Cash flow availability − 7,170 na na na 0.1307 0.0463 0.0045*** 0.0352** 3 11* 0 9* 5 
Convertible debt ? 10,223 na na na 0.0185 0.0208 0.3764 0.4061 6 8* 0 11* 3 
Debt maturity + 12,186 na na na 0.0974
†
 0.0346 0.0047*** 0.0012*** 0 6* 0 1 5* 
Dividend yield (binary) ? 13,255 na na na 0.2422 0.0655 0.0002*** 0.0740* 3 12* 1 4 10* 
Dividend yield (continuous) ? 17,038 0.0741 0.0319  0.0202** 0.1125 0.0239 0.0000*** 0.9816 7 33* 3 20* 18 
Interest coverage ratio − 16,187 -0.0127 0.0404  0.7530 -0.0145 0.0285 0.6110 0.1150 13 17* 4 23* 3 
Leverage ratio + 51,866 0.0302 0.0269  0.2607 0.0661 0.0165 0.0000*** 0.4042 34 71* 13 58* 38 
Liquidity − 33,767 -0.0893 0.0350  0.0108** -0.1100 0.0218 0.0000*** 0.2666 54* 16 28 37* 7 
Preferred stock ? 9,213 na na na 0.0712
†
 0.0534 0.1811 0.0000*** 5 6* 2 8* 1 
Profitability − 33,308 0.0751 0.0604  0.2135 0.1108 0.0247 0.0000*** 0.3895 21 46* 6 34* 28 
Size − 52,667 0.2148 0.0574  0.0002*** 0.2647 0.0295 0.0000*** 0.8943 20 94* 9 26 81* 
Tangible assets − 11,938 0.0715 0.0611  0.2425 0.1079 0.0495 0.0285** 0.0403** 4 7* 2 6* 3 
This table shows the results for the proxy variables related to the corporate tax hypothesis. Names of the proxy variables are listed in the first column, and the second column shows the specific hypothesized sign; the third column shows the 
number of firm observations summed up from the primary studies testing the respective proxy variable. Next, the results from multivariate meta-analysis are presented. Using the standardized regression slopes b from the multivariate linear 
model and their standard deviations SE(b) for each proxy variable, we calculate the z-statistic and the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑏𝑖 = 0. The table additionally provides the results from univariate meta-analysis. 
They contain the summary effect size 𝑟 (back-transformed in the correlation metric for an easier interpretation) and the standard deviation SE(𝑧) of the z-transformed values (as within the calculations in Appendix A). We calculate the z-
statistic and the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑟 = 0. The Egger’s regression test indicates the existence of publication bias for the respective proxy variable. Finally, the results from the vote counting procedure are 
displayed for 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.50. In the first case, “+” (“-”) indicates the number of significantly positive (negative) results from the primary studies and “0” shows the number of ins ignificant results. The second case corresponds to a 
t-statistic of zero, which means that only the negative and positive directions of the relationships are counted as shown in co lumn two and three. The asterisks (*) show the respective “winner category” for each proxy variable, i.e. the most 
reliable relationship due to the unique majority of entries, if the others have at least one entry fewer. In the case of equality between two or more winner categories, no statement can be made. *, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null 
hypotheses at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 
† The underlying sample of this proxy variable is adapted by the trim-and-fill method in the univariate meta-analysis to account for the detected publication bias. 
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Multivariate meta-analysis supports the findings with high significance and unique directions 
for the influences of dividend yield (continuous), liquidity, and size with p-values of 0.0202, 
0.0108, and 0.0002, and the standardized regression slopes of 0.0741, -0.0893, and 0.2148, 
respectively. The last magnitude is clearly the dominating effect. We can only confirm with 
significance the hypothesized negative influence of liquidity on corporate hedging behavior, 
which means that increasing liquidity makes corporate hedging unnecessary. In contrast, a 
higher dividend yield and a higher firm size induce firms to hedge significantly. On the one 
hand, this enables firms to satisfy investors’ expectations; on the other hand, higher company 
value requires a more conservative financing strategy with stable company results. Last but not 
least, the tax-loss carryforwards (binary) variable also serves as a proxy for the bankruptcy and 
financial distress hypothesis with a theoretical positive sign (see Appendix I). Regarding this 
variable we find weak evidence. For the other variables we find no evidence in our multivariate 
analysis.  
The robustness checks confirm the significant results in the univariate analysis as well in the 
vote counting. However, leverage ratio, profitability ratio, tangible assets and tax-loss 
carryforwards (binary and continuous) show also (more or less) significant results in the 
univariate meta-analysis, only partly supporting the hypothesis that reduction of financial 
distress costs coincide with hedging activity. Whereas the variables for debt maturity confirm 
the tested hypothesis, the variable cash flow variability rejects the hypothesis. However, the 
variables are only inspected in the univariate analysis as well as in the vote counting based on 
only 10,000 companies and there are far fewer studies covering this topic.  
All in all, our empirical findings indicate a strong evidence for the bankruptcy and financial 
distress hypothesis. In this regard, we find positive signs regarding the proxy variables dividend 
yield (continuous) and liquidity (each at a significance level of 5%) as well as size (at a 
significance level of 1%) and tax-loss carryforwards (binary) at a significance level of 10%. 
Regarding the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of the equity hypothesis (H3), we 
do not find empirical evidence, as summed up in Table II.1-4. 
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Table II.1-4 Statistical results for the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity hypothesis (H3) 
Proxy variable 
Hyp. 
sign No. of firms 
Multivariate meta-analysis Univariate meta-analysis Vote counting 
𝛼 = 0.50 𝛼 = 0.05 
b SE(b) p-value 𝑟 SE(𝑧) p-value 
Eggers’s 
regression test 
p-value - + - 0 + 
Blockholders’ ownership ? 1,724 na na na -0.0438 0.0330 0.1840 0.7162 9* 4 3 9* 1 
CEO cash − 2,800 na na na 0.0170 0.0653 0.7942 0.0504* 4 5* 4 1 5* 
Institutional investors − 18,040 0.0869 0.0559 0.1203 0.1352 0.0430 0.0016*** 0.7883 6 16* 2 9 11* 
Intangible assets + 4,968 na na na 0.0844 0.0551 0.1252 0.2872 2 5* 0 6* 1 
Number of analysts − 7,396 na na na 0.1584 0.0701 0.0227** 0.7638 1 7* 0 4 4 
Option ownership (binary) ? 1,208 na na na -0.0398 0.0699 0.5688 0.5474 3* 2 1 5* 0 
Option ownership (continuous) ? 13,026 -0.0279 0.0442 0.5275 0.0086 0.0331 0.7959 0.5585 8 10* 2 13* 4 
Share ownership + 13,643 -0.0421 0.0335 0.2091 -0.0876 0.0277 0.0015*** 0.6446 28* 14 19 19 6 
Tenure − 2,591 na na na 0.0439 0.0728 0.5460 0.7986 4* 3 1 4* 2 
This table shows the results for the proxy variables related to the corporate tax hypothesis. Names of the proxy variables are listed in the first column, and the second column shows the specific hypothesized sign; the third column shows the 
number of firm observations summed up from the primary studies testing the respective proxy variable. Next, the results from multivariate meta-analysis are presented. Using the standardized regression slopes b from the multivariate linear 
model and their standard deviations SE(b) for each proxy variable, we calculate the z-statistic and the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑏𝑖 = 0. The table additionally provides the results from univariate meta-analysis. They 
contain the summary effect size 𝑟 (back-transformed in the correlation metric for an easier interpretation) and the standard deviation SE(𝑧) of the z-transformed values (as within the calculations in Appendix A). We calculate the z-statistic and 
the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑟 = 0. The Egger’s regression test indicates the existence of publication bias for the respective proxy variable. Fina lly, the results from the vote counting procedure are displayed for 
𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.50. In the first case, “+” (“-”) indicates the number of significantly positive (negative) results from the primary studies and “0” shows the number of ins ignificant results. The second case corresponds to a t-statistic of 
zero, which means that only the negative and positive directions of the relationships are counted as shown in column two and three. The asterisks (*) show the respective “winner category” for each proxy variable, i.e. the most reliable 
relationship due to the unique majority of entries, if the others have at least one entry fewer. In the case of equality between two or more winner categories, no statement can be made. *, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null hypotheses 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 
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In multivariate meta-analysis three variables can be analyzed for hypothesis (H3): 
institutional investors, option ownership, and share ownership. None of the variables was 
significant at all. This is especially astonishing because these variables are taken from more 
than 10,000 companies, and the variables seem to operationalize the agency costs well. 
Furthermore, the variable “institutional investors” is intended to capture this agency conflict, 
as e.g. studies in corporate governance show.   
In the robustness check for institutional investors and share ownership, univariate meta-
analysis identifies a strong relationship with p-values, but each time in contrast to the 
hypothesized sign. However, vote counting does not consistently support a unique direction 
for these three proxy variables. Furthermore, we observe only a significant relationship 
between the number of analysts and corporate hedging behavior tested under this hypothesis. 
Again, the observed sign contradicts the predicted sign.  
Overall, we are not able to determine any strong and consistent association between 
asymmetric information and agency conflicts of the equity with corporate hedging behavior. 
Regarding the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt 
hypothesis (H4), we find only weak empirical evidence, displayed in Table II.1-5. 
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Table II.1-5 Statistical results for the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt hypothesis (H4) 
Proxy variable 
Hyp. 
sign No. of firms 
Multivariate meta-analysis Univariate meta-analysis Vote counting 
𝛼 = 0.50 𝛼 = 0.05 
b SE(b) p-value 𝑟 SE(𝑧) p-value 
Eggers’s 
regression test 
p-value - + - 0 + 
Asset growth rate + 3,909 na na na -0.1838 0.0865 0.0315** 0.1019 8* 2 2 8* 0 
Capex + 25,482 -0.0263 0.0262    0.3169 -0.0009 0.0180 0.9593 0.1126 18* 15 7 21* 7 
Price-earnings ratio + 6,230 na na na 0.0058 0.0310 0.8506 0.4874 4 7* 0 10* 2 
Research and development + 28,770 0.0910 0.0472    0.0541* 0.0811
†
 0.0310 0.0087*** 0.0002*** 14 22* 6 18* 13 
Sales growth rate + 11,015 na na na -0.0891 0.0389 0.0216** 0.2791 5* 2 4* 3 0 
Tobin's Q + 38,937 0.0433 0.0327    0.1856 0.0322 0.0202 0.1106 0.8578 37 42* 15 49* 15 
This table shows the results for the proxy variables related to the corporate tax hypothesis. Names of the proxy variables are listed in the first column, and the second column shows the specific hypothesized sign; the third column shows the 
number of firm observations summed up from the primary studies testing the respective proxy variable. Next, the results from multivariate meta-analysis are presented. Using the standardized regression slopes b from the multivariate linear 
model and their standard deviations SE(b) for each proxy variable, we calculate the z-statistic and the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑏𝑖 = 0. The table additionally provides the results from univariate meta-analysis. They 
contain the summary effect size 𝑟 (back-transformed in the correlation metric for an easier interpretation) and the standard deviation SE(𝑧) of the z-transformed values (as within the calculations in Appendix A). We calculate the z-statistic and 
the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of 𝑟 = 0. The Egger’s regression test indicates the existence of publication bias for the respective proxy variable. Finally, the results from the vote counting procedure are displayed for 
𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.50. In the first case, “+” (“-”) indicates the number of significantly positive (negative) results from the primary studies and “0” shows the number of insignificant results. The second case corresponds to a t-statistic of 
zero, which means that only the negative and positive directions of the relationships are counted as shown in column two and three. The asterisks (*) show the respective “winner category” for each proxy variable,  i.e. the most reliable 
relationship due to the unique majority of entries, if the others have at least one entry fewer. In the case of equality between two or more winner categories, no statement can be made. *, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null hypotheses 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 
†
 The underlying sample of this proxy variable is adapted by the trim-and-fill method in the univariate meta-analysis to account for the detected publication bias. 
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Multivariate meta-analysis reveals a positive relation between research and development and 
corporate hedging, which confirms the hypothesized direction with p-values of 0.0514 and a 
regression coefficient of 0.092. This shows that avoidance of underinvestment allows the 
value of corporate hedging to increase. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship (at a 
significance level of 5%) between liquidity and corporate hedging. The liquidity variable 
also serves as a proxy for this hypothesis (see Appendix J). 
However, neither capital expenditures for property plant and investment nor Tobin’s Q show 
any significant results. The latter is especially astonishing, because the number of 
observations is relatively high in comparison to the other variables. However, besides the 
ability to capture underinvestment, Tobin’s Q can also be interpreted as a risk factor in 
multifactor models or a measure for additional value in case of superior corporate 
governance. This might explain the non-significant results. 
Univariate analysis confirms these results in the robustness check. Univariate meta-analysis 
also reveals highly significant evidence for the influence of research and development, 
liquidity and leverage on corporate hedging behavior in accordance with the hypothesized 
positive sign, but shows no significant results for the other two variables. Again, the proxy 
variables liquidity and leverage also serve as proxies for this hypothesis (see Appendix J). In 
contrast, vote counting does not show any tendency. Hence, we validate the assumption that 
hedging activities increase in line with growing engagement in research and development, to 
ensure the existence of the company. However, this might be also due to the bias of the 
method, which could lead to insignificant results. Looking at variables not inspected by the 
multivariate meta-analysis, univariate meta-analysis reveals a strongly positive relation 
between asset growth rate (sales growth rate, respectively) and corporate hedging, which 
contradicts the hypothesized direction, and which is not strongly supported by vote 
counting. 
On the whole, all other results from vote counting as well as from univariate and 
multivariate meta-analysis do not point to further significant relationships under this 
hypothesis. 
Looking at all hypotheses, multivariate meta-analysis only indicates strong evidence for the 
bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis. We find weak or no support for the other 
hypotheses. 
The robustness tests confirm the results of multivariate meta-analysis, whereby clear biases 
can be recognized. By comparing the explanatory power of the three different applied 
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approaches, vote counting predominantly shows inconsistent and insignificant results in our 
case, as the huge amount of insignificant results from primary studies are not differentiated. 
We can also conclude that univariate meta-analysis strongly tends to overestimate the single 
results, as no interactions between proxy variables are integrated in this approach. However, 
these interactions are apparent in the world of corporate hedging, which weakens the 
influences of the single proxy variables.  
A further aspect is the existence of potential biases when applying meta-analyses. In the 
following we differ between two types of potential biases. The first bias occurs when 
researchers favor significant relationships, as significant results are more easily publishable. 
The second bias consists of the fact that significant results are in fact more likely to be 
published, according to Vevea and Woods (2005). The latter is also known as “publication 
bias”, whereas the former is called “data mining bias” or a “fishing expedition”. 
In our case, we face both potential biases. However, the second bias is more pronounced in 
our situation due to the following: our factors are derived from theory and the authors test 
hypotheses based on economic principles, as opposed to, e.g. the papers inspected by 
Harvey et al. (2014), who analyzes papers that generate factors and therefor hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, there might be also a potential bias due to the different ways of 
operationalizing a variable of a hypothesis and/or due to a growing mean number of 
observed firms over time. The reason for this might be that the larger the sample size, the 
easier it is to reject the null hypothesis due to statistical facts. Besides the tax hypothesis and 
the respective proxy variable, the number of different operationalizations (in the primary 
studies) of proxy variables used to test the other three hypotheses suggests a potential bias 
(Table II.1-1). However, this is equally true for significant and non-significant results, and 
the significant results remain significant even after a multiple test. Additionally, there is no 
clear trend regarding the sample distribution over time (Appendix F). All in all, we suggest 
multiple testing, which is in line with Harvey et al. (2014).  
The second, more severe publication bias leads to an overestimation of effect size. There is a 
battery of different tests estimating the size of the publication bias and the influence on 
effect size (see e.g., Thornton and Lee 2000). However, all tests show advantages and 
disadvantages. We excluded those tests where assumptions are not at all fulfilled, resulting 
in two different testing strategies. However, we implemented several approaches following 
the idea presented in Pigott (2012). 
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Therefore, in order to control for this problem and to prove the robustness of our results, we 
explicitly include gray literature in our sample, such as unpublished working papers, 
conference papers, and dissertations. In our sample, 31.82% of the analyzed primary studies 
are gray literature. This leads to the broader and more comprehensive sample seen in our 
study, and significantly enhances the power of our meta-analytical findings (Whiston and Li 
2011). Moreover, for each of the 30 proxy variables we check the corresponding funnel 
plots
25
 to detect a potential publication bias. To obtain an even more objective view, we 
apply Egger’s regression test. Hence, we adjust proxy variables by the well-known trim-and-
fill method to achieve more meaningful results, i.e. the variables: tax credits, debt maturity, 
preferred stock, and research and development which are all displayed with a 1% 
significance by Egger’s regression test. The results improved by the trim-and-fill method are 
highlighted in the result tables II.1-2 through II.1-5. However, the changes in our results are 
only marginal, which is proof of the robustness of our results. As Kirkham et al. (2012) find 
out in their simulation study, the multivariate approach as applied in this paper is also a 
method to lower the effect of the publication bias on the summary effect sizes itself. Frosi et 
al. (2014) came to the same conclusion and state that this is especially true in the case of 
missing outcomes in the primary studies, which underlines the validity of our multivariate 
results and supports the approach for further applications. Both studies clearly point out the 
added value of the “borrowing of strength”-mechanism to the summary effect sizes in the 
multivariate meta-analysis which means that “one can learn about unreported outcomes 
through the reported results for other correlated outcomes” (Frosi et al. 2014, p. 2). Looking 
at our mean correlation matrix in Appendix E, this is true for our empirical analysis as many 
proxy variables depend linearly on each other. 
II.1.6 Discussion 
In the following, we first compare our main (multivariate) results, as well as the results of 
robustness checks (vote counting and univariate meta-analysis), with the three most cited 
primary studies on the determinants of corporate hedging by Geczy et al. (1997), Mian 
(1996) and Nance et al. (1993), which can generally be seen as representative of empirical 
literature in this field of research. After, we compare the results with the previous 
(univariate) reviews from Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014). Second, we 
discuss the prime limitations of our work and potential for further research. 
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 The plots are available on request from the authors. For a detailed explanation of the interpretation of a 
funnel plot, see Arnold et al. (2014). 
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 Related Studies II.1.6.1
In general, Geczy et al. (1997), Mian (1996) and Nance et al. (1993) employ both univariate 
statistics and multivariate statistics (logit and/or probit models) in order to analyze 
differences between firms that use hedging and those that do not (see for details Geczy et al. 
(1997); Mian (1996); Nance et al. (1993)). Due to the fact that we only find multivariate 
results in these three primary studies, we first compare our main (multivariate) results with 
their results. 
In accordance with our findings, all studies find weak support for the tax hypothesis in terms 
of the proxy variable tax loss-carryforwards.  
Regarding bankruptcy and financial distress costs, they find mixed results. Concerning the 
proxy variables liquidity (negative relationship) and dividend yield (positive relationship), 
the same significant results similar to ours can be seen. In contrast to our work, they find 
weak support for the proxy variable size indicating a negative relationship. Moreover, the 
proxy variables interest coverage ratio, leverage ratio, and tangible assets are significant, 
which contrasts with our results. In addition, regarding the proxy variable profitability, they 
also find no significant relationship. 
With respect to asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity, they find mixed 
results. In total, as analogous to our results they find only weak and/or no support for this 
hypothesis. In detail, regarding the proxy variables institutional investors and share 
ownership, no clear relationship is discernible; in comparison, a low positive relationship 
can be observed for the variable option ownership. Interestingly, we find a positive 
relationship for institutional investors and a negative for the other variables, but all three 
relationships are not significant – at least at the 10% significance level.  
Last but not least, they also find weak support for the research and development variable 
regarding coordination of financing and investment policy, and agency conflicts of debt. For 
Tobin’s Q, their results are mixed. In contrast, we find a positive relationship for both 
variables. 
To sum up, our results are more or less comparable to those of the three most cited primary 
studies. The main finding is strong evidence for the bankruptcy and financial distress 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, there are a few differences, which could be explained by different 
samples amongst many others, with regard to the relationship trend between the proxy 
variable and hedging behavior, as well as the respective significance level. But overall, there 
exist no fundamental differences. 
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Furthermore, regarding our robustness checks (vote counting and univariate meta-analysis), 
we can generally confirm the empirical results of the existing (quantitative) reviews from 
Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014).  
Concerning, in particular, Aretz and Batram (2010), our results coincide with their results, 
which are derived from univariate and multivariate vote counting. We both times find weak 
evidence for the influence of tax loss-carryforward variables. In reference to the financial 
distress hypothesis, the same is true for variables such as liquidity, size, and dividend yield. 
However, the vote counting method used by Aretz and Batram (2010) shows partly 
significant results for leverage, interest rate coverage, and tangible assets. However, these 
results could be explained by the differing analytical approach applied. In case of leverage 
and tangible assets, our univariate vote counting
26
 shows the same tendencies as the vote 
counting of Aretz and Batram (2010). In case of the agency hypothesis, Aretz and Batram 
(2010) report results similar to those we derive in our multivariate setting, with a few 
exceptions. The exceptions concern option ownership and Tobin’s Q, where some 
significant results are found. In the former case, we observe the same tendency in our 
univariate vote counting. However, for Tobin’s Q our vote counting results differ from that 
of Aretz and Bartram (2010). The remaining deviation may arise from the larger sample, 
including gray literature. Looking at the variables, which could not be analyzed in a 
multivariate method, our results are largely similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). 
These results are significant according to our vote counting. Dividend yield (binary) and tax 
credits remain especially significant in both analyses. Overall, the winning categories in our 
vote counting procedures often present no significant relationship. Compared to the vote 
counting results from Aretz and Bartram (2010), the integration of gray literature increases 
the number of insignificant findings from primary studies in our analysis. Hence, this limits 
the power of the vote counting procedures, as all of these study-specific insignificant results 
are simply sorted into a “no relationship” category.  
Concerning Arnold et al. (2014), we can strongly confirm their findings. Particularly, the tax 
loss-carryforwards in our multivariate analysis have the same tendency as those in the 
univariate analysis of Arnold et al. (2014). However, as their analysis for the corporate tax 
hypothesis suffers from a lack of data, we can provide greater evidence to this point. The 
financial distress variables liquidity, dividend yield, and size are significant in our analysis 
as well as in the analysis of Arnold et al. (2014). Furthermore, additional financial distress 
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 This means an aggregation of univariate results from primary studies, which corresponds to our vote 
counting procedure. 
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variables, e.g. leverage ratio, contradict those of Arnold et al. (2014), in terms of respective 
significance level. Due to the fact that those variables are significant in our univariate 
analysis, these deviations are explainable by the methodology applied. Concerning the 
agency variables, our insignificant variables of share and option ownership coincide with 
those of Arnold et al. (2014). In contrast to our multivariate analysis, the institutional 
ownership variable is significant in ours and Arnold et al.’s (2014) univariate analysis. 
Furthermore, we observed the same results for the debt agency variables in our multivariate 
analysis as did Arnold et al. (2014). However, due to our larger sample we found (only 
partially) significant variables in our univariate analysis, which Arnold et al. (2014) declared 
to be non-significant. Concerning the variables not captured by our multivariate analysis, the 
results of our univariate analysis do not differ from the results in literature. To sum up, this 
speaks well both for the robustness of the findings of Arnold et al. (2014) and of the meta-
analysis in general. Secondly, compared to the multivariate technique, we observe a 
systematic overestimation and an arguably high significance of aggregated proxy variables 
in our univariate meta-analysis, which was also apparent in the results of Arnold et al. 
(2014).  
 Limitations and Further Research II.1.6.2
There are several issues to be critically considered when conducting a meta-analysis and 
interpreting its results. These aspects concern the underlying literature, the analyzed input 
data, and the pertinent mathematical framework. 
First, the search for relevant literature brings the trade-off between search accuracy and 
comprehensiveness. Our search command developed by Arnold et al. (2014), aims to find all 
studies from an initial interim list of thirty primary studies, but not to find all existing 
relevant studies. In order to yield a higher recall of relevant primary studies, a broader 
search command could be considered. In addition, the search for literature could be 
expanded by inclusion of additional databases, although the number of duplicates would 
probably increase, thus lowering precision. In contrast to Arnold et al. (2014), we try in this 
study to overcome these circumstances by conducting a forward and backward search, as 
well as a search of the authors’ publication lists. Another bias to meta-analysis with respect 
to the underlying sample is known as language bias (Rothstein and Hopewell, 2009). Studies 
written in languages other than English and German are not included in this study. For 
example, we found studies that are potentially relevant, but written in Portuguese or 
Chinese. Hence, there is a little bias concerning potential sources not published in these two 
languages.  
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Second, limiting factors incorporated only in few primary studies, are the “endogeneity and 
identification problems” as well as “empirical modeling of structural relations” as Aretz and 
Bartram (2010) state. This means that the causality of the variables is not unique. For 
example, many determinants of leverage also influence hedging strategies. Nevertheless, this 
problem is hard to address in meta-analysis, as only secondary data is available in most 
cases. A promising methodology to address the problem of endogeneity in a meta-analysis is 
the “meta-analytic structural equation modeling” (MA-SEM) approach presented by Cheung 
and Chan (2005). If a combined correlation matrix similar to the GLS estimator presented in 
Section II.1-3 were generated, this pooled correlation matrix could then be analyzed using 
structural equation models.  
Third, we can confirm that the lack of reported data in primary studies as well as the lack of 
their uniformity is a huge problem for meta-analysis, as Walker et al. (2008) clearly point 
out. Many times, the data reported in primary studies is very sparse, which is the reason for 
the exclusion of nearly one fourth of the discovered primary studies from our analysis – 
even on request – most authors did not provide us with the relevant data. Often, the primary 
studies’ samples are also not independent, as they are not randomly sampled, which is also 
stated by Arnold et al. (2014). After excluding results from primary studies based on the 
same sample, we still find some overlaps concerning observation time and country 
(Appendix C). However, each new data set provides us with new results, allowing us to 
reject the assumption of a biased sample, as the data is taken heterogeneously from all over 
the world and no regional bias is observable. Moreover, we limit the analysis to the four 
hypotheses of financial hedging mentioned above, in order to compare our results to 
findings of Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014). Nevertheless, our analysis 
could be adopted to test the rationales for operational hedging (see, e.g., Allayannis et al. 
2001 or Kim et al. 2006) or other theories of financial hedging. 
Fourth, we identified a substantial variation in the proxy variables across the studies and 
adjust for it by applying a random effects model instead of a fixed effects model. However, 
we do not examine the factors driving this heterogeneity, which could be a subject of an 
exploratory meta-analysis (Anello and Fleiss 1995). For instance, Feld et al. (2013) applied 
the technique of meta-regression to explain heterogeneous results of marginal tax effect on 
corporate debt ratio. Regarding investigation of the heterogeneity of corporate hedging 
determinants, further research is necessary.  
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II.1.7 Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging, by taking a 
second look at the following specific hypotheses: corporate tax, bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs, asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity, coordination of 
financing and investment policy, and agency conflicts of debt. In light of these hypotheses, 
our results indicate a strong evidence only for the bankruptcy and financial distress 
hypothesis. Regarding the other hypotheses, we find weak or no support. In general, the 
robustness checks (univariate meta-analysis and vote counting) confirm the results of 
multivariate meta-analysis. In this respect, we can conclude that univariate meta-analysis 
strongly tends to overestimate the single results, as no interactions between the proxy 
variables are integrated in this approach. However, these interactions are apparent in the 
world of corporate hedging, and thus weaken individual influences. Our vote counting 
results are mainly in accordance with previous findings by Aretz and Bartram (2010). 
Moreover, the same holds for our outcomes from the univariate meta-analysis, in 
comparison with the analysis of Arnold et al. (2014).  
Finally, we see various subjects for further applications of multivariate meta-analysis in 
corporate finance. Multivariate meta-analysis can help to obtain a holistic view of the 
influential structure of determinants of, for instance, capital structure, dividend policy, or 
credit spreads. Last but not least, further research should especially be performed regarding 
the mentioned potential biases, e.g. publication bias and data mining bias or fishing 
expeditions.   
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 57 
II.1.8 References 
Abdi H (2007) Bonferroni and Šidák Corrections for Multiple Comparisons. In: 
Encyclopedia of Measurement and Statistics. Salkind NJ (ed.), Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
Allayannis G, Ihrig J, Weston JP (2001) Exchange-Rate Hedging: Financial vs. Operational 
Strategies. American Economic Review 91, 391-395. 
Allayannis G, Ugur L, Miller DP (2012) The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value Around the World. Journal of International 
Economics 87, 65-79. 
Allayannis G, Weston JP (2001) The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market 
Value. The Review of Financial Studies 14, 243-276. 
Amihud Y, Lev B (1981) Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate 
Mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617. 
Anello C, Fleiss JL (1995) Exploratory or Analytic Meta-Analysis: Should We Distinguish 
Between Them? Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 48, 109-116. 
Aretz K, Bartram SM (2010) Corporate Hedging and Shareholder Value. The Journal of 
Financial Research 33, 317-371. 
Arnold MM, Rathgeber AW, Stöckl S (2014) Determinants of Corporate Hedging: A 
(Statisitcal) Meta-Analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 54, 443-
458. 
Baker M, Gompers PA (2003) The Determinants of Board Structure at Initial Public 
Offering. Journal of Law and Economics 46, 569-598. 
Bartram SM (2012) Corporate Hedging and Speculation with Derivatives. Working Paper, 
Warwick Business School. 
Bartram SM, Brown GW, Conrad J (2011) The Effects of Derivatives on Firm Risk and 
Value. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 967-999. 
Bartram SM, Brown GW, Fehle FR (2009) International Evidence on Financial Derivatives 
Usage. Financial Management 28, 185-206. 
Becker BJ (1992) Using Results From Replicated Studies to Estimate Linear 
Models. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 17, 341-362. 
Belghitar Y, Clark E,Mefteh S (2013) Foreign Currency Derivative Use and Shareholder 
Value. International Review of Financial Analysis 29, 283-293. 
Bender R, Bunce C, Clarke M, Gates S, Lange S, Pace NL, Thorlund K (2008) Attention 
Should Be Given to Multiplicity Issues in Systematic Reviews. Journal of Clinical 
Epidemiology 61, 857-865. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 58 
Berkman H, Bradbury ME (1996) Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use of 
Derivatives. Financial Management 25, 5-13. 
Berrospide JM, Purnanandam A, Rajan U (2008) Corporate Hedging, Investment and 
Value. Working Paper No. 2008-16, FEDS. 
Bessembinder H (1991) Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and 
Contracting Effects. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26, 519-532. 
Black F, Scholes M (1973) The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. The Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 637-654. 
Borenstein M, Hedges LV, Higgins JPT, Rothstein HR (2009) Introduction to Meta-
Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
Campbell TS, Kracaw WA (1990) Corporate Risk Management and the Incentive Effects of 
Debt. Journal of Finance 45, 1673-1686. 
Cheung MWL, Chan W (2005) Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling: A Two-Stage 
Approach. Psychological Methods 10, 40-64. 
Choi JJ, Mao CX, Upadhyay AD (2013) Corporate Risk Management under Information 
Asymmetry. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 40, 239-271. 
Croci E, Jankensgård H (2014) CEO Age, Risk Incentives and Hedging Instrument 
Choice. Working Paper, Lund University. 
Dadalt P, Gay GD, Nam J (2002) Asymmetric Information and Corporate Derivatives 
Use. The Journal of Futures Markets 22, 241-267. 
DeMarzo PM, Duffie D (1991) Corporate Financial Hedging with Proprietary 
Information. Journal of Economic Theory 53, 261-286. 
DeMarzo PM, Duffie D (1995) Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge 
Accounting. The Review of Financial Studies 8, 743-771. 
DerSimonian R, Laird N (1986) Meta-Analysis in Clinical Trials. Control Clinical Trials 7, 
177-188. 
Fauver L, Naranjo A (2010) Derivative Usage and Firm Value: The Influence of Agency 
Costs and Monitoring Problems. Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 719-735. 
Feld LP, Heckemeyer JH, Overesch M (2013) Capital Structure Choice and Company 
Taxation: A Meta-Study. Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 2850-3866. 
Fok RCW, Carroll C, Chiou MC (1997) Determinants of Corporate Hedging and 
Derivatives: A Revisit. Journal of Economics and Business 49, 569-585. 
Froot KA, Scharfstein DS, Stein JC (1993) Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate 
Investment and Financing Policies. Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 59 
Frosi G, Riley RD, Williamson PR, Kracaw WA (2014) Multivariate Meta-Analysis Hellps 
Examine the Impact of Outcome Reporting Bias in Cochrane Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Reviews. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology (forthcoming). 
Fu R, Gartlehner G, Grant M, Shamliyan T, Sedrakyan A, Wilt TJ, Griffith L, Oremus M, 
Raina P, Ismaila A, Santaguida P, Lau J, Trikalinos TA (2011) Conducting Quantitative 
Synthesis When Comparing Medical Interventions: AHRQ and the Effective Health 
Care Program. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 64, 1187-1197. 
Gay GD, Nam J (1998) The Underinvestment Problem and Corporate Derivatives 
Use. Financial Management 27, 53-69. 
Géczy CC, Minton BA, Schrand C (1997) Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives. The 
Journal of Finance 52, 1323-1354. 
Graham JR, Rogers DA (2000) Does Corporate Hedging Increase Firm Value? An 
Empirical Analysis. Working Paper, Northeastern University. 
Graham JR, Smith Jr. CW (1999) Tax Incentives to Hedge. Journal of Finance 54, 2241-
2262. 
Graham JR, Rogers DA (2002) Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives. Journal of 
Finance 57, 815-839. 
Guay WR (1999) The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: An Analysis of the 
Magnitude and Determinants. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 43-71. 
Guay WR, Kothari SP (2003) How Much Do Firms Hedge With Derivatives? Journal of 
Financial Economics 70, 423-461. 
Harvey CR, Liu Y, Zhu H (2014) ... and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. Working 
Paper, Duke University. 
Haushalter DG (2000) Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from 
Oil and Gas Producers. Journal of Finance 55, 107-152. 
Heaney R, Winata H (2005) Use of Derivatives by Australian Companies. Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal 13, 411-430. 
Hedges LV, Olkin I (1985) Statistical Methods for Meta-Analysis. Academic Press, London. 
Higgins JPT, Green S (eds) (2011) Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions Version 5.1.0. The Cochrane Collaboration. Retrieved from 
www.cochrane-handbook.org. 
Jackson D, Riley RD, White IR (2011) Multivariate Meta-Analysis: Potential and 
Promise. Statistics in Medicine 30, 2841-2498. 
Jankensgård H (2013) Does Centralisation of FX Derivatives Usage Imapct Firm 
Value. European Financial Management (forthcoming). 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 60 
Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Judge A (2004) The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging by UK Non-Financial 
Firms. Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management Association 2004, 
Basel, Switzerland. 
Judge A (2006) Why Do Firms Hedge? A Review of the Evidence. In: Issues in Finance and 
Monetary Policy. McCombie J, González CR (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Kim YS, Mathur I, Nam J (2006) Is Operational Hedging a Substitute for or a Complement 
to Financial Hedging? Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 834-853. 
Kirkham JJ, Riley RD, Williamson PR (2012) A Multivariate Meta-Analysis Approach for 
Reducing the Impact of Outcome Reporting Bias in Systematic Reviews. Statistics in 
Medicine 31, 2179-2195. 
Knopf JD, Nam J, Thornton Jr. J (2002) The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial 
Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging. Journal of Finance 57, 801-813. 
Lin BJ, Pantzalis C, Park JC (2007) Corporate Use of Derivatives and Excess Value of 
Diversification. Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 889-913. 
Lin BJ, Pantzalis C, Park JC (2010) Corporate Hedging Policy and Equity Mispricing. The 
Financial Review 45, 803-824. 
Marsden A, Prevost AK (2005) Derivatives Use, Corporate Governance, and Legislative 
Change: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed Companies. Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting 32, 255-295. 
Mason SP, Merton RC, (1985) The Role of Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate 
Finance. In: Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Altman EI, Subrahmanyam MG 
(eds.), Irwin, Homewood. 
Mavridis D, Salanti G (2013) A Practical Introduction to Multivariate Meta-
Analysis. Statistical Methods in Medical Research 22, 133-158. 
May DO (1995) Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction Strategies? Journal 
of Finance 50, 1291-1308. 
Mian SL (1996) Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 31, 419-439. 
Modigliani F, Miller MH (1958) The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment. American Economic Review 48, 261-297. 
Myers SC (1977) Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 
147-175. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 61 
Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-
221. 
Nam I, Mengersen K, Garthwaite P (2003) Multivariate Meta-Analysis. Statistics in 
Medicine 22, 2309-2333. 
Nance DR, Smith Jr. CW, Smithson CW (1993) On the Determinants of Corporate 
Hedging. Journal of Finance 48, 267-284. 
Nguyen H, Faff R (2002) On the Determinants of Derivative Usage by Australian 
Companies. Australian Journal of Management 27, 1-24. 
Nguyen H, Faff R (2006) Foreign Debt and Financial Hedging: Evidence from 
Australia. International Review of Economics and Finance 15, 184-201. 
Nguyen H, Faff R (2007) Are Financial Derivatives Really Value Enhancing? Australian 
Evidence. Working Paper,  Deakin University School. 
Nguyen H, Faff R (2010) Are Firms Hedging or Speculating? The Relationship Between 
Financial and Firm Risk. Applied Financial Economics 20, 827-843. 
Olkin I, Siotani M (1976) Asymptotic Distribution of Functions of a Correlation Matrix. 
In: Essays in Probability and Statistics: A Volume in Honor of Professor Junjiro Ogawa. 
Ikeda S, Ogawa J (eds.), Shinko Tsusho, Tokyo. 
Pigott TD (2012) Advances in Meta-Analysis. Springer, New York. 
Riley RD (2009) Multivariate Meta-Analysis: The Effect of Ignoring Within-Study 
Correlation. Journal of Royal Statistical Society 172, 789-811. 
Rothstein HR, Hopewell S (2009) Grey Literature. In: The Handbook of Research Synthesis 
and Meta-Analysis.  Cooper HM, Hedges LV, Valentine JC (eds.), Russel Sage 
Foundation, New York. 
Smith Jr. CW, Stulz RM (1985) The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 391-405. 
Smith Jr. CW, Warner JB (1979) On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Convenants. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 117-161. 
Sprčić MD, Šević Ž (2012) Determinants of Corporate Hedging Decision: Evidence from 
Croatian and Slovenian Companies. Research in International Business and 
Finance 26, 1-25. 
Sprčić MD, Tekavčič M, Šević Ž (2008) A Review of the Rationales for Corporate Risk 
Management: Fashion or the Need? International Journal of Economic Sciences and 
Applied Research 1, 71-99. 
Thornton A, Lee P (2000) Publication Bias in Meta-Analysis: Its Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 53, 207-216. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 62 
Tufano P (1996) Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management 
Practices in the Gold Mining Industry. Journal of Finance 51, 1097-1137. 
Vevea JL, Woods CM (2005) Publication Bias in Research Synthesis: Sensitivity Analysis 
Using A Priori Weight Functions. Psychological Methods 10, 428-443. 
Walker E, Hernandez AV, Kattan MW (2008) Meta-Analysis: Its Strengths and 
Limitations. Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine 75, 431-439. 
Whiston SC, Li P (2011) Meta-Analysis: A Systematic Method for Synthesizing Counseling 
Research. Journal of Counseling and Development 89, 273-281. 
Zimmerman JL (1983) Taxes and Firm Size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 119-
149. 
  
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 63 
II.1.9 Appendix 
Supplementary data associated with research paper 1 can be found in the appendix at hand. 
 Appendix A. Numerical example for vote counting, univariate and multivariate II.1.9.1
meta-analysis 
This example illustrates the three methods of research synthesis applied in this paper. We 
show the vote counting procedure and the univariate meta-analysis based on the 
methodology presented by Borenstein et al. (2009) exclusively for the proxy variable 
“leverage ratio”. For the case of the multivariate meta-analysis as presented by Becker 
(1992), we use the two proxy variables “leverage ratio” and “size”27 to show how the 
dependencies between these proxies are modeled by the multivariate approach. To illustrate 
a random-effects model in a meaningful manner, we use three primary studies from the list 
in Appendix B with heterogeneous findings. Moreover, to demonstrate how to handle 
missing data, we ensured that one of the three studies in the multivariate case does not report 
all correlations of interest. Of course, altogether this selection is subjective. However, the 
aim of this example is to show the methodology of meta-analysis and not to interpret the 
results. So instead of this selection, you could choose some random values as well. The 
sample data is summarized in Table A.1. Missing correlations are marked as “na”. 
Table A.1 Data from primary studies 
Name of study i ni 
Leverage ratio/ 
Hedging dummy 
Size/ 
Hedging dummy 
Leverage ratio/ 
Size 
Adedeji and Baker (2002) 140 na na 0.3440 
Ahmed et al. (2013) 288 0.001
28
 0.2970 0.2560 
Choi et al. (2013a) 68 0.0260 0.3910 -0.0860 
II.1.9.1.1. Vote counting 
The vote counting procedure is performed on two different significance levels: 𝛼 = 0.5 and 
𝛼 = 0.05. First, for 𝛼 = 0.5, we split the data in positive (“+”) and negative (“-“) 
relationships regarding the sign of the test statistic. Second, for 𝛼 = 0.05, we sort the effect 
sizes into one of the following three categories: “significantly positive” (“+”), “significantly 
                                            
27
 We chose the two proxies with the highest number of total firm observations across all studies. 
28
 This study reports the correlations between the proxies and the hedging dummy variable directly in the 
correlation matrix, but separately for interest rate, foreign currency and commodity price hedger. For this 
example, we focus on the correlation between the three proxies and the foreign exchange hedging dummy. 
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negative” (“-“) and “no significant relationship” (“0“), considering the p-value additionally. 
The winning category must contain the absolute majority of effect sizes.  
As the t-statistic is not always directly reported in the studies, we estimate it from the 
descriptive statistics as given in the primary studies. E.g., for the leverage ratio as reported 
by Adedeji and Baker (2002) we receive 
𝑡11 =
𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝑁𝐻
𝑆√
1
𝑛𝐻
+
1
𝑛𝑁𝐻
=
0.442−0.292
0.202∙√
1
88
+
1
52
= 4.2454  
The results for the vote counting procedure are summarized in Table A.2. An asterisk marks 
the final empirical result for the influence of leverage on the corporate hedging behavior. 
Accordingly, the numbers from vote counting in Table A.2 show no significant relationship 
between the proxy variable leverage ratio and corporate hedging behavior for 𝛼 = 0.05. 
Further statements about the magnitude or the absolute significance of the effect cannot be 
drawn from the vote counting results. 
Table A.2 Results from vote counting (leverage ratio) 
Proxy variable 
Adedeji and 
Baker (2002) 
Ahmed et al. 
(2013) 
Choi et al. (2013a) 
α = 0.5 α = 0.05 
test statistic 
(p-value) 
test statistic 
(p-value) 
test statistic 
(p-value) - + - 0 + 
Leverage ratio 
4.2454 
(0.0000) 
0.0169
29
 
(0.9865) 
0.0610
30
 
(0.9515) 
0 3* 0 2* 1 
II.1.9.1.2. Univariate meta-analysis 
We look at one proxy variable (leverage ratio), i.e., 𝑗 = 1, from three primary studies 
(𝑘 = 3) with the indexes 𝑖 = 1,2,3. As the correlation between “leverage ratio” and the 
“hedging dummy” is not directly observable from the Adedejji and Baker (2002) study, we 
apply the following transformation to derive the correlations from the descriptive statistics 
reported in the study. E.g., for Adedeji and Baker (2002), we use the t-statistic from the 
mean difference test as shown in Table A.2 and then we receive 
𝑟11 = √
𝑡𝑖𝑗
2
𝑡𝑖𝑗
2 +𝑑𝑓𝑗
= √
4.24542
4.24542 + (88+52−2)
= 0.3399.
  
                                            
29
 In this case, as the t-statistic is not directly reported in the study, we receive it from the correlation 
coefficient between the leverage variable and the foreign exchange hedging dummy, which is reported in the 
primary study. The t-statistic is then calculated by the inverse of the first formula stated in section II.1.9.1.2. 
30
 This value is directly reported in the primary study. 
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In the next step, we compute our effect sizes, which are Fisher’s z-transformed correlations, 
and the effect size variation. E.g., for the Adedeji and Baker (2002) study, i.e. 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, we 
obtain 
𝑧11 = 0.5 ∙ ln (
1+𝑟𝑖𝑗
1−𝑟𝑖𝑗
) = 0.5 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
1+0.3399
1−0.3399
) = 0.3540  
and 
𝜈11 =
1
𝑛𝑖−3
=
1
140−3
= 0.0073.
  
As we cannot assume that all studies share one common population effect size, we test 
whether effect sizes are heterogeneous across studies by calculating the Q-statistic 
𝑄1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑗
2 −
(∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖𝑗)
2
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖1𝑧𝑖1
2 −
(∑ 𝑤𝑖1
3
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖1)
2
∑ 𝑤𝑖1
3
𝑖=1
3
𝑖=1 = (136.9863 ∙ 0.3540
2 +
⋯) −
(136.9863∙0.3540+⋯)2
136.9863+⋯
= 11.9877, 
with the following degrees of freedom 
𝑑𝑓1 = 𝑘1 − 1 = 3 − 1 = 2. 
Obviously, we can reject the null hypothesis of homogenous effect sizes, and hence 
conclude that a random effects model is more appropriate than a fixed effects model. Thus, 
we estimate the between-study variation by the method of moments estimator  
𝑇𝑗² = {
𝑄𝑗 − dfj
𝐶𝑗
, 𝑄𝑗 > 𝑑𝑓𝑗
0       , 𝑄𝑗  ≤ 𝑑𝑓𝑗
. 
Therefore, 
𝑇1
2 =
𝑄1−𝑑𝑓1
𝐶1
=
11.9877−2
273.1016
= 0.0366, 
with 
𝐶1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1 −
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
2𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
= (
1
0.0073
+ ⋯) −
(
1
0.00732
  +⋯)
(
1
0.0073
+⋯)
= 273.1016. 
Accordingly, the random effects weight for the Adedeji and Baker (2002) study is given by 
equation (1): 
𝑤11 =
1
𝜈𝑖𝑗+𝑇𝑗²  
=
1
0.0073+0.0366
= 22.7790. 
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Now, by means of equation (2), we can estimate the mean population effect size using the 
WLS estimator with random effects weights 
?̂?1 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
=
(22.7790 ∙ 0.3540 + ⋯)
(22.7790 + ⋯)
= 0.1283 
and the variance 
𝜈(?̂?1) =
1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
  =
1
(22.7790+⋯)
= 0.0149. 
These results serve as input for a confidence interval for the normal distributed population 
effect size estimate, a z-test as well as the two-tailed p-value for a test of difference between 
Hedgers and Non-Hedgers. Finally, for interpretation, we convert the population effect size 
estimate back in the correlation metric with the inverse Fisher’s z-transformation: 
𝑟1 =
exp(2?̂?1) − 1
exp(2?̂?1) + 1
=
exp(2 ∙ 0.1283) − 1
exp(2 ∙ 0.1283) + 1
= 0.1276 
Accordingly, by using random effects weights, we estimate an aggregated correlation of 
0.1276 between leverage ratio and hedging behavior across the three sample studies.  
II.1.9.1.3. Multivariate meta-analysis 
Step 1: Deriving Mean Correlation Matrix via GLS 
The first step is to arrange the data in such a way that information from each study is 
summarized in the indicator matrix 𝑿 with an effect sizes vector 𝑧. Analogous to the 
univariate meta-analysis, for each study, we compute the Fisher’s z-transformation of the 
correlation vector. However, now we look at the two proxy variables “leverage ratio” and 
“size”. Thus, we extract 𝑝∗ = 2(2 + 1)/2 = 3 correlations from each study, which are 
shown in Table A.1. Moreover, we build the indicator matrix with the number of rows equal 
to the number of correlations provided in the particular study. E.g., the data from the study 
by Adedeji and Baker (2002) is represented by 
𝑧1 = [
0.3540
0.2824
0.3586
]  and  𝑿1 = [
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
]. 
After preparing this input for each study, we stack the three effect size vectors and the 
indicator matrices to 𝑧 and 𝑿: 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 67 
𝑧 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3540
0.2824
0.3586
0.0010
0.3062
0.2618
0.0260
0.4130
−0.0862]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and 𝑿 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then, the sample size weighted mean correlations for each of the three effect sizes, i.e. for 
each column in Table A.1, are calculated. For the effect size “leverage ratio and hedging 
dummy” (𝑗 = 1), this leads to  
𝑟1 =
∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
=
(140 ∙ 0.3399 + ⋯)
(140 + ⋯ )
= 0.1001. 
The mean correlations for the other two effect sizes are 0.3037 for “size and hedging 
dummy” and 0.2340 for “leverage and size”. In contrast to the univariate meta-analysis, we 
must consider the variation of each effect size as well as the covariances among the effect 
sizes. E.g., the within-study covariance between the effect size “leverage ratio and hedging 
dummy” 𝑧𝐿𝐻 and “leverage ratio and size” 𝑧𝐿𝑆 for the Adedeji and Baker (2002) study is 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝐿𝐻, 𝑧𝐿𝑆) =
[
0.5 𝜌1𝐿𝐻 𝜌1𝐿𝑆(𝜌1𝐿𝐿
2 +𝜌1𝐿𝑆
2 +𝜌1𝐻𝐿
2 +𝜌1𝐻𝑆
2 )+𝜌1𝐿𝐿 𝜌1𝐻𝑆+𝜌1𝐿𝑆𝜌1𝐻𝐿−
(𝜌1𝐿𝐻 𝜌1𝐿𝐿 𝜌1𝐿𝑆+𝜌1𝐻𝐿 𝜌1𝐻𝐿 𝜌1𝐻𝑆+𝜌1𝐿𝐿 𝜌1𝐿𝐻 𝜌1𝐿𝑆+𝜌1𝑆𝐿 𝜌1𝑆𝐻 𝜌1𝑆𝐿)
]
𝑛1𝐴
  
with  
𝐴 = [(1 − 𝜌𝐿𝐻
2 )(1 − 𝜌𝐿𝑆
2 )]. 
By substituting the unknown population correlations by the sample size weighted mean 
correlations, we receive 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝐿𝐻, 𝑧𝐿𝑆) =
[
0.5∙0.1001∙0.2340∙(12+0.23402+0.10012+0.30372)+1∙0.3037
+0.2340∙0.1001−(0.1001∙1∙0.2340+0.1001∙0.1001∙0.3037
+1∙0.1001∙0.2340+0.2340∙0.3037∙0.2340)
]
140∙(1−0.10012)(1−0.23402)
= 0.0021. 
 
The covariances for the other pairs of correlations are computed analogously. The diagonal 
elements are the effect size variances calculated in the previous section II.1.9.1.2. 
Consequently, we receive the following within-study variance-covariance matrix for 
Adedeji and Baker (2002):  
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𝑺1 = [
0.0073 0.0016 0.0021
0.0016 0.0073 0.0005
0.0021 0.0005 0.0073
] 
After computing the variance-covariance matrices 𝑺𝑖 for all studies 𝑖 = 1,2,3, we stack them 
into the block-diagonal matrix 𝑺. As we expect random effects, we test whether all studies 
appear to be drawn from a single population. The test of homogenous effect sizes
31
 
𝑄 = 𝑧′[ 𝑷−1 − 𝑷−1𝑿(𝑿′𝑷−1𝑿)𝑿′𝑷−1]𝑧 
leads to a Q-statistic of 21.7001. This value is approximately chi-squared distributed with 
(3 − 1)3 = 6 degrees of freedom. Since the null hypothesis is rejected and thus a random 
effects model is appropriate, in the next step we estimate the between-study variance as 
follows: 
                    𝑇𝑗𝑗
2 =
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−1(𝑧𝑖𝑗−𝑧𝑗)
2−(𝑘𝑗−1)
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑡𝑟(𝑴)
,  
with 
                                      𝑡𝑟(𝑴) = ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−1 −
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−2𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−1𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1   
and 
                                       𝑧𝑗 =
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−1𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗
−1𝑘
𝑖=1
  
for each effect size 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝∗, where 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑗 are the corresponding diagonal elements of the 
estimated covariance matrices 𝑺𝑖. Again, 𝑘𝑗 is the number of studies measuring effect size 𝑗. 
As in the univariate methodology, the actual between-study variance 𝜏𝑗𝑗
2  cannot be zero; 
however, our estimates can be – thus negative estimates of 𝑇𝑗𝑗
2 are set to zero. Consequently, 
we receive 
𝑻2 = [
0.0366 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0.0256
]. 
For the random-effects weights, we add the between-study variance to the diagonal of the 
block-wise covariance matrix (𝑺𝑖 + 𝑻
2). Then, 𝑧, 𝑿 and 𝑺 are used to estimate the random-
effects mean effect size vector ?̂? via GLS as stated in equation (3): 
                                            
31
 For reasons of clarity, we stop filling the matrices of the following formulas with exact values. 
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?̂? = (𝑿′𝑺−1𝑿)−1𝑿′𝑺−1𝑧 = [
0.1294
0.3137
0.1986
] 
The covariance matrix of the GLS estimator is 
𝑽𝒂𝒓(?̂?) = (𝑿′𝑺−1𝑿)−1 = [
0.0149 0.0004 0.0007
0.0004 0.0021 0.0001
0.0007 0.0001 0.0112
]. 
Analogous to the univariate example, we retransform ?̂? in the correlation scale and arrange it 
in a matrix 
𝑹 = [
1 0.1287 0.3038
0.1287 1 0.1960
0.3038 0.1960 1
]. 
Thus, by applying a GLS estimator, we derive a mean correlation matrix across all three 
exemplary studies. 
Step 2: Multiple Regression Model 
This mean correlation matrix now serves as input for a linear model with “leverage ratio” 
and “size” as predictors for the hedging dummy variables. We partition 𝑹 into 
𝑹𝑋𝑌 = [0.1287 0.3038] and 𝑹𝑋𝑋 = [
1 0.1960
0.1960 1
] 
and estimate the standardized regression slopes of the linear model according to equation (4) 
𝑏 = 𝑹𝑋𝑋
−1𝑹𝑋𝑌 = [
0.0719
0.2897
]. 
This leads to the regression slopes of the linear model predicting the aggregated hedging 
behavior by the aggregated proxy variables “leverage ratio” and “size”, based on a sample of 
three primary studies. Finally, the variance of the slopes can be derived by  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏) = 𝑨𝚺𝑨′, 
with the elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 of A computed by 
   𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
−∑ (𝝆𝑘𝑖𝝆𝑘𝑚 + 𝝆𝑙𝑚𝝆𝑙𝑖)𝝆𝑚0           𝑖𝑓 𝝆𝑗 = 𝝆𝑘𝑙 ∈ 𝑹𝑋𝑋
𝒑
𝒎=𝟏
𝝆𝑖𝑚                                                          𝑖𝑓 𝝆𝑗 = 𝝆0𝑚 ∈ 𝑹𝑋𝑌
,  
where 𝝆𝑖𝑚 are the elements of 𝑹𝑋𝑋
−1  for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑝 and 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝∗. This leads to 
𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝑏) = [
0.0160 −0.0033
−0.0033 0.0037
].  
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The standardized slopes and its variance serve as input to calculate confidence intervals of 
the standardized regression coefficient, a z-test and p-values. 
In summary, this example illustrates the meta-analytical procedure for two proxies and three 
studies. Applying this approach on the whole sample of 132 studies leads to the results 
presented in section II.1.5. 
 Appendix B. Overview of the literature search process in the electronic databases II.1.9.2
Search step Detailed description 
INCLUSION CRITERIA  
Appropriate data for effect-size calculation The study contains sufficient information about the correlation between the 
hedging dummy and the examined proxy variables or/and the correlations 
among the proxy variables. 
Only non-financial firms The study investigates non-financial firms. 
ELECTRONIC DATABASES  
Selected databases ABI/INFORM Complete (via ProQuest), Business Source Premier (via 
EBSCOhost), EconBiz, ScienceDirect 
Search period January 01, 1990 – June 24, 2014  
Search options We search only peer-reviewed articles in ABI/INFORM Complete, Business 
Source Premier, EconBiz and ScienceDirect. 
SEARCH COMMAND  
Search command for ABI/INFORM 
Complete, SSRN and Dissertations and 
Theses via ProQuest 
 
(cabs(hedg*) or cabs(derivative*)) and (ab(use) or ab(using) or ab(usage) or 
ab(polic*) or ab(activit*)) and (cabs(compan*) or cabs(corporat*) or 
cabs(firm*)) and (cabs(sample*) or cabs(evidence) or cabs(result*) or 
cabs(data) or cabs(investigat*) or cabs(test*) or cabs(empiric*) or 
cabs(survey*) or cabs(examine*)) 
Search command for Business Source 
Premier via EBSCOhost  
 
(hedg* OR derivative*) AND (AB use OR AB using OR AB usage OR AB 
polic* OR AB activit*) AND (compan* OR corporat* OR firm*) AND 
(sample* OR evidence OR result* OR data OR investigat* OR test* OR 
empiric* OR survey* OR examine*) 
Search command for EconBiz
a
 
 
(All Fields:hedg* OR derivative* AND All Fields:use OR using OR usage OR 
polic* OR activit* AND All Fields:compan* OR corporat* OR firm AND All 
Fields:sample OR evidence OR result* OR data OR investigat* OR test* OR 
empiric* OR survey* OR examine*) 
Search command for ScienceDirect 
 
tak(hedg* or derivative*) and (abs(use) or abs(using) or abs(usage) or 
abs(polic*) or abs(activit*)) and tak(compan* or corporat* or firm*) and 
tak(sample* or evidence or result* or data or investigat* or test* or empiric* or 
survey* or examine*) 
SORTING OF RESULTS  
Steps for sorting of results (1) Elimination by study title, (2) elimination by study’s abstract, (3) elimination 
by screening content and (4) eliminating studies with no or negative response 
from the authors to our data request mail. 
The table presents the details of our literature search in electronic databases.  
a For this library, the search term was applied on all fields (title, abstract, keyword, and full text) as the library did not support our standard search command. 
The AND-operator was built by copying each part of the search command in an extra search field. 
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 Appendix C. Overview of the final primary study sample with the corresponding II.1.9.3
references 
Author(s) (Year) Abbrev. Published 
Number of 
observed firms 
Observation period Observed countries 
Aabo et al. (2010) A10 P 213 2005, 2007 Denmark 
Aabo et al. (2013) Aa13 P 186 2008 Denmark 
Adam (2002) A02 P 111 1989-1999 US, Canada 
Adedeji and Baker (2002) AB02 P 140 1996 UK 
Afza and Alam (2011a) AA11a P 105 2004-2008 Pakistan 
Afza and Alam (2011b) AA11b P 86 2004-2007 Pakistan 
Ahmad and Haris (2012) AH12 P 110 2006-2009 Malaysia 
Ahmed et al. (2013) Ah13 G 288 2005-2012 UK 
Alam et al. (2013) Al13 P 1,612 2004-2010 Malaysia 
Allayannis and Weston (1999) AW99 G 916 1994-1995 US 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) AW01 P 120 1990-1995 US 
Allayannis et al. (2012) A12 P 272 1990-1999 Several countries 
Alsubaie (2009) A09 P 55 2001 US 
Bartram (2012) B12 G 6,896 2000-2001 Several countries 
Bartram et al. (2009) B09 P 7,319 2000-2001 Several countries 
Bartram et al. (2011) Ba11 P 6,860 2000-2001 Several countries 
Bashir et al. (2013) Ba13 P 107 2006-2010 Pakistan 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) BB96 P 116 1994 New Zealand 
Berkman et al. (2002) B02 P 106 1995 Australia 
Berrospide et al. (2008) B08 G 167 1997-2005 Brazil 
Brailsford et al. (2005) B05 P 96 2000 Australia 
Brown et al. (2006) B06 P 44 1993-1998 US, Canada 
Brunzell et al. (2011) Br11 P 112 2006 Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Sweden 
Búa et al. (2013) Bú13 P 100 2004-2007 Spain 
Buhr (2010) B10 G 74 2007 New Zealand 
Campello et al. (2011) C11 P 1,185 1996-2002 US 
Capstaff and Marshall (2005) CM05 P 212 2000 UK, France 
Chaudhry et al. (2014) C14 P 75 2007-2011 Pakistan 
Chen and Zhang (2012) CZ12 G 119 2007-2010 China 
Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) CF11 P 1,854 1993-2003 US 
Chiang and Lin (2007) CL07 P 99 1998-2005 Taiwan 
Chiorean et al. (2012) C12 G 3,858 2000-2008 US 
Choi et al. (2013a) C13a P 68 2001-2006 US 
Choi et al. (2013b) C13b G 276 1996-2006 US 
Chou and Lai (2013) CL13 G 125 2005-2010 US 
Clark and Judge (2008) CJ08 P 192 1994 UK 
Clark et al. (2006) C06 G 227 2002 Hong Kong, China 
Croci and Jankensgård (2014) CJ14 G 40 2000-2008 US 
Dadalt et al. (2002) D02 P 752 1992-1996 US 
Dadalt et al. (2012) D12 P 1,327 2002-2004 US 
Davies et al. (2006) D06 P 81 2001 Norway 
De Oliveira and Novaes (2007) ON07 G 343 1999-2002 Brazil 
Dionne and Triki (2013) DT13 P 18 1991-1999 US, Canada 
Dolde and Mishra (2007) DM07 P 493 1996 US 
Donohoe (2011) D11 G 2,772 2000-2008 US 
Elsawaf (2005a) E05a G 209 1996-1998 US 
Elsawaf (2005b) E05b G 474 1993, 1995, 1998 US 
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) DN10 P 1,746 1991-2000 US 
Fehle (1999) F99 P 2,528 1993-1997 US 
Fok et al. (1997) F97 P 396 1990-1992 US 
Gay and Nam (1998) GN98 P 486 1995 US 
Gay et al. (2011) G11 P 1,341 1992-1996, 2002-
2004 
US 
Gebhardt and Ruß (2002) GR02 G 113 1996 Germany 
Géczy et al. (1997) G97 P 372 1990 US 
Géczy et al. (2006) G06 P 19 1993-1995 US 
Glaum (2002) G02 P 65 1998 Germany 
Gleason et al. (2005) G05 G 216 1998 US 
Goldberg et al. (1998) G98 P 410 1993 US 
Gonzalez et al. (2007) G07 G 49 2003 Spain 
Gonzalez et al. (2010) G10 P 96 2004 Spain 
Goswami et al. (2004) G04 P 314 1996 US 
Graham and Rogers (2000) GR00 G 404 1995 US 
Hagelin (2003) Ha03 P 101 1997-2001 Sweden 
Hagelin et al. (2007) Ha07 P 62 1998-1999, 2000-
2001 
Sweden 
Heaney and Winata (2005) HW05 P 374 1999 Australia 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) HK01 P 325 1990-1993 US 
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Hu and Wang (2006) HW06 P 369 2003 Hong Kong 
Huang (2003) Hu03 G 382 1992-1996 US 
Huang and Li (2014) HL14 G 90 2009-2010 Australia 
Huang et al. (2007) Hu07 P 599 1992-1996 US 
Isin et al. (2014) I14 G 32 2000-2012 Several countries 
Jalilvand (1999) J99 P 77 1992-1994 Canada 
Jankensgård (2013) J13 P 207 2009 Sweden 
Jin and Jorion (2006) JJ06 P 66 1998-2001 US 
Jin and Jorion (2007) JJ07 G 44 1991-2000 US, Canada 
Judge (2004) J04 G 356 1995 UK 
Kang (2014) K14 G 831 1997 US 
Kapitsinas (2008) K08 G 81 2004-2006 Greece 
Khediri (2010) K10 P 250 2000-2002 France 
Khediri and Folus (2010) KF10 P 320 2001 France 
Kim et al. (2006) K06 P 424 1998 US 
Klimczak (2008) Kl08 P 150 2001-2003 Poland 
Krajcar et al. (2008) Kr08 P 44 2006 Several countries 
Lai et al. (2012) La12 G 596 2005-2009 Taiwan 
Lee (2001) L01 G 151 1985-1997 US 
Lel (2012) Le12 P 253 1990-1999 Several countries 
Lin (2003) L03 G 1,198 1992-1996 US 
Lin and Lin (2012) LL12 P 39 2002-2004 US 
Lin et al. (2007) L07 P 1,046 1992-1996 US 
Lin et al. (2008) L08 P 494 1992-1996 US 
Lin et al. (2009) L09 P 450 1992-1996 US 
Lin et al. (2010) L10 P 1,045 1992-1996 US 
Magee (2013) Mag13 P 401 1996-2000 US 
Mahayni (2001) M01 G 138 1998 Germany 
Marami and Dubois (2013) MD13 G 967 1998-2005 US 
Marsden and Prevost (2005) MP05 P 185 1994, 1997 New Zealand 
Marshall et al. (2013) Mar13 P 801 2006 UK 
Mefteh-Wali et al. (2012) M12 P 130 1999-2000 France 
Meredith (2002) M02 G 61 1996-1998 US 
Mian (1996) M96 P 3,022 1992 US 
Muff et al. (2008) M08 G 277 2000-2001 UK 
Muller and Verschoor (2005) MV05 G 335 2003 Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium 
Nain (2004) N04 G 1,630 1998-1999 US 
Naito and Laux (2011) NL11 P 434 2009 US 
Nance et al. (1993) N93 P 169 1986 US 
Nguyen (2011) N11 G 423 2000-2001 US 
Nguyen and Faff (2002) NF02 P 235 1999-2000 Australia 
Nguyen and Faff (2007) NF07 G 214 1999-2000 Australia 
Nguyen et al. (2007) N07 P 99 1996, 2000 France 
Panaretou et al. (2013) P13 P 169 2003-2008 UK 
Pérez-González and Yun (2013) PY13 P 203 1960-2007 US 
Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) R09 P 59 1993-1996 US 
Ramlall (2009) PR02 P 225 2005-2006 Mauritius 
Reynolds et al. (2007) Re07 G 99 1994-1999 New Zealand 
Rossi (2007) Ro07 P 212 1996-2004 Brazil 
Rossi (2013) R13 P 200 2007-2009 Brazil 
Rossi and Laham (2008) RL08 G 212 1996-2005 Brazil 
Samitas et al. (2011) S11 P 50 2007-2009 US 
Sang et al. (2013) Sa13 P 112 2000 UK 
Schiozer and Saito (2009) SS09 P 46 2001-2004 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico 
Shu and Chen (2003) SC03 P 391 1997-1999 Taiwan 
Spanò (2007) S07 P 222 1999-2000 UK 
Sprčić (2013) Sp13 G 49 2005 Croatia 
Sprčić and Šević (2012) SS12 P 89 2005 Croatia, Slovenia 
Tufano (1996) T96 P 17 1990-1993 US, Canada 
Velasco (2014) V14 P 74 2007-2011 Philippines 
Wang and Fan (2011) WF11 P 71 2003-2004 US 
Wang et al. (2010) W10 P 31 2002-2008 China 
Wysocki (1998) W98 G 403 1994 US 
Yip and Nguyen (2012) YN12 P 97 2006-2009 Australia 
Yong et al. (2011) Y11 P 235 1999-2000 Australia 
Zhu (2012) Z12 G 579 1994-2008 US 
This table shows the study characteristics for the underlying sample of primary studies. Beside the study code, the corresponding abbreviation is noted, as 
well as if the study has been published or not. “P” stands for published literature. Gray literature, such as dissertations, working and conference paper are 
marked “G”. The primary data examined by the studies is characterized by the observation period and the location of the investigated firms, shown in 
columns four and five. 
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 Appendix D. Results of heterogeneity test and between-study variances from II.1.9.4
univariate meta-analysis 
Proxy Variable Q p-value 𝑇² 
Asset growth rate 130.58 <0.0001*** 0.0655 
Blockholders 19.45 0.0783* 0.0050 
Capex 183.31 <0.0001*** 0.0067 
Cash flow availability 147.10 <0.0001*** 0.0243 
CEO cash 90.14 <0.0001*** 0.0355 
Convertible debt 39.02 0.0002*** 0.0033 
Debt maturity 39.05 <0.0001*** 0.0049 
Dividend yield (binary) 493.23 <0.0001*** 0.0598 
Dividend yield (continuous) 311.99 <0.0001*** 0.0175 
Institutional investors 501.61 <0.0001*** 0.0340 
Intangible assets 44.73 <0.0001*** 0.0140 
Interest coverage ratio 241.36 <0.0001*** 0.0175 
Leverage ratio 1,229.53 <0.0001*** 0.0227 
Liquidity 900.52 <0.0001*** 0.0268 
Number of analysts 222.77 <0.0001*** 0.0373 
Option ownership (binary) 16.61 0.0053*** 0.0186 
Option ownership (continuous) 138.24 <0.0001*** 0.0141 
Preferred stock 198.9 <0.0001*** 0.0280 
Price-earnings ratio 35.68 0.0002*** 0.0067 
Profitability 1,111.74 <0.0001*** 0.0342 
Research and development 854.36 <0.0001*** 0.0318 
Sales growth rate 50.39 <0.0001*** 0.0074 
Share ownership 382.59 <0.0001*** 0.0266 
Size 4,741.20 <0.0001*** 0.0921 
Tangible assets 174.31 <0.0001*** 0.0220 
Tax credits 2,149.22 <0.0001*** 0.4572 
Tax-loss carryforwards (binary) 102.95 <0.0001*** 0.0086 
Tax-loss carryforwards (continuous) 260.50 <0.0001*** 0.0298 
Tenure 65.60 <0.0001*** 0.0302 
Tobin's Q 1,015.93 <0.0001*** 0.0259 
This table presents the results from Cochran’s Q-test with the corresponding p-value, which identifies the intensity of heterogeneity among our study-specific 
effect sizes. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypotheses at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability levels. 𝑇² stands for the magnitude of the effect size-
specific between-study variance estimate, which is a measure of variation of the particular effect size around the mean of the true effect size across the 
examined primary studies. 
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 Appendix E. Mean correlation matrix II.1.9.5
 
Hedging 
dummy 
Dividend yield 
(continuous) 
Institutional 
investors 
Interest 
coverage ratio 
Leverage 
ratio Liquidity 
Option 
ownership 
(continuous) Profitability Capex 
Research and 
development 
Share 
ownership Size 
Tangible 
assets 
Tax-loss 
carryforwards 
(binary) Tobin's Q 
Hedging dummy 1                             
Dividend yield 
(continuous) 0.1124*** 1              
Institutional 
investors 0.1334*** -0.0216 1             
Interest coverage 
ratio -0.0134 -0.0277 -0.0583* 1            
Leverage ratio 0.0666*** 0.0175 -0.0249 -0.2469*** 1           
Liquidity 0.0109 -0.0777*** 0.2526*** 0.0217 0.0481 1          
Option ownership 
(continuous) 0.1074*** 0.1356** 0.0411 0.3264*** -0.1467*** 0.1189** 1         
Profitability -0.0014 0.0152 -0.1088*** -0.1096 0.0954** -0.0471 -0.0431 1        
Capex -0.1094*** -0.1002*** -0.0819*** 0.1201* -0.2081*** -0.0128 0.0743** -0.0935* 1       
Research and 
development 0.0785** -0.0257 0.118 -0.1112 -0.1090*** 0.052 -0.0505 0.029 0.1989* 1      
Share ownership -0.0876*** -0.1385*** -0.1705 0.0248 -0.0231 -0.024 0.0152 0.0029 0.0463* 0.0651*** 1     
Size 0.2639*** 0.1059* 0.0947*** 0.0304 0.1172*** 0.0587 0.1964*** -0.0206 -0.1234*** -0.0405 -0.0762* 1    
Tangible assets 0.1064** -0.0281 -0.0144 0.0439 0.1633*** -0.1562*** -0.0154 0.1513 -0.0368 0.0496*** -0.0542 0.1015* 1   
Tax-loss 
carryforwards 
(binary) 0.0816*** -0.0456 0.0941 -0.0983 0.0973 0.0783 -0.1838 0.1916*** 0.0261 0.1178** -0.0671** 0.0236 0.0785 1  
Tobin's Q 0.0315 -0.0599 -0.0475*** 0.1459* -0.1015* -0.0608 0.3076 -0.0022 0.1141*** 0.0998** 0.0498 -0.0756*** -0.0647 0.0131 1 
This table shows the mean correlation matrix R estimated via GLS with random effects weights across all 132 primary studies. *, ** and *** indicate a 10%, 5%, or 1% significance level, respectively. 
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 Appendix F. Sample distribution over time II.1.9.6
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix G. Sample description II.1.9.7
Criteria 
Statistic 
PUBLISHING TYPE  
Published studies 68.18% 
Unpublished studies 31.82% 
EXAMINED COUNTRIES  
North America 45.45% 
Europe 25.76% 
Asia and Pacific 9.85% 
Australia 9.09% 
South America 4.55% 
Other countries 5.30% 
OBSERVATION PERIOD  
Before 1995 22.66% 
Between 1996 and 2000 33.99% 
Between 2001 and 2005 25.62% 
After 2005 17.73% 
SAMPLE SIZE  
Minimum 17 
Maximum 7319 
Mean 555.96 
Standard deviation 1155.29 
This table gives an overview of the underlying 132 primary studies. 
  
Publication 
year 
Number of studies Mean number of observed firms 
1993 1 169 
1996 3 1,052 
1997 2 384 
1998 3 433 
1999 3 1,174 
2000 1 404 
2001 4 184 
2002 9 182 
2003 4 518 
2004 3 767 
2005 8 263 
2006 7 176 
2007 13 275 
2008 8 202 
2009 5 1,619 
2010 8 472 
2011 13 1,194 
2012 13 1,105 
2013 18 327 
2014 6 190 
This table shows the temporal distribution of our analyzed sample. For each year we 
display the number of studies and the average number of firms in the respective 
sample. 
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 Appendix H. Distribution of effect size estimates and univariate meta-analysis II.1.9.8
results 
 
 
This plot shows the effect size estimates observed from the primary studies for each proxy variable as black dots. The weighted mean correlations (i.e. the 
univariate meta-analytical results) are presented by the red crosses. 
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 Appendix I. Overview of the proxy variables for the corporate tax hypothesis reviewed in the meta-analyses (H1) II.1.9.9
Variable Hyp. sign  Description Classification of the findings by the reviewed studies 
Tax credits + Absolute value of available (investment) tax credits [+] B09, F97, N93 
[0
+
] L07, SC03 
[0
-
] na 
[−] SS12 
Tax-loss carryforwards 
(binary)
a
 
+ Dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if the firm 
has tax-loss carryforwards available and “0” 
otherwise 
[+] BB96, C06, J04 
[0
+
] AB02, AA11a, AA11b, B02, C12, CJ08, D11, G10, HW05, J99, MP05, 
PR02, Sa13 
[0
-
] HW06, M08 
[−] M96 
Tax-loss carryforwards 
(continuous)
a
 
+ Tax-loss carryforwards (scaled) [+] CL13, GN98, G05, N04, V14 
[0
+
] F97, G97, Hu03, K06, Mar13, Sp13 
[0
-
] Hu07, N93, Ro07, SS12, T96 
[−] D06, G11, L03, SC03 
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the paper at hand, including their hypothetical sign for the impact on the corporate hedging decision, as well as the corresponding definition. The hypothesized sign describes the 
theoretical relationship between the proxy and the incentive for corporate hedging. Our variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the reviewed studies and are similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). 
The descriptions are generalizations of the study-specific variable definitions. All variables are analyzed by vote counting and univariate meta-analysis. The variables included in the multivariate meta-analysis are in bold face. The 
last column classifies the proxy-specific findings from the analyzed primary studies in significant positive [+], insignificant positive [0+], insignificant negative [0-] and significant negative [-] relations, by the study name 
abbreviation as presented in Appendix B, with respect to a probability level of 5%. The study abbreviations are explained in Appendix B. 
a The two tax-loss carryforwards variables also serve as a proxies for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis with a theoretical sign of “+”. 
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 Appendix J. Overview of the proxy variables for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis reviewed in the meta-analyses (H2) II.1.9.10
Variable Hyp. sign  Description Classification of the findings by the reviewed studies 
Cash flow availability − Firm’s operating cash flow (scaled) [+] B08, CZ12, C13b, DN10, Re07 
[0
+
] A02, D11, Hu03, I14, L07, R09 
[0
-
] CM05, GR02, N11 
[−] na 
Convertible debta ? Book value of convertible debt (scaled) [+] BB96, C12, Hu07 
[0
+
] F99, GN98, Hu03, J99, J04 
[0
-
] C06, F97, G97, Le12, N93, W98 
[−] na 
Debt maturity + (Logarithm of) Debt that matures in more 
than 1 year 
[+] B09, CJ08, J99, M96, SC03 
[0
+
] C11 
[0
-
] na 
[−] na 
Dividend yield (binary) ? Dummy variable that takes a value of “1” 
if the firm pays dividend to its 
shareholders and “0” otherwise 
[+] Ah13, B09, Ba13, C13a, GR00, Ha07, K08, Re07, RL08, V14 
[0
+
] CL13, J13 
[0
-
] CJ14, K10 
[−] C12 
Dividend yield (continuous) ? Dividend per share (scaled) [+] A09, BB96, C14, C13b, C06, E05a, E05b, F99, J04, Le12, L10, M96, M08, N93, NF02, 
Re07, S07, SS12 
[0
+
] AB02, AA11a, AA11b, D06, F97, Ha03, HW05, J99, M01, MP05, MV05, N04, PR02, 
SC03, W98 
[0
-
] B02, G97, G06, PY13 
[−] Al13, L01, Y11 
Interest coverage ratio − (Logarithm of) Earnings before interest 
and taxes ÷ interest expenses 
[+] AB02, B12, Re07 
[0
+
] AA11a, AA11b, A09, B02, D06, GN98, G02, HW05, HW06, J99, Kl08, M02, Sp13, 
SS12 
[0
-
] BB96, CJ08, F97, G97, G10, N93, Sa13, SC03, W98 
[−] CM05, C12, C06, J04 
Leverage ratiob + Book value of long-term or total debt 
(scaled) 
[+] AB02, Ah13, AW99, B12, BB96, B08, B05, C11, CM05, CF11, C13b, CL13, CJ08, 
C06, DN10, F99, G10, HW05, Hu03, J04, Kr08, La12, L03, L07, M01, MP05, Mar13, 
M12, MV05, N04, NF02, P13, PR02, Re07, Ro07, R13, V14 
[0
+
] AA11a, AA11b, A12, B02, Br11, CJ14, ON07, DT13, D11, E05b, F97, GR02, G06, 
GR00, HK01, HW06, J99, Kl08, LL12, L09, MD13, M02, M96, M08, N11, PY13, R09, 
Sa13, S07, Sp13, T96, YN12 
[0
-
] AH12, A09, Ba13, B10, D02, D06, E05a, G97, G05, G98, G07, G04, Ha03, K08, L10, 
N93, N07, SS09, SC03, SS12, W10 
[−] Al13, C14, C12, D12, Ha07, I14, K10, K06, RL08, S11, WF11, W98, Y11 
Liquidityc − Current assets or cash and cash 
equivalents (scaled) 
[+] AA11b, B08, Bú13, C12, Ha07, WF11, Y11 
[0
+
] A02, A09, Ba13, L07, M02, M08, R09, R13, SS12, W10 
[0
-
] AA11a, AH12, B02, C14, CJ08, D06, DT13, GR02, G97, G10, GR00, Ha03, J99, K06, 
L01, M01, Mar13, MV05, N93, N11, NF02, Ro07, SC03, T96, YN12 
[−] AB02, Al13, B12, BB96, CM05, CL13, C06, CJ14, F99, F97, G11, G98, G07, HW05, 
HL14, J04, La12, MP05, M96, N04, N07, PR02, Re07, RL08, Sa13, S07, V14 
Preferred stock ? Book value of preferred stock (scaled) [+] V14 
[0
+
] C12, ON07, F99, F97, GN98 
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[0
-
] G97, J04, N93 
[−] C06, W98 
Profitability − (Logarithm of) Sales or return on assets 
or EBIT (scaled) 
[+] A12, B12, B08, Br11, B10, CM05, C14, CZ12, CF11, C13b, CL13, D02, DM07, F97, 
G11, G05, J13, K10, Kl08, La12, MD13, N11, N07, Re07, RL08, S11, SC03, YN12 
[0
+
] A02, AA11b, D06, DT13, D11, G10, GR00, Ha07, I14, K14, K08, Kr08, L07, L10, 
MV05, NF07, R09, Ro07 
[0
-
] Ah13, Ba13, B06, Bú13, C12, C13a, CJ08, E05b, GR02, G07, M01, M02, M08, PY13, 
W10 
[−] A10, E05a, DN10, SS09, Sp13 
Size − (Logarithm of) Book value of total assets 
or market value of the firm 
[+] A10, AB02, AH12, Ah13, AW99, A12, B12, Ba13, BB96, B02, B05, B10, C11, CM05, 
CZ12, CL07, C13b, CL13, C06, D02, ON07, DM07, E05a, DN10, F99, F97, G11, GR02, 
G97, G05, G98, G10, G04, GR00, Ha03, Ha07, HW05, HK01, Hu03, HL14, Hu07, J99, 
J13, JJ06, JJ07, J04, K14, K06, Kr08, La12, L01, Le12, L03, L07, L10, MD13, MP05, 
Mar13, M12, M02, M96, M08, MV05, N04, N93, NF02, N07, PY13, R09, PR02, Re07, 
Ro07, R13, RL08, Sa13, SC03, S07, SS12, V14, W98, YN12 
[0
+
] Aa13, Aa13, AA11a, C13a, CJ08, D06, DT13, D11, E05b, G02, LL12, N11, P13, T96 
[0
-
] AA11b, Al13, A09, C14, GN98, G06, HW06, I14, K08, Sp13 
[−] Bú13, C12, CJ14, G07, K10, SS09, WF11, W10, Y11 
Tangible assets − Tangible assets (scaled) [+] HW05, MD13, Re07 
[0
+
] AA11a, AA11b, C11, ON07 
[0
-
] R09, SS09 
[−] Al13, B12 
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the paper at hand, including their hypothetical sign for the impact on the corporate hedging decision, as well as the corresponding definition. The hypothesized sign describes the 
theoretical relationship between the proxy and the incentive for corporate hedging. Our variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the reviewed studies and are similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). The 
descriptions are generalizations of the study-specific variable definitions. All variables are analyzed by vote counting and univariate meta-analysis. The variables included in the multivariate meta-analysis are in bold face. The last 
column classifies the proxy-specific findings from the analyzed primary studies in significant positive [+], insignificant positive [0+], insignificant negative [0-] and significant negative [-] relations, by the study name abbreviation as 
presented in Appendix B, with respect to a probability level of 5%. The study abbreviations are explained in Appendix B. 
a The convertible debt variable serves as proxy for the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity hypothesis with a theoretical sign of “–“ . 
b The leverage variable also serves as a proxy for the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt hypothesis with a theoretical sign of “+“. 
c The liquidity variable also serves as a proxy for the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt hypothesis with a theoretical sign of “–“. 
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 Appendix K. Overview of the proxy variables for the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity hypothesis reviewed in the II.1.9.11
meta-analyses (H3) 
Variable Hyp. sign  Description Classification of the findings by the reviewed studies 
Blockholders’ ownership ? Number of outside investors holding a significant amount 
of shares (usually more than 5%) 
[+] Ha07 
[0
+
] Br11, J13, NF02 
[0
-
] MP05, M02, M08, T96, WF11, W10 
[−] D06, Kl08, Y11 
CEO cash − CEO salary + CEO bonus (scaled) [+] CL13, GR02, Hu07, Mar13, W98 
[0
+
], [0
-
] na 
[−] C13b, CJ14, M08, WF11 
Institutional investors − Percentage or number of shares held by institutional 
investors 
[+] DN10, F97, G97, G10, GR00, Ha03, L09, L10, M01, N04, PR02 
[0
+
] D11, G02, Kl08, MP05, SS12 
[0
-
] AB02, ON07, DT13, G07 
[−] B09, E05b 
Intangible assets a + Intangible assets (scaled) [+] C13a 
[0
+
] Bú13, D11, DN10, G10 
[0
-
] G07, M01 
[−] na 
Number of analysts − (Logarithm of) Number of analysts following the firm [+] D02, G11, G97, P13 
[0
+
] D11, L07, L09 
[0
-
], [−] na 
Option ownership (binary) ? Dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if managers or 
directors own options of the firm and “0” otherwise 
[+] na 
[0
+
] Ha07, Mar13 
[0
-
] Br11, CJ14 
[−] Ha03 
Option ownership (continuous) 
 
? 
 
(Logarithm of) Number, percentage or market value of 
options held by managers or directors 
[+] B09, DT13, G97, GR00 
[0
+
] GN98, Hu07, M02, SS12, T96, Y11 
[0
-
] HW05, M08, NF02, PR02, Sa13, WF11 
[−] N04 
Share ownership + (Logarithm of) Number, percentage, or market value of 
shares held by managers or directors 
[+] G10, GR00, Ha03, MP05, N04, Y11 
[0
+
] DT13, G97, Hu07, Le12, PR02, Sa13, SC03, T96 
[0
-
] AH12, BB96, Br11, CL13, G07, J99, J13, SS12 
[−] AB02, AA11b, B02, ON07, DM07, DN10, F97, GN98, HW05, M01, 
Mar13, M02, M08, NF02, S07, V14, WF11, W98 
Tenure ? (Logarithm of) Number of years that the officer(s) hold in 
their current job 
[+] WF11 
[0
+
] Hu07 
[0
-
] CJ14, K14, SS12 
[−] Hu03 
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the paper at hand, including their hypothetical sign for the impact on the corporate hedging decision, as well as the corresponding definition. The hypothesized sign describes the theoretical relationship 
between the proxy and the incentive for corporate hedging. Our variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the reviewed studies and are similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). The descriptions are generalizations of the study-
specific variable definitions. All variables are analyzed by vote counting and univariate meta-analysis. The variables included in the multivariate meta-analysis are in bold face. The last column classifies the proxy-specific findings from the analyzed 
primary studies in significant positive [+], insignificant positive [0+], insignificant negative [0-] and significant negative [-] relations, by the study name abbreviation as presented in Appendix B, with respect to a probability level of 5%. The study 
abbreviations are explained in Appendix B. 
a “Intangible assets” complements the proxy variables analyzed by Aretz and Bartram (2010).  
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 Appendix L. Overview of the proxy variables for the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt II.1.9.12
hypothesis reviewed in the meta-analyses (H4) 
Variable Hyp. sign  Description Classification of the findings by the reviewed studies 
Asset growth rate + Current year change in net tangible assets + 
depreciation (scaled) 
[+] na 
[0+] NF07, R13 
[0-] BB96, B02, B06, B10, D11, R09 
[−] AA11b, V14 
Capex + Capital expenditures (scaled) [+] A02, B08, C11, CL13, G11, K10 
[0
+
] C12, C13a, D11, K08, L07, PY13, SS12 
[0
-
] Ah13, A12, CF11, GR00, Ha07, HW06, I14, J04, N11, R09, W10 
[−] B12, Ba13, CJ14, G97, J13, SS09, Sp13 
Price-earnings ratio + Earnings per share ÷ share price [+] B02, Re07 
[0
+
] AB02, C12, GN98, MP05, YN12 
[0
-
] C06, HW06, J04, M01 
[−] na 
Research and development + Research and development expenses (scaled) [+] C12, C13a, C13b, C06, DM07, F97, G97, G05, G98, K06, L01, N93 
[0
+
]A10, A12, Bú13, B10, CJ08, GN98, L07, S07, SS12 
[0
-
] D11, GR00, HW06, J04, K14, Kl08, L03, M08 
[−] Ah13, AW99, B12, CF11, MD13, N04 
Sales growth rate a + Current year or 4-year change in firm’s sales [+] na 
[0
+
] D11, P13 
[0
-
] GR02 
[−] Ba11, N11, Re07 
Tobin's Q + (Logarithm of) Market value of firm ÷ book value of 
total assets 
[+] AW01, B08, C12, DM07, E05b, G97, Ha03, Hu03, Re07, Ro07, RL08, 
S11, W98, Y11 
[0
+
] AA11a, AA11b, AH12, Ba13, B06, Bú13, C11, CM05, C14, D06, ON07, 
GN98, GR02, G02, G05, J99, J13, K08, K06, Kl08, La12, L07, L10, Mar13, 
PY13, PR02, SC03 
[0
-
] A09, Br11, CJ08, C06, D11, DN10, G06, G10, Ha07, HW06, JJ07, J04, 
L01, M01, MP05, M08, N11, NF02, N07, P13, S07, W10 
[−] Ah13, A12, B12, CL13, CJ14, G07, HW05, Hu07, K14, KF10, M12, M96, 
MV05, N04, NL11 
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the paper at hand, including their hypothetical sign for the impact on the corporate hedging decision, as well as the corresponding definition. The hypothesized sign describes the 
theoretical relationship between the proxy and the incentive for corporate hedging. Our variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the reviewed studies and are similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). The 
descriptions are generalizations of the study-specific variable definitions. All variables are analyzed by vote counting and univariate meta-analysis. The variables included in the multivariate meta-analysis are in bold face. The last 
column classifies the proxy-specific findings from the analyzed primary studies in significant positive [+], insignificant positive [0+], insignificant negative [0-] and significant negative [-] relations, by the study name abbreviation as 
presented in Appendix B, with respect to a probability level of 5%. The study abbreviations are explained in Appendix B. 
a “Sales growth rate” complements the proxy variables analyzed by Aretz and Bartram (2010). 
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II.2 Research Paper 2: “How do soccer matches and competitions 
really influence stock markets? A review of recent empirical 
evidence” 
Author: Matthias Walter 
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Abstract: 
The economic meaning of soccer has increased significantly in recent years; as a result, the 
number of empirical studies analyzing soccer’s effects on stock markets has grown. These 
studies show that soccer’s effect on stock markets can be explained from both rational and 
irrational perspectives. From a rational perspective, a soccer club’s financial performance 
is a function of its sporting performance. From an irrational perspective, soccer “solely” 
affects investors’ mood and consequently their investment behavior. Hence, soccer is a 
suitable subject to test the efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral alternative 
hypothesis, particularly because in the case of soccer, match information becomes available 
for all market participants simultaneously. Consequently, the paper provides a thorough 
review of the recent empirical evidence and aggregates existing knowledge to an overall 
level. In this regard, we show that soccer in general influences stock returns and that capital 
markets seem to be driven predominantly by moods.  
JEL-classification: G020, G140 
Keywords: Behavioral Finance, Market Efficiency, Sentiment, Soccer, Stock Market 
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II.2.1 Introduction 
The 2014 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in Brazil 
once again proved that soccer affects peoples’ sentiments worldwide, perhaps more so than 
any other sport. Consequently, the era in which soccer was solely a type of sport is long 
past. Further, soccer’s meaning for the global economy has significantly increased over 
recent decades. For instance, the 2014 World Cup generated total revenue of US$4.8 billion 
(FIFA 2015), implying an expected increase of 30% compared with the total revenue of 
US$3.7 of the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa (FIFA 2011). For soccer clubs, a 
significant increase in economic relevance is also observable. In 2010, the most valuable 
soccer club in the world was Manchester United FC, with a team value of US$1.84 billion, 
revenue of US$459 million, and an operating income of US$150 million (Forbes 2010). In 
contrast, Real Madrid CF, currently the most valuable soccer club, had a team value of 
US$3.44 billion in 2014, demonstrating an increase of nearly 100% compared with 
Manchester United FC in 2010. During the 2012–13 season, Real Madrid CF generated 
revenue of US$675 million and had an operating income of US$172 million (Ozanian 
2014). Although Real Madrid CF is an example of a club that is not listed on a stock market, 
numerous soccer clubs are listed across European stock markets. For instance, the STOXX 
Europe Football index currently includes 22 European soccer clubs.  
Because stock market reactions following the matches of these clubs or national teams can 
be observed regularly, one of the most “popular” debates in financial research can be 
considered with regard to soccer: Are financial markets efficient in the sense of, e.g., Fama 
et al. (1969), or are they driven by moods, thus supporting the behavioral alternative 
hypothesis that derives from Shiller et al. (1984)?  
Because of its tremendous economic impact, soccer influences the future cash flows of 
either clubs or their sponsors respectively companies from interconnected sectors (e.g., 
sportswear sector). For instance, a win is associated with higher cash flow in the future, 
because with increasing sporting success, among other benefits, more merchandising items 
are sold and more fans attend matches. Thus, market reactions following matches, 
particularly for market-listed clubs, can be explained in a rational manner. However, 
psychological and financial research provides evidence that soccer strongly influences fans’ 
sentiments (e.g., Hirt et al. 1992; Kerr et al. 2005) and that soccer fans can be found in all 
social classes (Edmans et al. 2007). Consequently, soccer could also influence stock market 
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participants and their investment decisions (Lucey and Dowling 2005), which in turn may 
lead to behavior-driven market reactions.  
In the literature, numerous studies have been conducted to explore the influence of soccer 
matches and competitions on stock markets and consequently to help find an answer to the 
market efficiency debate. Despite, or perhaps because of, the large number of studies, the 
empirical evidence is mixed. The heterogeneous findings are reasoned predominantly by 
differences in data samples, study objects, and different methodological approaches. For 
example, some studies analyze the impact of club matches on stock markets and some 
consider the impact of national team matches. Further, some of the periods examined are 
hard to compare in the context of soccer’s meaning to the economy.  
Thus, the aim of our paper is three-fold. First, we want to provide a review of the different 
studies. In order to not only describe the results of these studies but also to deliver new 
evidence, we aggregate the findings by means of an approach similar to the vote counting 
method. By doing so, we aim to present generalized statements regarding the influence of 
soccer on stock markets in general and to provide the specific key drivers of this influence. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no structured and comprehensive review available 
that synthesizes studies and provides a holistic overview of the different contributions 
respectively heterogeneous findings. Even the popular and comprehensive work of Dobson 
and Goddard (2011), The Economics of Football, does not analyze in detail soccer’s impact 
on stock markets. In contrast, our paper covers 42 studies, identified through a structured 
literature search process. Second, although not all of the 42 studies explicitly analyze the 
presence of market efficiency, by providing such a comprehensive review, we want to offer 
a more general answer to the question of whether stock markets with regard to soccer are 
efficient or are driven by behavioral factors. Third, based on our findings, we want to 
provide opportunities for further research. Consequently, we formulated four concise 
research questions derived from the three aforementioned aims.  
RQ1: Referring to the current state of the art, which methodological approaches and data 
sets have been examined in order to analyze the impact of soccer on stock markets? 
RQ2: Referring to the current state of the art, are stock markets generally influenced by 
soccer, and what are the main sport-related drivers for this influence? 
RQ3:  Are stock markets in the context of soccer efficient, or driven by moods?  
RQ4:  Concerning the impact of soccer on stock markets, are there any research gaps that 
can be identified and that lead to recommendations for further research? 
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To answer these questions, we follow the commonly accepted process for literature reviews, 
based on, e.g., Cooper and Hedges (1994) and Webster and Watson (2002). Consequently, 
after formulating the research problem in this section, we provide a brief overview of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral alternative hypothesis in terms of soccer in 
section II.2.2. In section II.2.3, we elaborate on our evaluation of the literature in order to 
identify existing studies that examine soccer’s influence on stock markets. In section II.2.4, 
we compile the key findings regarding the different methodologies and data samples (RQ1) 
and soccer’s influence on stock markets (RQ2) from the different studies and try to provide 
an answer to whether stock markets in terms of soccer are efficient or not (RQ3). In section 
II.2.5, the current state of related research is analyzed with regard to opportunities for future 
studies (RQ 4). Finally, section II.2.6 summarizes the key findings. 
II.2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
Assessing the influence of soccer on stock markets helps to find an answer to one of the 
most controversial questions in financial research: Are financial markets efficient; namely, 
do investors behave in a fully rational manner and is all available information completely 
processed and reflected in market prices? Fama et al. (1969) test the incorporation of 
publicly available information in stock prices. When a stock price contains all relevant 
information relating to a specific underlying (e.g., company), it is assumed that the price is 
changed only by the publication of new information. Using the example of stock splits, 
Fama et al. (1969) show that the incorporation of new information in stock prices is 
completed almost as soon as they become public. Thus, in an efficient market, stock prices 
adjust rapidly to new information. This theory is also confirmed by, e.g., Stoll and Whiley 
(1990), thereby showing that the appearance of public information has a direct impact on 
listed companies’ stock prices. 
Nevertheless, in “traditional” industries it is often hard to identify the release of new public 
information and thus the corresponding market reaction because value-relevant public 
information is often released infrequently and in a confounding manner (e.g., during trading 
hours). In contrast, sporting events in general and soccer matches in particular elude these 
shortcomings, as they occur regularly (e.g., weekly), are easy to quantify (at the simplest 
level, win or lose), and mostly appear at times when stock markets are closed (late in the 
evening, at night, and at weekends); thus, the results become available for all market 
participants at the same time. However, sports in general and soccer in particular strongly 
affect people’s, and thus also investors’, sentiment. Consequently, two different 
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explanations for a stock market reaction following the release of new match-related 
information must be distinguished: the stock market reaction can be caused by rational 
economic considerations or it can be caused by irrational changes in investors’ sentiment. 
Depending on which effect is observable, one can confirm the hypothesis of efficient 
markets or the behavioral alternative hypothesis derived from Shiller et al. (1984). With 
regard to the latter hypothesis, Shiller et al. (1984) propose that stock prices are heavily 
influenced by social dynamics and psychological effects, e.g., fashion or sentiments. Both 
lines of reasoning are now briefly considered. 
Following, among others, Brown and Hartzell (2001), who examine the coherence of the 
publicly traded basketball club Boston Celtics of the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
and stock markets, the rational explanation is based on the belief that a club’s share price is 
a function of the club’s financial performance, which in turn is a function of sporting 
performance. This assumption is based mainly on the impact of successful sporting 
performances on cash flows, thus contributing to firm value. Although Brown and Hartzell 
(2001) analyze an NBA club, the cash flow impact of success in soccer is virtually the 
same.
32
  
 Sporting success leads to better game attendance and thus to higher revenue (including 
regular ticket sales and luxury box leasing). Further, sporting success offers the 
opportunity to increase ticket prices. 
 (Long-term) sporting success leads to an increase in advertising and licensing revenue 
(e.g., higher team-related merchandising sales).  
 Depending on the country, (long-term) sporting success leads to higher revenue because 
of the sale of TV broadcasting rights.  
 Sporting success may lead to more and higher value sponsoring deals. 
 When a club qualifies to participate in an international tournament, additional revenue in 
the form of millions of dollars is generated. Winning such a tournament generates even 
further income. 
 Aside from the direct cash flow impact, sporting success contributes to the value of a 
club’s reputation and thus the value of the franchise.  
In sum, good performances in soccer matches and competitions mean higher cash flow, 
which increases the fundamental value of the club. Thus, increases in stock market prices 
                                            
32
 The relation between a club’s financial performance and sporting performance is even more distinct for 
soccer because in the case of the NBA, sporting success is negatively correlated with the club’s position in next 
season’s draft order. Thus, in at least some respects, sporting success in basketball is even “penalized”. 
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following wins and decreases following losses can be explained in terms of investors’ 
rational behavior, thereby indicating market efficiency. 
Hence, based on these theoretical considerations, we propose four major hypotheses 
regarding the rational influence of soccer matches on stock markets. Table II.2-1 presents an 
overview of the four major hypotheses and the predicted market reactions. 
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Table II.2-1 Hypotheses and predicted market reactions depending on match results  
Hypothesis Description Match result Predicted 
reactiona 
H1: Wins positively affect 
stock market returns, and 
losses negatively affect 
stock market returns. 
Wins lead to higher cash flow and thus to an increase in fundamental value and a positive influence on stock returns. The opposite applies for losses. 
For draws, the sportive and thus financial consequences are less negative compared with those of losses (“one point is more than no points”). Thus, the 
influence on stock returns from an ex ante position is unclear. 
Win + 
Loss - 
Draw ? 
H2: The results of 
important matches affect 
stock market returns more 
strongly than “normal” 
matches. 
Important matches can be matches against direct rivals or local derbies; domestic cup matches; international competition matches (e.g., UEFA 
Champions League, the World Cup, or a continental championship); “post-March matches” (played at the end of the season, when “decisions are 
made”); an elimination match (“up or out”); and relegation and promotion matches (i.e., matches to determine whether a club stays in the league for 
the next season or advances to a higher league). Important matches can increase or decrease the probability of a successful season. In addition, 
important matches are often associated with higher success premiums (wins) or the prevention of higher cash flow in the future (losses); thus 
wins/losses may have a stronger positive/negative impact on firm value than “normal” matches, leading to higher positive/negative (abnormal) returns 
compared with wins in “normal” matches. For draws, the hypothesized market reaction remains unclear because draws in elimination matches still 
provide the opportunity to proceed to the next stage. 
Important Win ++ 
Important Loss -- 
 Important Draw ? 
H3: Stock market 
reactions are mainly 
driven by non-expected 
results. 
The expected match outcome (quantified by, e.g., betting odds) is already priced prior to the match. Thus, market reactions to wins or losses should be 
stronger when a result is more unexpected because unexpected wins or losses increase the probability to reach/fail the objective for the season. 
However, when a result is strongly expected, a weak (insignificant) positive/negative market reaction can agree with the efficient market hypothesis 
because betting odds always imply a certain residual probability for an alternative result.  
Expected 
Win/Loss/Draw 
o/o/? 
Unexpected 
Win/Loss/Draw 
+(+)/-(-)/? 
H4: Overall, losses affect 
stock market returns more 
strongly than wins. 
The monetary consequences of a loss can be worse than for a win. For example, a win in an elimination match “only” means reaching the next stage 
(unless it is the final game), thus providing the chance to generate higher cash flow. However, a loss in an elimination match immediately eliminates a 
club from a tournament, thus denying the opportunity for further cash flow. The same holds for a loss in the last match of the season, e.g., leading to 
non-qualification for an international tournament. In order to explain market efficiency from this hypothesis, it is necessary to examine the extent of 
the gap between the market reactions to wins and losses.  
Win/Loss |+| < |-| 
a For each match result, the predicted market reaction is indicated. A “++” indicates high positive abnormal returns; “+” indicates positive (abnormal) returns; “-” indicates negative (abnormal) returns; and “--” indicates 
high negative (abnormal) returns. An “o” indicates weak (insignificant) market reactions and a “question mark” indicates an unclear direction. |+| and |-| indicate positive and negative (abnormal) returns respectively in 
absolute terms. 
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In contrast to rational explanations, market reactions following soccer matches can also be 
explained in terms of behavioral effects based on the bounded-rational or even irrational 
behavior of market participants. The behavioral alternative hypothesis tries to explain capital 
market anomalies (e.g., abnormal returns), combining cognitive psychological theories, e.g., 
sentiments and moods, with common financial theories (Baker and Nofsinger 2010). In 
order to examine the effect of investors’ sentiment on capital market returns, Edmans et al. 
(2007) provide three characteristics of a “good” mood variable. First, the variable must show 
a substantial and clear impact on sentiments to guarantee that the effect really influences 
asset prices. Second, the mood variable must influence the mood of a large proportion of a 
specific population, otherwise only a few investors may be affected. Third, the effect of the 
mood variable must be correlated across most individuals within a population. For instance, 
Hirshleifer and Ahumway (2003) use sunshine duration as a mood variable, showing the 
highly significant effect of sunshine on stock returns, thereby enabling investors to gain 
substantial benefits from weather-based trading strategies. In addition, Kamstra et al. (2000) 
analyze the influence of changes in investors’ sleeping patterns on stock indices’ returns. 
Edmans et al. (2007) introduce soccer results (win/draw/loss) as a mood variable because 
sports in general and soccer in particular have a significant influence on sentiments. Indeed, 
especially in Europe, it is hard to identify any events other than soccer matches that 
influence sentiments in such a large proportion of a country’s population.  
With regard to the mood variable “soccer match result,” it is doubtful whether fans treat 
wins and losses “equally.” The literature provides several suggestions that losses may be 
more strongly valued by fans than wins (as already discussed from a rational perspective in 
H4). This phenomenon can be explained through prospect theory, which claims that gains 
and losses are measured against a specific reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
For soccer, because of an “allegiance bias” (e.g., Markmann and Hirt 2002; Wann et al. 
2001), this reference point is often an ex ante estimated win, thus leading to a greater stock 
price reaction following a loss. Consequently, confirmation of hypothesis H4 does not 
necessarily confirm the existence of efficient markets. 
An example of obvious irrational behavior is a stronger market reaction after (domestic) 
away wins than after (domestic) home wins because this reaction neither agrees with the 
aforementioned hypotheses nor is rational. The same holds for an increase in stock prices 
after a lost match. Further, a strong stock market reaction following national team matches is 
hard to explain from a rational viewpoint because national teams are not related to a single 
stock, thus indicating no direct cash flow impact (although one can argue that a national 
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team win has a positive influence on the cash flow of the national team’s sponsor and that a 
win can stimulate consumer behavior, thus leading to higher sales within the national 
economy and consequently to higher cash flows among listed companies). 
Numerous studies examining the influence of soccer matches on stock markets analyze the 
four aforementioned hypotheses. Although not all of these studies explicitly discuss the 
presence of market efficiency (e.g., some of the studies examine the influence of mood on 
financial decision-making), each study nonetheless delivers some evidence for market 
efficiency and the behavioral alternative hypothesis. Because such studies reach 
heterogeneous findings, this paper aims to provide a thorough overview of the research topic 
and tries to provide a more comprehensive answer to the question of whether or not stock 
markets with regard to soccer are efficient. 
II.2.3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 
 Identification II.2.3.1
In a similar fashion to other literature examinations (e.g., Müller 2014), the following review 
uses multidimensional classification to structure the literature. First, the literature is 
analyzed with regard to the different methodological approaches and data sets that have been 
used to examine soccer’s impact on stock markets (RQ1). Second, the results from the 
various studies are systematically analyzed (RQ2, RQ3) and the need for further research is 
derived (RQ4). Thus, to provide a holistic and precise overview of the literature, it is 
necessary to identify all relevant articles from this field of research in a systematic manner. 
Consequently, we conducted a focused web search of the major online databases, Proquest, 
ScienceDirect, and EBSCOhost,
33
 combing the search terms (“football” OR “soccer”) and 
(“stock” OR “share”), and using title and abstract as search fields. These search terms are 
relatively broad and were chosen in order to avoid unintended exclusions because this field 
of research is rather a “niche”. By using this broad search approach, we were also able to 
consider articles about the impact of (international) soccer events (e.g., the FIFA World 
Cup) on investment behavior. Our search achieved 610 results (after eliminating duplicates).  
Because our search procedure still yielded numerous unrelated articles, e.g., articles dealing 
with American football and rugby, betting issues, and the influence of football events on a 
country’s economy at a macroeconomic level, we screened the resulting hits for relevance. 
Thus, we screened the abstracts and the articles to see whether they focus on the impact of 
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 The following databases were used within EBSCOhost: Business Source Premier, EconLit, and eBook 
Collection. 
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soccer results or competitions on stock markets, including single stocks and stock indices. 
We also excluded studies that, for instance, analyse the impact of a clubs’ match results on 
the industrial growth rate (e.g., Berument and Yucel 2005), the impact of economic success 
on the sporting performance (e.g., Baur and McKeating 2011; Ozawa et al. 2004), the stock 
market effects of the sale of live broadcasting rights (e.g., Gannon et al 2006) respectively 
the impact of soccer competitions on stock prices of jersey sponsors (e.g., Hanke and 
Kirchler 2013). After searching the above-mentioned databases, we obtained 25 relevant 
studies. By means of forward and backward reference searches, we obtained another 17 
relevant studies, including six working papers. By including “grey literature”, namely 
unpublished working papers, we tried to reduce the threat of publication bias in our 
systematic review. The major source of this threat is that studies containing insignificant 
results are published less frequently than studies reporting significant results. Further, it is 
important to note that the current study does not claim to be fully comprehensive. Although 
every effort has been made to include all relevant research, it is likely that studies exist of 
which the authors are not aware. Finally, to provide a holistic view, the timely scope of 
articles is unlimited but ends with September 2015. A descriptive overview of the 42 studies 
examined is presented in Table II.2-2. 
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Table II.2-2 Descriptive overview of the studies examined (in alphabetical order) 
Reference (year) Main analytical approacha Sample examined 
Object of study Match/tournament sample size Observation period 
Ashton et al. (2003) Event study (generalized method of moments) National team on index 210 matches of the England national soccer team 1984–2002 
Ashton et al. (2011)  Descriptive statistics 
 Event study (nonparametric binomial test) 
 Regression model (OLS and GARCH) 
National team on index 290 matches of the England national soccer team 1984–2009 
Bell et al. (2012) Regression analysis (OLS) Club on single stock 5,187 matches of 19 quoted English soccer clubs 2000–2008 
Benkraiem et al. (2009) Event study (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) Club on single stock 745 matches of 18 quoted European soccer clubs 2006–2007 
Benkraiem et al. (2011) Regression analysis (EGARCH) Club on index 408 matches of eight quoted UK soccer clubs 2006–2007 
Berlemann and Vöpel (2012) Field experiment National team on 
experimental stock market 
All 64 matches of the 2010 World Cup 2010 
Bernile and Lyandres (2009) Regression analysis (OLS) Club on single stock 595 matches of the UEFA Champions League/UEFA Euro League with 
at least one quoted European soccer club 
2000–2006 
Berument et al. (2006) Regression analysis (GARCH-M) Club on single stock UEFA Champions League matches of three quoted Turkish soccer 
clubs (number not reported) 
1987–2002 
Berument et al. (2009) Regression analysis (transfer function analysis) Club on index International matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs (number not 
reported) 
1987–2006 
Berument et al. (2013) Regression analysis (EGARCH) Club on index 385 international matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs 1990–2011 
Berument and Ceylan (2012a) Regression analysis (EGARCH) Club on index 1,543 international matches of 13 soccer clubs from Chile, Spain, 
Turkey, and the UK 
1977–2007 
Berument and Ceylan (2012b) Regression analysis (EGARCH) Club on index International matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs NA 
Boido and Fasano (2007)  Descriptive statistics Club on single stock 157 matches of quoted Italian soccer clubs 2005–2006 
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 Event study (Shapiro–Wilk normality test, 
Welch two sample t-test) 
Brahmana (2011)  Probability distribution 
 Event study (correlation test, Holt–Winters 
method, Kruskal–Wallis test, Wilcoxon 
signed-ranked test) 
Club on index 10 finals of the UEFA Champions League 1999–2009 
Castellani et al. (2013) Event study (OLS, SUR) Club on single stock 2,157 matches of all quoted European soccer clubs 2007–2009 
Demir and Danis (2011) Regression analysis (OLS) Club on single stock Matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs (number not reported) 2004–2009 
Demir and Rigoni (2014) Event study (OLS) Club on single stock Matches of quoted Italian soccer clubs (number not reported) 2004–2010 
Dimic et al. (2015) Event study (OLS) Club on single stock 4,347 matches of 13 quoted European soccer clubs 2000-2013 
Duque and Ferreira (2008) Regression analysis (ARCH, GARCH) Club on single stock 330 national championship matches of quoted Portuguese soccer clubs 1998–2002 
Edmans et al. (2007) Regression analysis (OLS, GARCH) National team on index 1,162 tournament matches of 39 worldwide national teams 1973–2004 
Floros (2014) Regression analysis (TGARCH) Club on single stock 179 matches of four soccer clubs from Italy, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands 
2006–2011 
Fung et al. (2015) Regression analysis (OLS, GARCH, panel data 
analysis) 
Club and national team on 
index 
278 international matches of the Turkish national team and 3 quoted 
Turkish soccer clubs 
1999-2011 
Gerlach (2011) Regression analysis (OLS) National team on index 464 World Cup matches of 32 worldwide national teams 1974–2002 
Jørgensen et al. (2012) Regression analysis (news model of asset price 
determination) 
Club on single stock 119 national matches of the quoted Danish soccer club Brøndby IF 2009–2011 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010) Event study (OLS, GARCH) National team on index 304 trading days in the course of past World Cups relative to 14,375 
trading days beyond World Cups 
1950–2006 
Klein et al. (2009a) Replication study National team on index 210 matches of the England national soccer team 1984–2002 
Klein et al. (2009b) Event study (constant mean model, two-state 
Markov-switching market model) 
National team on index 1,017 European and World Cup matches (including qualification 
matches) of 14 European national soccer teams 
1990–2006 
Kolaric et al. (2015) Event Study (GARCH) National team on index 1,466 tournament matches of 41 worldwide national teams 1998-2012 
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Özdurak and Ulusoy (2013) Regression analysis (GARCH) Club on single stock Matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs (number not reported) 2011–2012 
Palomino et al. (2009) Own approach (based on event studies) Club on single stock 916 matches of 16 quoted English soccer clubs 1999–2002 
Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2002)  Event study (Student’s t-test) 
 Regression analysis (OLS) 
Club on single stock 840 matches of 17 quoted UK soccer clubs 1995–1998 
Samagaio et al. (2009) Structural equation modeling Club on single stock 235 matches of 16 quoted English soccer clubs 1995–2007 
Saraç and Zeren (2013) Regression analysis (OLS) Club on single stock 882 matches of three quoted Turkish soccer clubs 2005–2012 
Scholtens and Peenstra (2009) Event study (Student’s t-test, Corrado’s rank test) Club on single stock 1,274 matches of eight quoted European soccer clubs 2000–2004 
Stadtmann (2004) Regression analysis (news model of asset price 
determination) 
Club on single stock 98 matches of one quoted German soccer club 2000–2002 
Stadtmann (2006) Regression analysis (reversed news model of 
asset price determination) 
Club on single stock 175 matches of one quoted German soccer club 2000–2004 
Stöckl and Schulz (2007) “Sportive success and share price” model Club on single stock 161 matches of one quoted German soccer club 2002–2006 
Sun and Wu (2015) Regression analysis (news model of asset price 
determination, reversed news model of asset 
price determination) 
Club on single stock 215 matches of one quoted Italian soccer club 2001-2006 
Tufan (2004)  Descriptive statistics 
 Event study (Jargue–Bera test, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test) 
National team on index All 64 matches of the 2002 World Cup 2002 
Tufan and Hamarat (2014)  Descriptive statistics 
 Event study (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, 
Kruskal–Wallis test) 
 Regression analysis (logistic regression test) 
Club on single stock Matches of quoted Turkish soccer clubs (number not reported) 2005–2011 
Vieira (2013) Regression analysis (OLS) National team on index All 31 matches of the 2008 European Cup 2008 
Zuber et al. (2005) Regression analysis (OLS) Club on single stock 1,072 matches of 10 quoted English soccer clubs 1997–2000 
a OLS is ordinary least squares; GARCH is generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity; EGARCH is exponential GARCH; GARCH-M is GARCH-in-mean; TGARCH is threshold GARCH; ARCH is 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity; and SUR is seemingly unrelated regressions. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 104 
 Description of Relevant Literature II.2.3.2
As Table II.2-2 shows, the selected 42 studies can be described in terms of their analytical 
approaches and the samples examined. Table II.2-3 presents aggregated “descriptive 
statistics” of the selected studies’ analytical approaches and data samples. 
Table II.2-3 Aggregated overview of analytical approaches and samples examined 
Analytical approach Sample examined 
Object of study Region examined Period of study 
Descriptive statistics: 
4  
Club on single stock: 
24 
Denmark: 
1 
Before 1980: 
4 
Event study:  
15 
Club on index: 
5 
Europe (> 1 country): 
9 
1981–85: 
7 
Regression analysis: 
25  
of which 
National team on index: 
13 
Germany: 
3 
1986–90: 
11 
ARCH/(T)GARCH/EGARCH(-M) 
11 
Other: 
1 
Portugal: 
1 
1991–95: 
13 
OLS regression: 
11 
 
Italy: 
3 
1996–00: 
25 
Other: 
8 
 Turkey: 
9 
2001–05: 
31 
Other:  
7 
 The UK: 
9 
2006–10: 
27 
  Worldwide (>1 country): 
7 
After 2010: 
9 
   Not reported: 
1 
Entries in alphabetical/chronological order; absolute values are in relation to the total number of studies; multiple mentions of “analytical 
approach”, “object of study”, and “period of study” are possible because the study covers multiple subcategories; and the most frequent 
entries in each category are in bold font. 
In order to answer research question RQ1, the highlights of the different categories are 
presented hereafter. 
II.2.3.2.1. Analytical approach 
Considering the analytical approaches, 55% of the 42 analyzed studies use regression 
analysis methods. Here, in turn, 11 studies conduct standard OLS regressions with soccer-
related variables (e.g., dummy variables for win/loss or the goal difference) as independent 
variables. However, several studies from our sample show that the volatility of the analyzed 
time series (e.g., stock returns) varies over time, thus implying heteroskedasticity and 
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violating one of the major assumptions of the standard OLS estimation. In addition, another 
11 studies use autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) family models, 
originally proposed by Engle (1982) and enhanced by Bollerslev (1986) and Nelson (1991). 
Only the studies of Ashton et al. (2011) and Edmans et al. (2007) use both standard OLS 
regression and an ARCH family model. Thus, most studies that use regression analysis 
exclusively apply standard OLS regression, despite the fact that the examined time series 
may be heteroskedastic (Finding 1). 
Regarding the event study approach, which aims to examine the (abnormal) returns for a 
specific event (in our case soccer matches or competitions), we observe 15 studies (36%) in 
our sample. The most interesting finding regarding the event studies conducted in our 
sample is the heterogeneity of approaches used in order to test the statistical significance of 
(abnormal) returns. For example, Ashton et al. (2003) use generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation, whereas Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2002) and Scholtens and Peenstra 
(2009) conduct a Student’s t-test. The latter authors also conduct Corrado’s rank test to 
account for non-normality in data distribution. In addition, two approaches are conducted by 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010), who use the aforementioned standard OLS regression and a 
GARCH model, and by Klein et al. (2009b), who conduct a constant mean model as well as 
a two-state Markov-switching market model. This heterogeneity of event study approaches 
makes it very difficult to compare the results of the different studies and thus to draw overall 
conclusions (Finding 2).  
Overall, we observe some patterns regarding the applied methodologies. In particular, we 
analyzed the three most frequently applied methodologies (event studies, OLS, and (E, 
G)ARCH regressions) with regard to the observed results. According to this, when 
conducting event studies, 44% of the results show at least the predicted sign. For OLS and 
(E, G)ARCH regression, we observed the predicted result in only 29% and 24% 
respectively. 
II.2.3.2.2. Samples examined 
The research regarding the impact of soccer matches on stock markets can be separated by 
using three categories and their corresponding core questions: (1) the object of study (“What 
was analyzed?”), (2) the examined region (“Where was it analyzed?”), and (3) the period of 
study (“When was it analyzed?”).  
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Regarding the “What,” we observe that most studies in our sample (57%) analyze the 
impact of club matches on stock markets, with only five studies examining the impact of 
club matches on stock indices. Another 31% of the studies analyze the impact of national 
team matches on stock markets. Such studies include those on the impact of matches in the 
course of major international football competitions (continental tournaments and the FIFA 
World Cup). Because national teams by their nature cannot be market-listed, these studies 
solely examine the impact of soccer on stock indices. Only the study of Fung et al. (2015) 
examines both, national team and club matches simultaneously (with one-fifth of the sample 
comprising Turkish national team matches and four-fifth comprising international matches 
of Turkish soccer clubs). Although the total ratio between studies on single stocks and stock 
indices is balanced, there is still an underrepresentation of studies analyzing the impact of 
(unlisted) club matches on indices, because the most successful soccer clubs from the last 
decade are mainly unlisted clubs with a widespread fan base and high economic relevance 
(Finding 3). Apart from the studies on single stocks and indices, Berlemann and Vöpel 
(2012) examine the impact of World Cup games on trading behavior in an experimental 
stock market.  
Regarding the “Where,” it is striking that 43% of the studies in our sample focus on either 
the UK or Turkey, countries in which soccer plays an important role in social life, thus 
influencing investors’ sentiment. In order to account for behavioral investment patterns 
following soccer matches, a data sample is worthwhile that considers both, countries in 
which soccer plays a more respectively less important role. Otherwise, an “importance bias” 
can result (e.g., when only analyzing clubs from the UK and Turkey, it might be hard to 
distinguish between rational effects and behavioral-driven effects). Consequently, we 
observe eight Europe-wide studies and six worldwide studies.  
All other countries examined in the remaining studies play only a subordinate role. Thus, to 
sum up, beside the predominant role of studies on the UK and Turkey, other important 
soccer nations are underrepresented in the literature. This applies to Spain (no exclusive 
study available), Germany (only three exclusive studies available), and Italy (only three 
exclusive studies available), although these countries are ranked first, second, and fourth 
respectively in the 2015 UEFA coefficient ranking and are the latest three FIFA world 
champions (Finding 4). 
We further observe that the sample size is not directly correlated with the “clarity” of the 
results because studies with large and small match samples can either provide significant 
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and predicted or insignificant and surprising results. Nevertheless, seven of nine studies with 
a sample of more than 1,000 matches tend to confirm strongly the expected hypothesis (Bell 
et al. 2012; Berument and Ceylan 2012a; Castellani et al. 2013; Dimic et al. 2015; Scholtens 
and Peenstra 2009) or show obvious contradictory results (Klein et al. 2009b; Zuber et al. 
2005).  
Regarding the “When”, it is difficult to draw general conclusions. The first finding is that 
although the sample periods of the 42 studies overlap in most cases, we observe 
heterogeneous empirical findings. We further observe only six studies (Ashton et al. 2003; 
Ashton et al. 2011; Castellani et al. 2013; Fung et al. 2015; Gerlach 2011; Klein et al. 
2009a) that examine the change in stock market reaction on soccer in sub-periods (e.g., 
through out-of-sample tests or panel regression) in order to account for soccer’s growing 
economic importance and thus to check for the existence of different regimes. Because of 
overlapping samples, in Table II.2-3 we categorize the studies into five-year periods. There 
is a significant focus on the period between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, but only a 
few studies for the period after 2010. An explanation of this latter issue may be that studies 
analyzing the period after 2010 are not yet published and are still work in progress. 
Nevertheless, the past decade is underrepresented in the literature, although the economic 
importance of soccer has grown in recent years (Finding 5). 
We further observe a possible pattern that shows that the number of studies providing 
predominantly surprising results has slightly increased in recent years. 
Apart from the analytical approaches and examined samples, we controlled the relevant 
studies for the presence of a publication bias because it is easier to publish studies with 
significant results. Following Klein et al. (2009b), it seems natural that “through sheer 
coincidence significant (although useless) interrelations can sometimes be found”. As a 
result, we observed some evidence for the presence of publication bias because the only 
study showing no correlation between soccer and stock markets (Tufan 2004) is 
unpublished. In addition, the unpublished study of Duque and Ferreira (2008) shows only a 
weak correlation. Overall, considering all the study characteristics presented in this section, 
conspicuousness regarding the correlation of applied methodologies, examined samples, 
and the studies’ results can be observed (Finding 6). 
II.2.4 Empirical Evidence regarding Soccer’s Influence on Stock Markets 
To answer research questions RQ2 and RQ3, we identified the heterogeneous empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of soccer on stock markets as the core criteria of our analysis. 
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As aforementioned, we do not aim to describe only existing findings. Instead, our objective 
is to aggregate existing findings and thus provide new evidence for soccer’s overall impact 
on stock markets. Thus, in a similar way to the vote counting method that simply “counts”, 
which direction is confirmed the most often in primary studies (e.g., Aretz and Bartram 
2010), we proceed as follows: (1) we distinguish between the four aforementioned 
hypotheses for the key drivers of soccer’s impact on stock markets; (2) for each hypothesis, 
we identify the applicable studies; and (3) for each hypothesis, we count the number of 
studies that confirm/reject the hypothesis with at least a 10% significance level and provide 
mixed evidence depending on the subsample or applied methodology.  
However, before distinguishing between the hypotheses, we must point out that 41 of the 42 
studies provide statistical evidence for soccer having an impact on stock markets. Only 
Tufan (2004) concludes that soccer matches do not affect stock markets. Further, not all of 
the studies that indicate a correlation between soccer matches and stock markets provide 
statistically significant results. For example, Boido and Fasano (2007) show that stock 
markets are influenced by soccer matches but only to an insignificant extent. The same 
holds for Klein et al. (2009b), Vieira (2013), and Zuber et al. (2005). Subsequently, the 
overarching finding about soccer’s general impact on stock markets is concretized. 
 Evidence regarding the General Effect of Wins, Draws, and Losses II.2.4.1
Our first hypothesis (H1), which is somehow analyzed to some extent in 32 of the studies 
from our sample, is that wins positively affect stock market returns, and losses negatively 
affect stock market returns.
34
 Table II.2-4 provides an overview of the evidence regarding 
the impact of wins.  
Table II.2-4 Evidence regarding the general effect of wins 
Object of study Positive effecta Mixed effecta No effecta 
National team on index 1 4 2 
Club on single stock 11 4 6 
Club on index 2 2 0 
Total 14 (44%)
b 10 (31%)b 8 (25%)b 
a “Positive effect” indicates significant positive (abnormal) returns associated with a win; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides 
inconsistent results with evidence for both positive as well as negative (or no) market reactions following a win; and “No effect” indicates 
that no significant market reaction following wins had been observed. 
b Absolute values and relative values are in relation to the total number of studies examining this relationship; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived from 
the verbal description in the study. 
                                            
34
 In a similar way to most studies from our sample, we do not account for expectations or match importance 
effects in this particular first step of the analysis. 
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Evidence for positive market reactions after wins is provided by 44% of the studies. For 
national teams, only Ashton et al. (2003) provides (weak) significant evidence for the 
positive effect of wins on returns of the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index. 
This finding is contradicted by the “corrected” version of this study provided by Klein et al. 
(2009a). Another 13 studies conclude that club wins positively affect stock markets. In 
particular, the studies of Boido and Fasano (2007), Castellani et al. (2013), Demir and 
Rigoni (2014), Dimic et al. (2015), Jørgensen et al. (2012), Palomino et al. (2009), 
Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2002), Saraç and Zeren (2013), Scholtens and Peenstra (2009), 
Stadtmann (2004), and Stadtmann (2006) provide significant evidence of positive 
(abnormal) returns for clubs’ own stock following wins. Berument and Ceylan (2012a) and 
Berument et al. (2013) provide significant evidence of positive (abnormal) returns for 
indices following wins. This result is hard to argue from a rational viewpoint because it is 
doubtful that the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) 100 Index, which comprises many global 
companies, is rationally driven by a soccer club’s win.  
Of the appropriate studies, 31% provide mixed evidence regarding H1, depending on 
subsamples and applied methodologies. For club matches, according to Berument et al. 
(2006) and Berument et al. (2009), the win hypothesis holds exclusively for the matches of 
Beşiktaş and not for Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray. This may be explained by the “traditional” 
higher volatility of the sporting performance of Beşiktaş and the greater fanaticism of 
Beşiktaş’ supporters (for the latter see, among many others, Berument et al. 2009). Özdurak 
and Ulusoy (2013) contradict this finding for a distinctly shorter observation period, and 
show only significant positive stock market returns following Fenerbahçe’s wins. Bernile 
and Lyandres (2009) provide mixed evidence for stock market reaction after wins in UEFA 
club tournament matches because the mean abnormal returns on the days after the matches 
are not statistically significant; but when the authors apply standard OLS regression, they 
observe high significant positive abnormal returns following wins. The unpublished but 
methodologically sounder study of Duque and Ferreira (2008) confirms the win hypothesis 
only for matches of Sporting Lisbon and not for matches of FC Porto. Fung et al.’s (2015) 
methodological sound panel regressions show the predicted effect of wins only for the 
whole sample (comprising 45 national team matches and 233 international matches of 
Turkish clubs). When solely analyzing the club matches and the whole period (1999-2011), 
wins are surprisingly associated with negative returns (for Galatasaray even on a significant 
level). This surprising result may be reasoned in the data sample, as the negative impact of 
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wins disappears in case that Monday matches and sport-related firms are excluded from the 
sample. 
For national teams, Vieira (2013), who solely analyses 31 matches from the 2008 European 
Championship, supports the win hypothesis only when accounting for general market trends. 
In particular, wins only have a significant positive influence on returns in bearish markets; 
otherwise, wins are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. In addition, Ashton 
et al. (2011) provide mixed evidence for national teams. Only when accounting for the full 
data period (2002–2009) and when using GARCH regression, significant positive returns are 
observed to follow wins (with the additional finding that the positive impact of wins has 
declined over time). In the Kolaric et al. (2015) study, wins are mostly associated with 
negative, but insignificant abnormal returns. Only in case of matches of Asian national 
teams, market reactions after wins are significant (and negative). Gerlach (2011) also 
provides inconsistent findings, which will be examined in Section II.2.4.2.  
In contrast, 25% of the studies show no or negative market reactions after wins. What 
attracts attention is that most of these studies are published in prestigious journals and thus 
tend to be high quality. For national teams, the highly appreciated study of Edmans et al. 
(2007) presents only an insignificant (positive) relation between wins and returns. As 
aforementioned, the replication study of Klein et al. (2009a) does not provide evidence for 
positive market reactions following wins either, whereas Klein et al. (2009b) actually show 
contradictory results with significant negative abnormal returns following matches (although 
most of the other results are insignificant). For club matches, Benkraiem et al. (2009) 
provide evidence for significant positive returns prior to wins, but not following wins (a 
situation that is explained by investors’ expectations); however, the study is limited because 
it comprises only a two-year period. In addition, the studies of Demir and Danis (2011), 
Floros (2014), Sund and Wu (2015), and Zuber et al. (2005) show no significant positive 
market reaction after wins.  
Based on the results at this specific level of granularity, it is still hard to draw general 
conclusions regarding market efficiency following wins. For national teams, the only study 
that provides strong evidence for the “win effect” was corrected afterwards. For clubs, 14 
studies provide mixed evidence. Conspicuously, two of the three studies examining the 
impact of wins on indices provide significant evidence for positive abnormal returns, 
although the impact of one club on an index is limited.  
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For lost matches, 67% of all appropriate studies confirm the hypothesis that losses have a 
significant negative effect on stock returns. Table II.2-5 provides an overview of the 
evidence regarding the impact of losses. 
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Table II.2-5 Evidence regarding the general effect of losses 
Object of study Negative effecta Mixed effecta No effecta 
National team on index 4 3 1 
Club on single stock 12 2 2 
Club on index 2 1 0 
Total 18 (67%)
b 6 (22%)b 3 (11%)b 
a “Negative effect” indicates significant negative (abnormal) returns associated with a loss; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides 
inconsistent results with evidence for both negative as well as positive (or no) market reactions following a loss; and “No effect” indicates 
that no significant market reaction following losses had been observed. 
b Absolute values and relative values are in relation to the total number of studies examining this relationship; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results, with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived 
from the verbal description in the study. 
For national team matches, Edmans et al. (2007) shows next-day abnormal stock returns of -
49.4 basis points after losses (which was, at that time, more than three times the market 
value of all clubs belonging to the English Premier League). This general market reaction is 
confirmed by the controversial study of Ashton et al. (2003) and by Gerlach (2011). The 
latter also shows that negative returns are not restricted to the playing country but further 
hold for the playing team’s largest neighboring country (measured by its GDP). From 
another perspective, Vieira (2012) confirms the “win effect” but with a small amount of 
data. All these findings strongly support the behavioral alternative hypothesis because their 
magnitude is large (except for Vieira 2012) and the returns cannot be explained by changes 
in fundamental value. 
Regarding the effect of club matches on single stocks, Renneboog and Vanbrabant’s (2002) 
working paper confirms high significant negative abnormal returns following losses on the 
first and second days after matches. Palomino et al.’s (2009) comprehensive study provides 
evidence that “bad news”, namely losses, is incorporated more slowly than wins because 
only 28% of three-day abnormal returns are incorporated on the first day following matches. 
These findings are partially contradicted by Benkraiem et al. (2009), who confirm 
significant negative abnormal returns only on the first day following losses and not on the 
second day. The authors further show a stronger effect following home losses rather than 
away losses, a finding that is also confirmed by Castellani et al. (2013) and Demir and Danis 
(2011). Bernile and Lyandres (2009) show that losses are followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns, but only on the day following the loss and not on the match day itself. 
Further studies proving the negative impact of losses are Boido and Fasano (2007), Demir 
and Rigoni (2014), Dimic et al. (2015), Saraç and Zeren (2013), Scholtens and Peenstra 
(2009), and Stadtmann (2004). 
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In addition, two studies provide evidence for the significant negative effect of lost club 
matches on stock indices. Berument and Ceylan (2012a) show that losses of FC Barcelona 
and Real Madrid CF have a negative impact on the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, 
and losses of Arsenal FC, Chelsea FC, Liverpool FC, and Manchester United FC have a 
negative impact on the FTSE 100 Index. Similar evidence is provided by Berument et al. 
(2013) for the BIST 100 Index and the Turkish clubs Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray.  
Four studies provide inconsistent results regarding the effect of losses. Ashton et al. (2011) 
show a strong negative impact of English national team losses on the FTSE 100 Index when 
applying binomial statistics and examining the period 1984–2009. However, when the 
authors apply OLS/GARCH regressions, no significant influence of losses is observed. The 
replication study of Klein et al. (2009a) also provides evidence in both directions, depending 
on match type and sub-period. Kolaric et al. (2015) provide significant negative abnormal 
returns following losses in case of tournament (elimination) matches (especially European 
championship matches and World Cup matches). For clubs, Duque and Ferreira’s (2008) 
working paper presents mixed results because (analogous to wins) losses have only a 
significant influence for Sporting Lisbon and not for FC Porto. Because the success of both 
clubs had been similar in the observation period, the most obvious explanation for this result 
is the significant difference between the supporters: Sporting Lisbon’s supporters are more 
emotional than those of FC Porto. The finding regarding FC Porto is further confirmed by 
the TGARCH specification conducted by Floros (2014). This study rejects the “loss effect” 
for Benfica Lisbon and Ajax Amsterdam; indeed, significant negative returns after losses are 
observed only for Juventus Turin. Analogous to the win effect, Fung et al. (2015) show the 
predicted effect of losses only for the whole data sample. When solely analyzing the club 
matches and the whole period (1999-2011), losses are surprisingly associated with 
(insignificant) positive returns. 
Only three studies provide no or exclusively contradictory results. Through a comprehensive 
data sample, Zuber et al. (2005) provide no evidence of any market reaction for the losses of 
nine out of 10 examined clubs. The same holds true for Sun and Wu (2015) examining 
Juventus Turin. Klein et al. (2009b) show a negative market reaction following losses for 
only one of the 14 examined countries (Belgium). All other results are insignificant and 
show even significant positive excess returns following losses for Denmark and England. 
This surprising result can be explained by the study’s unique elaboration. 
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Overall, losses seem to be strongly associated with negative (abnormal) returns. Thus, at 
least in this particular regard, we can strongly confirm H1.  
To date, the effect of draws is not well documented in the literature. Table II.2-6 provides an 
overview of the available evidence. 
Table II.2-6 Evidence regarding the general effect of draws  
Object of study Positive effecta Mixed effecta Negative effecta No effecta 
Club on single stock 0 1 9 1 
Club on index 0 0 1 0 
Total 0 (0%)
b 1 (8%)b 10 (84%)b 1 (8%)b 
a “Positive effect” indicates significant positive (abnormal) returns associated with draws; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides 
inconsistent results with evidence for both positive and negative (or no) market reactions following draws; and “Negative effect” indicates 
significant negative (abnormal) returns following a draw. “No effect” indicates that no significant market reaction following draws had 
been observed. 
b Absolute values and relative values are in relation to the total number of studies examining this relationship; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results, with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived 
from the verbal description in the study. 
Draws are only analyzed with regard to club matches. Overall, the respective studies come 
to almost the same conclusion that draws have a negative impact on stock markets.  
In particular, Benkraiem et al. (2009) provide overall evidence for significant negative 
abnormal returns (only) on the day following a draw. When distinguishing between home 
and away draws, only away draws show significant (negative) results. Castellani et al. 
(2013) confirm this result. Similar results are provided by Demir and Danis (2011), although 
the detail of their study has contradictions. Demir and Danis (2011) also present overall 
evidence for negative abnormal returns following draws. Further, in contrast to Benkraiem 
et al. (2009), Demir and Danis’s (2011) results show a higher significance for home draws 
(away draws are only significant for Galatasaray). This contradictory finding may be 
explained by the data samples: Benkraiem et al. (2009) analyze 18 clubs from across Europe 
for just 2006–2007, whereas Demir and Danis (2011) analyze three Turkish clubs, covering 
2004–2009. Because the degree of soccer fanaticism is high in Turkey, fans visiting a match 
with “their” team may be more disappointed in the event of a draw. Further, the results of 
both sets of research show higher significance for domestic draws (i.e., league matches) than 
for European competition draws. Bernile and Lyandres (2011), Berument et al. (2013), 
Boido and Fasano (2007), Dimic et al. (2015), Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2002), 
Scholtens and Peenstra (2009), and Duque and Ferreira (2008) confirm the finding of 
negative market reactions following draws for different regions and periods. The last of 
these studies shows that for Sporting Lisbon draws have an even greater negative impact on 
returns than losses. For FC Porto, draws are the only “result” that leads to significant market 
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reactions. These findings might indicate that Portuguese markets at least anticipate losses 
more effectively than draws. 
Only Floros’s (2014) recent study provides at least partial evidence for significant positive 
returns after draws, particularly for Benfica Lisbon and Ajax Amsterdam (which are both 
exclusively examined in the study). The only club that shows significant negative returns 
after draws is Juventus Turin, a finding that accords with Boido and Fasano (2007). 
The only study that does not confirm any significant market reactions to draws is the 
methodologically sound research by Palomino et al. (2009), although the sign is negative in 
all cases.  
Overall, we observe a negative effect for lost matches and draws. Wins tend to be associated 
with positive (abnormal) returns, although the effect is less obvious. This finding is not yet 
sufficient to draw conclusions on market efficiency, because according to H1, positive and 
negative market reactions can be explained by rational behavior. 
 Evidence regarding the “Importance Effect” II.2.4.2
Our second hypothesis (H2) that is recurrently analyzed in the studies is that the results of 
important matches affect stock market returns more strongly than “normal” matches; 
namely, market reactions in absolute terms are higher after important matches. Table II.2-7 
provides an overview of the evidence regarding the “importance effect.” 
Table II.2-7 Evidence regarding the “importance effect”  
Match type Yesa Mixeda Noa 
Tournament match (national team) 0 6 1 
International competition match (club) 2 6 4 
Domestic cup match (club) 2 1 4 
Relegation/promotion matches (club) 2 0 0 
Late season match (club) 2 1 3 
Matches against rivals/derbies (club) 1 1 1 
Total 8
b 15b 13b 
a “Yes” indicates a significant market reaction associated with important matches; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides 
inconsistent results with evidence for both the confirmation and the rejection of H2, depending on the competition type; and “No” 
indicates that no significant market reaction following important matches had been observed. 
b Only absolute values as relative values are not applicable because multiple entries from each study are possible; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results, with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived 
from the verbal description in the study. 
Regarding the “importance effect” in the context of national team tournaments, we assume 
that World Cup matches are more important than continental cup matches; continental cup 
matches are more important than qualifying matches; and qualifying matches are more 
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important than friendlies. Within a competition, elimination stage matches are more 
important than group stage matches because a loss is associated with immediate elimination. 
The most interesting finding is that the “importance effect” cannot be confirmed for national 
teams because all studies provide at least mixed results. Ashton et al. (2003) compare all 
examined matches (including friendlies) and more significant negative mean returns 
following losses in a tournament’s final matches. However, for wins, the effect cannot be 
confirmed. The same holds for the corrected version of Ashton et al.’s (2003) study 
provided by Klein et al. (2009a), and for the studies of Edmans et al. (2007) and Vieira 
(2013). Ashton et al. (2011) also provide mixed evidence through a broad range of applied 
methodologies, thus indicating robust results. In this context, the mean returns (in absolute 
terms) following wins and losses are higher after qualifying matches; however, the 
significance levels of the regression results provide no evidence for any difference between 
more or less important matches (only the regression coefficients are higher for tournament 
matches). Gerlach (2011) shows that group-stage matches are associated with negative mean 
returns, regardless of whether they were won or lost. In elimination matches, wins are 
associated with positive mean returns and losses with less negative mean returns compared 
with group-stage matches. Kolaric et al. (2015) show that the importance effect exists for 
European and Asian national team matches, but not for matches of South American teams. 
Klein et al. (2009b) shows no corresponding evidence at all.  
Regarding the “importance effect” in terms of international club competition matches in 
relation to domestic matches, Zuber et al. (2005) show that cup matches in general (which 
are not distinguished between international and domestic) are the only match type with a 
significant influence on returns. The same holds for the Sun and Wu (2015) study and 
Champions League matches of Juventus Turin. Scholtens and Peenstra (2009) provide 
mixed evidence because losses in European competition matches lead to higher (almost 
double) negative average abnormal returns than those in the domestic league, whereas for 
wins the opposite is true. Stadtmann (2004) provides equivalent findings for Germany (with 
losses also being almost twice as bad in international matches). In contrast, Stadtmann 
(2006), who examines a longer period, concludes that stock price reactions to European 
competition matches are not significantly different from reactions to domestic league 
matches, but they have a “lagged” effect that lasts more than one trading day. Castellani et 
al. (2013) show stronger reactions to losses for UEFA Champions League matches 
(compared to domestic league matches). The same does not hold for wins and UEFA Cup 
matches. In the UK, Renneboog and Vanbrabant’s (2002) working paper shows that lost 
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international competition matches are associated with abnormal returns that are more 
negative compared to matches played in the English and Scottish leagues, and that once 
again the same does not hold for wins. For Turkish clubs, Demir and Danis (2011) show that 
after wins in European competitions, the abnormal returns are even negative (but 
insignificant) whilst after losses, they are more negative than for domestic matches. Saraç 
and Zeren (2013) confirm this and provide evidence for (mainly significant) negative returns 
following European competition matches. These findings might be explained by the 
moderate performance of Turkish clubs in international competitions over recent years and 
the correspondingly small number of European competition matches. In contrast, Demir and 
Rigoni (2014), Jørgensen at al. (2012), Özdurak and Ulusoy (2013), and Stöckl and Schulz 
(2007) show no significant difference between international and domestic matches for 
Italian, Danish, Turkish, and German clubs respectively. 
Regarding domestic cup matches, Renneboog and Vanbrabant’s (2002) working paper 
provides mixed evidence for the UK during 1995–1998 because wins in league and cup 
competitions show nearly the same abnormal returns. However, losses are associated with 
higher abnormal returns in cup competitions (even higher and more significant compared 
with international competition matches because of the high local value of the English cups). 
Palomino et al. (2009), who analyze the subsequent period from 1999 to 2002 by means of 
their own methodological approach, provide contradictory results. They do not show 
significant market reactions to English cup matches, indicating that the effect may have 
decreased. The same heterogeneous results are observed for German clubs. Stadtmann 
(2004) shows no difference between losses in the domestic cup and the German Bundesliga; 
however, by applying a larger data sample, Stadtmann (2006) provides evidence for higher 
stock price reactions following wins in the domestic cup competition rather than the 
Bundesliga (also depending on the applied model). Jørgensen at al. (2012) show no effect of 
Danish cup matches on Brøndby IF’s stock price, but the sample comprises only seven such 
matches. 
Regarding promotion and relegation matches, Renneboog and Vanbrabant’s (2002) working 
paper confirms the “importance effect” because after wins and losses, both match types 
show high significant abnormal returns, which (in absolute terms) are at least twice as high 
as after normal league matches. Stöckl and Schulz (2007) provide similar evidence, showing 
that qualifying matches that are associated with high further cash flows cause stronger 
market reactions than “normal” matches. 
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Regarding the progress of the season in general (and the “post-March effect” in particular), 
the unpublished study of Duque and Ferreira (2008) provides overall evidence that wins 
(losses) at the end of the season that increase (decrease) the distance to the direct follower 
(the club ahead) in the league have a significant influence on stock returns. Bell et al. (2012) 
provide only modest evidence for the overall existence of the “post-March effect”, whereas 
Castellani et al. (2013) show stronger market reactions at the end of the season. The studies 
by Demir and Rigoni (2014), Palomino et al. (2009), and Stöckl and Schulz (2007) show no 
significant reaction to late-season matches.  
Regarding matches against direct rivals and derby matches, Özdurak and Ulusoy (2013) 
show through GARCH regression that such matches are the only ones with a significant 
effect on stock markets. Bell et al. (2012) further show that the influence of matches against 
rivals on returns increases with the number of goals ahead (otherwise, only modest evidence 
for this relationship is provided). In contrast, Saraç and Zeren (2013) show through their 
large data sample that derby matches do not have a significant influence.  
In conclusion, the overall results regarding the “importance effect” show heterogeneous 
findings with a tendency to account solely for bad news in important matches and to ignore 
good news. This is surprising because important matches (at least in the case of club 
matches) are mostly associated with higher cash flow consequences and thus are 
hypothesized to have a stronger influence on stock returns from a rational viewpoint. Thus, 
we reject H2 and support the behavioral alternative hypothesis instead. 
 Evidence regarding the “Surprise Effect” II.2.4.3
Our third hypothesis (H3) examines the “surprise effect”; namely, the effect that stock 
market reactions are mainly driven by non-expected results. In other words, unexpected 
results are associated with higher (abnormal) returns (in absolute terms) than expected 
results. The predominant method to quantify expectations is the usage of betting odds, 
which seek to reflect a realistic estimation of probabilities for a win, draw, and loss. Table 
II.2-8 provides an overview of the evidence regarding the “surprise effect.” 
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Table II.2-8 Evidence regarding the “surprise effect”  
Object of study Yesa Mixeda Noa 
National team on index 0 1 2 
Club on single stock 5 8 1 
Club on index 0 0 1 
Total 5 (31%)
b 7 (44%)b 4 (25%)b 
a “Yes” indicates stronger market reactions after unexpected match results; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides inconsistent 
results with evidence for the confirmation and rejection of H3; and “No” indicates that no difference between expected and unexpected 
match results is observable. 
b Absolute values and relative values are in relation to the total number of studies examining this relationship; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results, with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived 
from the verbal description in the study. 
In accordance with H3, five studies provide evidence that unexpected match results lead to 
stronger market reactions than expected ones, thus tending to support the efficient market 
hypothesis. Bell et al. (2012) show that point surprises (especially in home matches) have a 
strong impact on stock returns. The authors’ large data sample, covering more than 5,000 
matches and an observation period of eight years, might indicate the robustness of this 
finding. A similar conclusion (for European club competition matches but with a far smaller 
sample) is drawn by Bernile and Lyandres (2009), who show that markets have a significant 
positive reaction to wins in the context of expected losses and vice versa. The authors 
explain their finding by referring to investors’ inability to form unbiased ex ante beliefs 
regarding the match outcome because they tend to be too optimistic. Thus, the authors 
conclude that primarily pre-match stock prices are inefficient, but that this does not 
necessarily apply to post-match prices. The small studies of Jørgensen at al. (2012), Özdurak 
and Ulusoy (2013), and Stadtmann (2006) confirm H3 for Danish, Turkish, and German 
clubs respectively. 
Kolaric et al. (2015) present mixed results because expected wins in tournament matches are 
accompanied with negative abnormal returns and unexpected wins in elimination matches 
with positive ones. In case of losses and draws, no surprise effect is observed. Demir and 
Danis (2011) present mixed results because they show that market reactions are mainly 
caused by unexpected outcomes; but they also provide evidence that market reactions to 
losses are significantly negative regardless of whether or not they are expected. The authors 
further show strong dependency on the investors’ characteristic; namely, which club is 
examined. Demir and Rigoni (2014) show that surprising outcomes that are not related to 
the “own” club but the arch-rival influence stock markets. In particular, an arch-rival’s 
unexpected loss counterbalances the negative reaction to an own loss (and increases the 
positive reaction to a win), whilst an arch-rival’s unexpected win increases the impact of an 
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own loss. Dimic et al. (2015) show that positive abnormal returns after wins increase with 
increasing surprise. For losses, there is no surprise effect observable. Palomino et al. (2009) 
provide evidence for a kind of “inverse surprise effect”, as investors react as stronger to 
wins, the more expected such wins are. Sun and Wu (2015) as well as Scholtens and 
Peenstra (2009) observe the “surprise effect” only for wins in European tournament matches 
(however, such matches cover only one-third and one-fifth of the entire sample, 
respectively). Further, for wins in the domestic league, Scholtens and Peenstra’s (2009) 
study observes an “inverse surprise effect”, because only expected wins lead to significant 
positive abnormal returns. For losses, highly significant abnormal returns are observed after 
expected and unexpected results. Although Stadtmann (2004) shows that unexpected wins 
have a positive impact (and unexpected losses vice versa), the “expectation effect” does not 
have superior information content compared with the match outcome (without accounting 
for expectations). Further, Castellani et al. (2013) show that the “surprise effect” exists only 
when accounting for the problem of event clustering through the SUR model. 
Another four studies do not support the “surprise effect.” For national teams, the well-
elaborated studies of Edmans et al. (2007) and Klein et al. (2009b) do not show any relation 
between ex ante beliefs and stock market reactions. Zuber et al.’s (2005) study, which tends 
to reject any significant relation between soccer and stock markets, even provides 
(insignificant) evidence for negative market reaction to unexpected wins and positive market 
reaction to unexpected losses. In addition, the panel regressions of Fung et al. (2015) do not 
provide evidence for a “surprise effect” in case of 233 international matches of Turkish 
soccer clubs. 
In conclusion, it is hard to identify patterns regarding the result of the “surprise effect” 
because sample size, observation period, and applied methodology seem to have no 
influence on the “direction” of the finding. Thus, because most studies provide at least 
mixed evidence, the overall finding regarding the “surprise effect” tends to reject hypothesis 
H3. 
 Evidence regarding the “Bad News Effect” II.2.4.4
In the prior sections, we have already found evidence that investors tend to overvalue losses. 
Thus, we want to analyze this overall effect (irrespective of match type and expectations) 
through H4, which assumes a “bad (match-related) news effect”; namely, that overall, losses 
affect stock market returns more strongly than wins. In other words, we expect to observe 
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higher (abnormal) returns in absolute terms after losses than after wins. Table II.2-9 
provides an overview of the evidence regarding the “bad news effect.” 
Table II.2-9 Evidence regarding the “bad news effect”  
Object of study Yesa Mixeda Noa 
National team on index 4 2 2 
Club on single stock 6 3 3 
Club on index 3 1 0 
Total 13 (54%)b 6 (25%)b 5 (21%)b 
a “Yes” indicates the overvaluation of losses; “Mixed effect” indicates that a study provides inconsistent results with evidence for both the 
confirmation and rejection of H4; and “No” indicates that losses do not affect stock markets more strongly than other match outcomes. 
b Absolute values and relative values are in relation to the total number of studies examining this relationship; general overall result or 
trend, based on the significance of the results, with at least a 10% level. When the significance is not provided, the direction is derived 
from the verbal description in the study. 
From the 24 studies, which draw conclusions on the difference between the “win effect” and 
the “loss effect,” we again gather heterogeneous findings.  
Regarding the eleven studies that show an overvaluation of losses, three analyze national 
team matches. Ashton et al.’s (2003) study shows that the number of returns that are smaller 
than the unconditional mean is much more significant after losses than after wins. Edmans et 
al.’s (2007) study draws a similar picture overall and shows that the mean returns (in 
absolute terms) after losses are higher than after wins. The same holds for the regression 
results, where both the significance levels and the β-values show a market reaction that is at 
least twice as strong after losses than after wins. Through a far smaller data sample but a 
comparably long observation period, Gerlach (2011) shows that the mean returns (in 
absolute terms) after losses are higher and more significant than after wins. Regarding these 
three studies, the direction and sheer magnitude of the “bad news effect” support H4. 
Regarding club-related studies, Demir and Danis (2011) show that the daily returns on the 
first trading day after losses are (in absolute terms) several times as high as after wins. This 
is confirmed by the regression coefficients and the significance levels. The abnormal returns 
provided by Scholtens and Peenstra (2009) are four times as negative as they are positive 
after wins. Stadmann (2004) also shows that losses are at least twice as “bad” as wins for a 
small sample and the German stock market. The same holds for Dimic et al.’s (2015) 
working paper examining 13 European clubs. Castellani et al. (2013) and Renneboog and 
Vanbrabant’s (2002) working paper present similar but weaker results. Further, the latter 
study shows that the significance of abnormal returns lasts longer after losses than after 
wins. Regarding the relationship of club matches and stock indices, Benkraiem et al. (2009) 
use a shorter but more recent sample and show that abnormal returns on the first and second 
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trading days following losses are, in absolute terms, six times as high as after wins. For 
home losses, the effect is even more intense. Berument et al. (2013) provide also a higher 
significance and regression coefficients that are at least twice as high following losses as 
wins. The explanation may be that this particular study only analyzes international 
tournament matches where a loss might have worse consequences than for a league match. 
Berument and Ceylan (2012a) present evidence that losses, as opposed to wins, lead to an 
increase in investors’ risk appetite, thus proving that losses have a stronger impact. 
Mixed evidence is provided by Palomino et al. (2009). On the trading day directly following 
a match, the average abnormal returns (in absolute terms) after wins are higher and more 
significant than after losses. The same applies for the cumulative abnormal returns for the 
two days after the match, but on the third day absolute cumulative abnormal returns 
following losses exceed those following wins. Floros’s (2014) study confirms H4 only for 
Ajax Amsterdam and not for Benfica Lisbon, FC Porto, and Juventus Turin. As 
aforementioned, Fung et al.’s (2015) panel regressions confirm the “bad news effect” only 
for the whole sample. When solely analyzing the club matches and the whole period (1999-
2011), we observe an “inverse bad news effect”. 
For national teams, the replication study of Klein et al. (2009a) shows that the mean returns 
(in absolute terms) after losses are lower than after wins. Nevertheless, the number of 
returns after losses is lower than the unconditional mean and shows higher significance than 
the corresponding returns for wins. It is also difficult to draw an overall conclusion from 
Ashton et al.’s (2011) study because the magnitude of the effects changes in accordance 
with the data period. When examining the whole data period (1984–2009), losses seem to 
have a stronger impact on returns than wins (as observed in the mean returns and the 
OLS/GARCH regression results). However, especially when accounting for the data period 
2002–2009, the effect seems to change and wins are penalized more than losses. Overall, the 
negative effect of losses has tended to decrease over time. Bernile and Lyandres (2011) also 
draw a mixed picture because abnormal returns (in absolute terms) on trading days 
following losses are a multiple of the returns for wins (with higher significance). 
Nevertheless, regression results provide only slight evidence for the “bad news effect”; and 
on match days, H4 must be rejected because wins show stronger market reactions. A further 
interesting finding is that the abnormal returns after losses are negative (at an insignificant 
level), even when a club advances to the next tournament stage. The latter finding confirms 
the behavioral alternative hypothesis because from a firm value perspective, few reasons 
exist to penalize such a loss. 
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In contrast, five studies provide evidence for a “bad news effect,” at least regarding bad 
news in terms of sporting performance. For national teams, Klein et al. (2009b) show that 
the numbers of excess returns greater and smaller than zero following losses are almost 
balanced, irrespective of the match type or the model applied (the same holds for wins). 
Further, the authors show that the average abnormal returns after wins tend to be higher than 
after losses (in absolute terms). Vieira (2013) shows for the small sample of the 2008 
European Championship that there is not just a “bad news effect” but also, according to the 
correlation coefficients, a “wins are as bad as losses effect”. For club matches, Duque and 
Ferreira’s (2008) working paper shows that for Sporting Lisbon, wins have a stronger 
impact than losses (regarding regression coefficients as well as significance level). The same 
holds for Demir and Rigoni (2014). Boido and Fasano (2007) show for the Italian league 
that wins and losses are not significantly different. Thus, the latter two studies confirm the 
aforementioned results of Floros (2014) for Portuguese and Italian clubs respectively. 
Overall, although the majority of studies provide at least mixed results, we confirm H4 at an 
aggregated level. This is explained by the sheer magnitude of the “loss effect”, which has 
already been discussed in prior sections, and in the prestigiousness of the studies examining 
the “bad news effect” (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007, Gerlach 2011, Scholtens and Peenstra 2009) 
that confirm H4. Nevertheless, as discussed in section II.2.2, H4 can confirm both the 
efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral alternative hypothesis. 
 Evidence regarding Volatility and Trading Volume II.2.4.5
Beside the studies examining soccer’s influence on absolute returns, a number of studies 
also analyze soccer’s influence on alternating stock-related variables. Five studies explicitly 
examine the influence of soccer on the volatility of stock market returns. The idea behind 
these studies is that short-term-oriented investors adjust their portfolios after matches 
because of changes in their risk attitude, thus causing an increase in price volatility.  
In particular, Benkraiem et al. (2011) show for a short data period that price volatility is 
higher around match days, with wins and losses associated with an increase in volatility. The 
authors also find evidence that the effect of losses on price volatility is twice the effect of 
wins, which is in line with hypothesis H4 and with prior non-soccer-related findings (e.g., 
Engle and Ng 1993, Nelson 1991). Additionally, Benkraiem et al. (2011) find that volatility 
is higher following losses at home than away. Although this circumstance can be 
“rationally” explained by the decreasing probability of forthcoming wins (a club seems 
unable to win despite the home advantage), this is also a signal for allegiance bias and thus 
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for investors’ mood-driven behavior because it makes no difference whether a loss is at 
home or away in the context of sporting success. Surprisingly, away wins do not cause a 
similar market reaction. This emphasizes that markets may not be efficient because market 
reactions are unbalanced following comparable events. Berument et al. (2013) confirm these 
findings for a significantly longer observation period. The overvaluation of losses can, for 
instance, be explained by the significant decrease in risk tolerance after losses, a perspective 
that is confirmed by Berument and Ceylan (2012b), but only for losses and not for wins. 
Fung et al. (2015) show that international soccer matches increase stock market volatility 
after matches especially in case of smaller firms and firms with low(er) profit. Only Floros’s 
(2014) study provides contradictory results because for three clubs in the sample, no effect 
of soccer matches on price volatility can be observed; and for Ajax Amsterdam, losses even 
have a decreasing effect on volatility. This result can be explained by the use of an 
asymmetric TGARCH model, which is exclusively applied in Floros’s (2014) study. 
Five studies argue that soccer matches have a significant influence on trading volumes, a 
proposal that is also based on the hypothesis that investors revise their portfolios 
instantaneously following matches. This can be explained in a rational way (the probabilities 
for further successes might have changed) and an irrational way (following Edmans et al. 
(2007), sad moods after losses can lead to an increase in trading volumes because investors 
try to negate negative moods by generating further profits). However, a decrease in trading 
volume can also be argued because investors may be “hungover” (Edmans et al. 2007) after 
a match, leading to a reduced order flow. 
Three studies provide evidence for a significant increase in trading volume around match 
days. In line with the volatility-related findings and with H4, Benkraiem et al. (2009) 
present evidence that trading volumes increase, especially after losses, and that the effect 
after losses tends to last longer than after wins. The authors further show a significant 
difference between home and away matches, with the effect after away matches being more 
significant. They also provide evidence of a significant change in trading volume the day 
before home losses and argue that the primary cause of this change is different ex-ante 
beliefs. For Turkish clubs, Tufan and Hamarat (2014) present evidence that trading volume 
increases around match days in periods with match fixing accusations.
35
 Palomino et al. 
(2009) also show significantly high trading volumes following soccer matches in the UK, 
with cup matches having a particularly strong influence. 
                                            
35
 In 2011, several players from the clubs of Turkey’s two highest soccer leagues, Süper Lig and First League, 
were accused of involvement in illegal match fixing. 
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In contrast, Edmans et al.’s (2007) well-elaborated study shows only insignificant changes 
in trading volumes after wins and losses. Zuber et al. (2005) confirm this finding through 
their comprehensive data sample. They show that the on-season and off-season trading 
volumes of soccer clubs are not statistically different although there are few matches in the 
off-season period and consequently less match-related information. 
Overall, most studies show significant amplitudes in volatility and trading volumes. This 
result is rather surprising against the backdrop that soccer shares are often supposed to be 
“collectors’ shares”; namely, shares that are held by fans regardless of the current sporting 
success of the club. This observation leads to the finding that none of the studies in the 
sample analyzes the shareholder structure of clubs and distinguishes between, e.g., the 
investment behavior of fans and professional asset managers (Finding 7). 
In order to explain the market anomalies regarding volatility and trading volume, it can be 
helpful to account for the characteristics of “soccer stock markets”. In particular, several 
studies (Edmans et al. 2007; Gerlach 2011; Vieira 2013) show that the impact of match 
results on returns is more significant in small stocks. Additionally, in line with the 
aforementioned idea of “collectors’ shares”, Zuber et al. (2005) conclude that soccer teams’ 
stock market performance is different from “traditional” stocks because soccer stocks have 
four times as many trading days with zero returns; thus, soccer club investors are less active 
compared to “traditional” investors. Consequently, it is conceivable that investors trade their 
stocks after a match but include “non-match-related effects” that occur prior to a match in 
their investment decisions. This finding implies that the sheer “match-related effect” might 
be diluted in the literature because no study accounts for this particular market 
characteristic.  
Overall, because these results provide some further insights into the characteristics of the 
stock market in terms of soccer, a lack of studies that provide concrete investment strategies 
to exploit existing market anomalies can be observed (Finding 8). 
 Further Evidence regarding Soccer’s Influence on Stock Markets II.2.4.6
Most of the studies in our sample analyze the influence of a specific club’s or national 
team’s match results on stock returns. Moreover, Stadtmann (2006) provides (subordinated) 
evidence that the results of a club’s direct competitor have a direct influence on stock 
returns.  
Three studies in our sample focus on tournaments as a whole and provide evidence that is 
not related to specific matches and their results. The comprehensive and methodologically 
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sound study of Kaplanski and Levy (2010) examines the influence of World Cup matches 
between 1950 and 2006 on the “neutral” U.S. market. The idea behind this approach is that 
non-U.S. investors conduct about one-third of the transactions on the U.S. market; thus, their 
sentiments are thought to influence stock returns in the U.S. Rather surprisingly, and not in 
line with our hypotheses, the study provides significant evidence that returns on U.S. 
markets are always lower during World Cups, regardless of the concrete match results. Also 
focusing on World Cup matches, Berlemann and Vöpel (2012) show that strong individual 
tournament incentives contribute to unstable markets. In the context of the UEFA 
Champions League, Brahmana (2011) finds that Asian stock markets show significant 
seasonality seven days before and after the final match because of investors’ euphoria 
(which is a rather surprising finding).  
 Overall Evidence on How Soccer Matches and Competitions Really Influence II.2.4.7
Stock Markets 
According to the aggregated empirical evidence, it is obvious that soccer matches and 
competitions have a significant impact on stock markets. In particular, and in line with the 
most prestigious study in our sample provided by Edmans et al. (2007), losses are associated 
with negative market reactions because only a small amount of contradictory evidence is 
available. The same holds for draws, which investors similarly penalize as losses (although 
this particular relation is not well documented in the literature). The empirical evidence 
regarding the remaining key drivers of soccer’s influence on stock markets is less obvious 
and shows high heterogeneity. In line with some well-elaborated studies (e.g., Aston et al. 
2011; Edmans et al. 2007; Klein et al. 2009b), wins that are hypothesized to have a positive 
impact on returns show predominantly no significant effect on stock markets. In addition, 
the “bad news effect” is confirmed by less than half of the studies examining this particular 
relation. Nevertheless, the most prestigious studies (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007; Gerlach 2011; 
Scholtens and Peenstra 2009) confirm the presence of a “bad news effect”. Regarding the 
importance of matches, we hypothesized that matches with higher importance have a 
stronger impact because cash flow-related consequences are stronger. Surprisingly, the 
literature delivers heterogeneous results, making it almost impossible to draw an overall 
conclusion regarding the “importance effect”. For example, Klein et al. (2009b) provide no 
evidence, whereas Bell et al.’s (2012) study, which examines the most comprehensive data 
sample, confirms the “importance effect” hypothesis. Only relegation/promotion matches 
provide an unambiguous picture and consistently show stronger impact than “normal” 
matches do. Finally, the same holds for the “surprise effect”. We hypothesized that market 
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reactions to soccer match results are mostly driven by the unexpected part of the result 
information. Although some prestigious studies from our sample confirm the “surprise 
effect” (e.g., Bell et al. 2012; Scholtens and Peenstra 2009), most studies provide mixed 
evidence or reject the hypothesis, thereby proving that market reactions are also caused by 
expected outcomes (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007). To conclude, there is a general trend 
regarding soccer’s overall influence on stock markets. However, when the hypotheses 
become more specific, the heterogeneity of the findings increases (Finding 9). 
Research question RQ3 considers whether stock markets in terms of soccer are efficient or 
not. As partially discussed in the prior sections, we observe rather mixed evidence to support 
either the efficient market hypothesis or the behavioral alternative hypothesis. The literature 
shows intense market reactions with a magnitude that cannot be explained by solely rational 
investment decisions (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007). The overall finding regarding draws 
emphasizes this observation because markets do not react much less weakly to draws than to 
losses, although the sporting and thus financial consequences are stronger regarding the 
latter. This may be reasoned in the fact that investors anticipate losses rather than draws. 
The finding that important matches are not necessarily followed by stronger market 
reactions further confirms the behavioral alternative hypothesis because it is hard to argue 
why a win at the start of the domestic league should have the same impact as a win in an “up 
or out” elimination match in an international competition. However, the two strongest pieces 
of evidence for the behavioral alternative hypothesis are: (1) the overall rejection of the 
“surprise effect”, namely most studies do not confirm that market reactions to soccer 
matches are driven solely by unexpected match results (which from a rational perspective, at 
least for clubs, are the only results expected to cause market reactions), and (2) the strong 
influence of national team matches, which do not have any direct cash flow consequences. 
Overall, it is still hard to conclude whether or not stock markets in terms of soccer are 
efficient. Further, we have to consider soccer-specific market characteristics because many 
days show zero returns, implying that the sheer “match-related effect” in the literature might 
be diluted by other (good or bad) news. Thus, although the empirical evidence 
fundamentally allows the conclusion that stock markets are driven by moods rather than by 
rational behavior and hence supports the behavioral alternative hypothesis, a final 
conclusion regarding market efficiency is as yet impossible to reach (Finding 10).  
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II.2.5 Identified Opportunities for Future Research 
Because the literature draws an ambiguous picture of soccer’s impact on stock markets, 
there are still research gaps that should be addressed in future research. Table II.2-10 
provides the list of findings from our review and corresponding research opportunities. 
Table II.2-10 Findings and research opportunities 
Findings Research opportunity 
F1: Most studies that use regression analysis 
exclusively apply standard OLS regression, 
despite the fact that the examined time series 
may be heteroskedastic. 
RO1: Conduct a comprehensive study that 
covers a large data sample, accounts for 
market characteristics, and applies different 
methodologies. 
F2: The heterogeneity of event study 
approaches makes it very difficult to compare 
the results of the different studies and thus to 
draw overall conclusions. 
 
F3: There is still an underrepresentation of 
studies analyzing the impact of (unlisted) club 
matches on indices because the most 
successful soccer clubs from the last decade 
are mainly unlisted clubs with a widespread 
fan base and high economic relevance. 
RO2: Investigate the influence of the matches 
of Europe’s most successful soccer teams 
from the last decade through a data sample 
covering recent years. 
F4: Important soccer nations (e.g., Germany, 
Italy, and Spain) are underrepresented in the 
literature. 
F5: The past decade is underrepresented in the 
literature, although the economic importance 
of soccer has grown in recent years. 
F6: Conspicuousness regarding the correlation 
of applied methodologies, examined samples, 
and the studies’ results can be observed. 
RO1: see above. 
F7: None of the studies in the sample analyzes 
the shareholder structure of clubs and 
distinguishes between, for example, the 
investment behavior of fans and professional 
asset managers. 
RO3: Conduct a comprehensive study of 
investors’ market reaction with regard to 
soccer matches, taking account of different 
investor types and providing concrete 
investment strategies. 
II Risk Identification – Aggregated Empirical Evidence 129 
F8: A lack of studies that provide concrete 
investment strategies to exploit existing 
market anomalies can be observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
F9: There is a general trend regarding soccer’s 
overall influence on stock markets. However, 
when the hypotheses become more specific, 
the heterogeneity of the findings increases. 
RO1: see above. 
F10: A final conclusion regarding market 
efficiency is as yet impossible to reach. 
RO4: Assess the fundamental value 
contribution of wins/losses and conduct a 
study that examines the rational and irrational 
parts of a stock market reaction. 
Research Opportunity RO1: Conduct a comprehensive study that covers a large data 
sample, accounts for market characteristics, and applies different methodologies. Although 
the current study provides an overview of the empirical evidence on an aggregated level 
through an approach similar to vote counting method, Borenstein et al. (2009) indicate the 
major drawbacks of such method. Among other drawbacks, this approach do not account for 
studies’ different sample sizes and do not indicate the clarity of the “victory” of a specific 
hypothesis. Further, they leave room for subjective interpretations. In order to provide an 
unbiased overall picture regarding soccer’s influence on stock markets, we suggest a 
comprehensive empirical study. This suggested study should feature five major elements. 
(1) It should comprise all countries that are examined in the literature (analogous to the 
study of Fama and French 1996); thus, clubs and national teams should be examined. (2) 
The study should cover the maximum possible observation period (in order to identify and 
account for structural regimes because of soccer’s increasing economic importance over 
time). (3) The study should account for all the aforementioned hypotheses; and (4) apply 
multiple methodological approaches (in order to ensure the results are as robust as possible). 
(5) Additionally, we suggest that the study accounts for the specific characteristics of soccer 
stock markets, e.g., the infrequent trading behavior that causes a high number of zero return 
days. We believe that providing such a comprehensive study offers the opportunity to check 
whether existing findings are robust and if they can be generalized to an overall level. 
Research Opportunity RO2: Investigate the influence of the matches of Europe’s most 
successful soccer teams from the last decade through a data sample covering recent years. 
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Regarding the clubs listed in the STOXX Europe Football index, most of the recent decade’s 
top clubs (e.g., FC Barcelona, Real Madrid CF, and FC Bayern Munich) are missing 
because they are not market-listed. Nevertheless, analogous to Berument and Ceylan 
(2012a), it is reasonable to conduct studies on the impact of these clubs on stock indices 
because they have a widespread fan base. Further, although a club may not be listed, it is 
possible to observe trading volumes at a specific stock exchange that is located near the 
home base of such a club (e.g., trading volumes at the Munich Stock Exchange following a 
match of FC Bayern Munich). We also suggest analyzing the impact of Spanish and German 
national team matches on stock markets in more detail, because compared with their success 
in recent years and compared with the “soccer boom” in these countries, appropriate studies 
are underrepresented in the literature. 
Research Opportunity RO3: Conduct a comprehensive study of investors’ market reaction 
with regard to soccer matches, taking account of different investor types and providing 
concrete investment strategies. Because none of the studies in our sample distinguishes 
between different types of investor, we suggest conducting a study that accounts for this 
particular effect. We assume that fans, who hold shares primarily because they are fans, 
react differently to match results because institutional investors and professional asset 
managers, for example, try mainly to maximize returns. The insights regarding shareholder 
structure, in combination with the lessons learned regarding market anomalies, could be 
used to develop reasonable investment strategies. 
Research Opportunity RO4: Assess the fundamental value contribution of wins/losses and 
conduct a study that examines the rational and irrational parts of a stock market reaction. 
As aforementioned, it is difficult to draw an overall conclusion about whether or not 
investors react rationally to soccer results. Thus, we suggest conducting a study based on a 
three-step approach. (1) Examine a match result’s cash flow-related consequences (e.g., in 
case of international club competition matches, as premiums are available) and thus the 
realistic impact of a result on fundamental firm value (e.g., analogous to Hickman et al. 
2008). (2) Account for expectations regarding a match result. (3) Analyze stock market 
reaction against the backdrop of realistic financial consequences. By adopting this approach, 
we are confident that it would be possible to provide more accurate evidence regarding the 
market efficiency debate. 
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II.2.6 Conclusions and Limitations 
Against the backdrop of the high (and still increasing) economic relevance of soccer, it is 
unsurprising that the number of empirical studies regarding the impact of soccer matches 
and competitions on stock markets has increased in recent years. The main goals of most of 
these studies are to analyze how stock markets are influenced by soccer in general, establish 
which particular determinants are the key drivers of this influence, and, consequently 
(explicitly or implicitly), discover whether stock markets in terms of soccer are driven by 
rational investment decisions or by moods. The empirical evidence regarding these three 
central questions is mixed. Thus, the aim of this paper is three-fold. First, we want to 
provide a systematic and holistic review of all studies in this area of research in order to 
present aggregated evidence about soccer’s impact on stock markets. Second, we aim to 
give a more general answer to the question of whether stock markets with regard to soccer 
are efficient or driven by behavioral factors. Third, we want to provide opportunities for 
future research. 
Thus, we first conducted a systematic literature search covering multiple databases and 
using forward and backward reference searches. By doing so, we analyzed 42 relevant 
studies, including grey literature. Next, we systematically analyzed the methodological 
approaches and samples examined in order to find focus areas in the research and “plain 
spots”. Our review’s core criteria are the different results from the studies, which we 
discussed in detail. In this regard, we distinguished between specific hypotheses regarding 
soccer’s influence on stock markets. Thus, we conducted a semi-quantitative approach 
similar to the vote counting method. Based on our analysis and the corresponding key 
findings, we concluded our work by suggesting further research opportunities. 
The key result of our review is that soccer does influence stock markets, particularly soccer 
losses and draws (both to a high negative extent). Surprisingly, wins do not affect markets to 
the same magnitude. Another surprising result is that, at an aggregated level, important 
matches seem not to have a stronger influence than less important matches, although the 
cash flow-related consequences may be much more significant. The same holds for the 
“surprise effect” because investors also react strongly to expected results and not only to 
unexpected ones. Thus, based on the empirical evidence, we reject the efficient markets 
hypothesis and confirm the behavioral alternative hypothesis. Nevertheless, this overall 
impression might be biased by the specific characteristics of soccer stock markets, which 
show infrequent trading behavior, an issue that is so far neglected in most studies. 
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Although the market efficiency debate will never end because it is impossible to test fully 
for efficiency, we suggest conducting a study that is based on the realistic assessment of a 
soccer match’s fundamental financial consequences. Further, we suggest conducting a 
comprehensive empirical study covering a large data sample, accounting for market 
characteristics, and applying multiple methodological approaches in order to provide robust 
empirical evidence at an aggregated level. 
Although we used a semi-quantitative approach based on significance levels from primary 
studies, the major limitation of our review is that our approach still leaves room for 
subjective interpretations. Further, the literature was only analyzed with regard to the impact 
of soccer matches and competitions on clubs’ share prices and indices; we excluded other 
factors such as, e.g., the impact of soccer on (jersey) sponsors’ share prices.  
Despite the limitations outlined above, our review delivers a holistic overview of the 
empirical evidence and thus contributes to the general understanding of how stock markets 
react to soccer.  
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III Risk Treatment – Recent Empirical Evidence from the 
Financial and Industrial Sector 
The research papers embedded in section III address the treatment of risks. As outlined in 
section I, risk treatment is one of the key challenges in risk management and provides broad 
potential for optimization. Section I-1 introduced four concrete forms of risk treatment – risk 
avoidance, reduction, transfer, and retention. Not all of these forms are applicable for each 
sector. For instance, within the financial sector risk transfer especially may be an adequate 
measure, as the transfer of credit risk liberates capital for further loan intermediation and can 
improve financial stability by spreading credit risks among a magnitude of investors (Duffie 
2007). However, in the industrial sector, it may be more expedient to reduce or even avoid 
supply risks in order to avoid supply disruptions, and consequently, disruptions in the 
production process. Thus, several questions arise regarding risk identification that must be 
answered. First, regarding the financial sector and the transfer of credit default-related risks, 
suitable instruments have to be identified and examined as to whether their pricing is fair 
and risk-adequate. Second, regarding the industrial sector and the avoidance or reduction of 
(commodity) supply risks, suitable early warning indicators for a commodity’s future supply 
risk have to be examined and proposed in literature. 
Consequently, for the financial sector, research paper 3, “Market pricing of Credit Linked 
Notes - the influence of the financial crisis”, focuses on Credit Linked Notes (CLN) as 
instrument in order to hedge credit default risks. In particular, the paper investigates whether 
CLN contracts are priced fairly and adequately in relation to the inherent risk structure. 
Ninety CLN contracts are examined, covering 13,555 daily quoted prices, and they provide 
strong evidence that CLN are not only overpriced, but in nearly 50% of cases are also 
underpriced in the secondary market. Further, evidence is provided to show that the 2007-
2009 financial crisis increased market transparency for structured financial products and 
changed investors’ behavior. 
For the industrial sector, research paper 4, “Is the convenience yield a good indicator of a 
commodity’s supply risk?”, proposes the convenience yield derived from the term structure 
of commodity futures contracts as an indicator of a commodity’s future supply risk. By 
using daily convenience yield data with different maturities and examining the period from 
1999-2011, the research paper shows that – with some limitations – the convenience yield is 
in fact an applicable early warning indicator for future supply risks.  
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Abstract: 
In Germany, structured financial products already account for 6% to 8% of all assets 
invested, proving that the market for these products is still very attractive for retail 
investors. A question often discussed in this context is whether these products are priced 
fairly. One of the latest contributions in this field is the paper by Rathgeber and Wang 
(2011), who analyzed the pricing of Credit Linked Notes (CLN) in the primary market. In 
this paper, we significantly extend the work of Rathgeber and Wang (2011) and analyze the 
effect of the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis on the pricing of CLN and, specifically, on their 
pricing in the secondary market. Therefore, we analyzed the pricing of 90 CLN covering 
13,555 daily quoted prices. In addition to the major finding that CLN in the secondary 
market are not only overpriced but also underpriced in many cases, we discovered that the 
overpricing of CLN significantly decreased after the financial crisis.  
JEL-classification: F64, M14, Q56 
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III.1.1 Introduction 
In the last years, structured financial products have increased in popularity among retail 
investors. In Germany, they account for 6% to 8% of all invested assets. Even in the United 
States, structured financial products have an annual growth rate of approximately 30%, 
although the local market for these products is strongly regulated (Rieger 2012). To put 
these relative figures into absolute terms, the gross sales of structured retail investment 
products accounted for EUR 174.2 billion in Europe, USD 179.8 billion in the Asia-Pacific 
market and USD 65.1 billion in North America in 2010 (Jørgensen et al. 2011). One such 
structured product is the so-called Credit Linked Note (CLN), which allows the issuing bank 
to securitize its credit risk, particularly concentration risks. As explained in Rathgeber and 
Wang (2011), the mechanism of CLN is as follows: The buyer of the CLN receives payment 
for the notes only when the reference entity - another debtor of the CLN issuer - does not go 
into default. As a premium for taking over the risk, the buyer receives an attractive coupon. 
In case of the reference entities’ default, the buyer receives only the recovery rate of the 
CLN. Although the figures mentioned above show that CLN contracts are very popular for 
retail investors as they provide the opportunity for a high coupon payment, they are subject 
of controversial discussions in financial research and the public. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS), which are similar to CLN, were voted Europe’s “most 
dangerous financial product” in 2013 (DFP 2013). One of the major points of criticism of 
such structured products is their non-transparency regarding the fact whether the coupon 
payments for and the prices of these instruments are fair and adequate compared with the 
related risk. 
Several studies exist on the pricing of equity-linked notes, on certificates in general and the 
pricing of CLN in particular. In one of the latest studies on the pricing of CLN, Rathgeber 
and Wang (2011) found that CLN are generally overpriced to a large extent in the primary 
market, ie, on the date of their issue. This major finding was widely consistent with previous 
results in the literature. Since issuers of structured financial products are market makers, 
they participate in almost every transaction and, therefore, have the incentive to overprice. 
Further, overpricing tends to increase as products become more complex and as markets 
become less transparent.  
As the study by Rathgeber and Wang (2011) primarily focused on the market pricing of 
CLN in the primary market, this study aims to apply a similar model to test mispricing of 
CLN in the secondary market. Consequently, “mispricing” (the difference between a fair 
III Risk Treatment – Recent Empirical Evidence from the Financial and Industrial Sector 141 
price and a quoted price), does not only imply overpricing but also underpricing of CLN, as 
particularly in the secondary market, quoted CLN prices can fall below the fair value. In our 
study, in particular, we analyze whether the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 had an effect on 
the mispricing of CLN. The financial crisis revealed the enormous complexity and inherent 
risks of structured financial products. Thus, an investor’s behavior may have changed from 
risk loving and only bounded-rational to more reflective (reasoned, among others, in a 
decrease of information asymmetry between the issuer and the investor), leaving CLN 
issuers less space for overpricing and inducing a decline in demand for such products. By 
testing the change in mispricing during the financial crisis, we simultaneously test the 
validity of the product life cycle hypothesis for CLN, i.e., whether mispricing – in the sense 
of overpricing (which is higher for CLN than for other standard certificates) – decreases 
during the products’ lifetime. Therefore, in a first step, we calculate the daily fair prices of 
the CLN. In a second step, we compare them with the daily quoted prices and track the daily 
development of price differences.  
The paper is structured as follows: First, we provide an overview of the existing literature 
regarding the pricing of structured financial products. We then derive our hypotheses and 
explain the details of the methodology. Next, we explain our valuation framework and 
describe the widespread data sample used for our analyses, which contains 90 CLN 
contracts from the German retail market with a total of 13,555 historical quoted prices on a 
daily basis (2008 - 2012), reflecting a significant extension of the data sample used in 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011). Based on our methodology and our data sample, we 
statistically test our hypotheses. In our test, we find statistically significant evidence that the 
mispricing of CLN changed during the financial crisis.  
III.1.2 Literature 
According to Fabiozzi et al. (2007), a CLN is a credit derivative that represents a bilateral 
contract under which the seller sells the credit risk of the reference entity and receives a 
certain premium from the protection buyer. Regarding the pricing of such credit derivatives, 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011) pointed out that various studies exist on the mispricing of 
equity-linked notes. For example, Chen et al. (1990) and Chen and Sears (1990) were the 
first to find evidence of overpricing of these products in the U.S. market. Whereas the 
former focused on overpricing in the primary market, the latter found the first evidence of 
decreasing overpricing with decreasing maturity in the secondary market and, thus, for the 
life cycle hypothesis. Later, these findings regarding the primary and the secondary markets 
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were transferred to non-U.S. markets by other studies, such as Wilkens et al. (2003) or 
Gruenbichler and Wohlwend (2005). 
Baule (2011) provided further evidence for the existence of a product life cycle. He found 
that for discount certificates on the German DAX index, the investor’s demand is driven by 
tax benefits. Because of the high demand for certificates with a maturity of just longer than 
one year, banks anticipate a significant number of net sales and thus are able to charge 
higher premiums than for shorter maturities. According to Henderson and Pearson (2011), 
some structured financial products are even sold with high average margins although they 
have expected negative returns. Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) provided further evidence 
for the existence of life cycle effects, as banks are net sellers at the beginning of a product’s 
lifetime and net buyers toward the end in order to increase the bank’s margin. 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011) provided the first comprehensive study on the mispricing of 
CLN. Thereby, they focused on the primary market, in other words, on the pricing of CLN 
on their date of issue. The paper provides evidence that CLN products are generally 
overpriced and further confirms the finding of, e.g., Benet et al. (2006) and Entrop et al. 
(2009) that the coupon rate and the complexity of a contract (measured by the number of 
reference entities, the number of payment days and the coupon structure) have a major 
influence on the mispricing.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study is available that analyzed the pricing of CLN on the 
secondary market as proposed by Rathgeber and Wang (2011) at the end of their paper. By 
analyzing pricing in the CLN secondary market, we are able to test whether the results for 
the primary market are transferable to the secondary market. Further, we analyze whether 
significant differences exist regarding the causes of mispricing in the primary and secondary 
markets. Moreover, we are able to test the hypothesis of the product life cycle for CLN.  
Of further interest is the question of whether the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis had an effect on 
the mispricing of CLN. This consideration is based on the thought that CLN investors often 
act in a risk-loving manner because they invest in a product that promises attractive coupon 
payments even though it may contain a complex and non-transparent risk structure, which 
investors do not know in detail due to, e.g., asymmetric information between the investor 
and the issuer. Thus, an investor’s decisions are often based on biased or incomplete 
information. Hens and Rieger (2014) used the circumstance of incorrect beliefs (e.g., 
probability misestimations) or behavioral utility functions (e.g., prospect theory) to explain 
the utility gain of structured financial products and, thus, their popularity with retail 
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investors. Breuer et al. (2009) found evidence for such bounded rational behavior in the case 
of structured financial products with sports betting components, as their popularity can only 
be explained by the existence of inhomogeneous expectations and bounded rational, risk-
loving investors. This bounded rational behavior may be intensified by very attractive 
coupons, which investors in structural financial products can receive. Wojtowicz (2014) 
showed that, for collateralized debt obligations (CDO) in general, even fair spreads are due 
to their conditions much larger than fair spreads on similarly rated corporate bonds. This is 
accompanied by a high sensitivity of these instruments in case of changes in the 
underlying’s default probability. Bounded rational behavior may have ended during the 
financial crisis when investors became aware of the high risks of structured financial 
products. For example, tranches for high-yielded CDO were very appealing to investors 
before the financial crisis because they assumed that ratings represent the actual default 
risks. Then, this market collapsed during the financial crisis (Wojtowicz 2014). Thus, two 
effects of the financial crisis on the pricing of CLN are conceivable: On the one hand, 
investors may increasingly face up with the underlying risks of structured financial products 
(amplified by a stronger regulation) and, hence, consider them in the course of their 
investment decisions. On the other hand, the demand for such products may decrease. Based 
on theoretical considerations, both effects lead to a decrease in overpricing. 
Hence, our research questions are concretized as follows. Are daily prices of CLN contracts 
fair and adequate compared with the related risk? If not, what are the reasons for the 
mispricing and did the financial crisis have an effect on mispricing? Does an observable 
product life cycle exist for CLN? 
III.1.3 Hypotheses 
According to Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), asset prices are strongly driven by asymmetric 
information. Consequently, asymmetric information may lead to mispricing of financial 
assets. For instance, with focus on the primary market, Myers and Majluf (1984) showed 
that managers have strong incentives to issue overvalued equity in case of information 
asymmetry. Examining the interdependence of mispricing and asymmetric information more 
detailed, among many others, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) showed that market makers (in 
terms of security markets) use mispricing (in the sense of overpricing) to compensate the 
risk of trading with investors that have superior information. Another aspect contributing to 
information asymmetry is the complexity of a financial product. Particularly in the case of 
CLN contracts, it is very difficult for investors to estimate the default probabilities of the 
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underlying assets, which can be interpreted as some kind of information asymmetry, too 
(Rieger 2012). Additionally, the information asymmetry and the resulting mispricing are 
amplified by the circumstance that CLN are the only major credit derivate products 
available for retail investors. Thus, no adequate position exists in the retail market, making it 
difficult to replicate a CLN contract (particularly for multi-reference CLN) (Rathgeber and 
Wang 2011).  
In addition to the aforementioned general reasons of information asymmetry, in the case of 
CLN, we particularly have to deal with information asymmetry in terms of bank lending. 
This is reasoned in the circumstance that a CLN contract is, at least from the issuer’s 
perspective, a loan (provided to the reference entity). According to Sharpe (1990), “a bank 
learns more than others about its own customers”, e.g., about the borrower’s characteristics. 
Consequently, the CLN issuer has a significant information advantage regarding the default 
probabilities compared to the investor, thus providing the possibility to misprice the 
contract. Further, Wittenberg-Moeman (2008) provides evidence that loans issued by 
institutional investors, i.e., loans that are typically issued with long maturities, are associated 
with higher information costs, thus leading to an increase of information asymmetry. 
However, although it may be undisputed that markets for structured financial products show 
high information asymmetry, there is evidence for a decline of information asymmetry 
concerning, e.g., a specific product (group), in the course of time. For instance, the recent 
contribution of McLean and Pontiff (2015) shows for the case of stock returns that investors 
learn about mispricing from academic publications, thus implying that (some) stock market 
anomalies become less anomalous (and instead more “normal”) after being published. 
Thereby, the fact that the number of academic publications on the pricing of structured 
financial products increased in course of time is undisputed. For instance, when using the 
search database “ScienceDirect” and searching for journal articles using the search items 
(“structured product” AND “pricing”), we obtain an increase of more than 68% regarding 
the number of related articles between 2008 and 2012. Additionally, although more difficult 
to express in numbers, the public coverage regarding structured financial products like CLN 
increased in recent years, too. Therefore, coinciding with McLean and Pontiff (2015), we 
conclude that both, academic research and public coverage contributed to a decrease of 
information asymmetry. Thus, our major hypothesis is as follows: 
- Hypothesis H1: The mispricing of CLN in the German retail market decreases over 
time. 
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Hypothesis H1 is strongly based on the fact that the pricing of CLN is influenced by the 
presence of asymmetric information within the CLN market and that this information 
asymmetry decreases generally over time. Now, we want to examine the influence of the 
financial crisis on the mispricing of CLN. Here too, we use information asymmetry as basic 
idea and obtain two major influences of the financial crisis: First, referring to the 
aforementioned development of academic research, we obtain a strong increase during 
respectively after the financial crisis. Using the same database and search items as above, we 
obtain 1,096 related articles for the 46-year covering period of 1960-2006 and 2,219 related 
articles for the 8-year covering period of 2007-2015. Obviously, information asymmetry 
regarding the general understanding for the pricing of structured financial products 
decreased, thus leaving issuers less space to misprice. The second major influence of the 
financial crisis on information asymmetry is related to regulation aspects, above all bank 
regulation and financial regulation. Since the financial crisis, financial markets in general 
and banks in particular are stronger supervised by federal authorities (e.g., the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority for the case of Germany). This stronger regulation of 
financial markets has had impact on the market for structured financial products, too. For 
instance, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which was developed in 
late 2009 as consequence of the financial crisis and which came into force in August 2012, 
aims to increase the stability of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market (which also 
includes the CDS as hedging for CLN) and, among others, also includes reporting 
obligations for OTC derivatives. Concluding, both, the increased number of academic 
contributions after the financial crisis as well as the stronger regulation of financial markets, 
led to (1) an increase in transparency of the CLN market and (2) to an increase of investor’s 
awareness regarding the complexity of such products. 
In addition to these two aspects related to a decrease of information asymmetry and thus to a 
decrease of mispricing, we assume a third aspect, how the financial crisis changed 
mispricing of CLN: During the financial crisis, the demand for structured financial products 
strongly decreased. For instance, the German securitization market broke down from 68.7 
billion € in 2006 to 7.7 billion € in 2008, implying a decrease of approximately 90% 
(Schiller et al., 2009). Similar evidence is provided by Wojtowicz (2014), who showed that 
during the climax of the financial crisis of 2008, the CDO market collapsed. Even some 
highly rated CDO tranches lost up to 90% of their value and were classified as “junk”. 
Based on logical considerations, two effects could be reasonable: On the one hand, one 
might assume that mainly expert traders remained in the market and (uninformed) retail 
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investors left the market due to the unknown risk exposure. Following, among many others, 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), a shift towards a market “full of (informed) experts” would 
imply an increase in overpricing, as the CLN issuer tries to compensate the risk of insider 
trading. On the other hand, the strong decrease in demand might have forced the CLN issuer 
to price the contract more fairly in order to increase demand.  
To conclude, although both, a decrease or even an increase in mispricing of CLN due to the 
financial crisis is conceivable, we expect at least some effect. Thus, our second major 
hypothesis is as follows: 
- Hypothesis H2: The mispricing of CLN in the German retail market changed after 
the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009. 
The hypotheses H1 and H2 are related to the temporal development of CLN mispricing on 
an aggregated market-level, regardless of a specific contract. To extent our analysis, we 
further want to examine the development of mispricing of a specific CLN contract, 
depending on its time to maturity. Thereby, the third hypothesis is based on two (closely 
related) research strands.  
Firstly, taking up the already discussed strand of information asymmetry, we argue that the 
asymmetry of information between the CLN issuer and the CLN investor decreases with 
decreasing maturity. Sharpe (1990) and Berger et al. (2005) point out that the lender (and 
with that the CLN issuer) has a comparative advantage over public markets in gathering 
information. Consequently, the CLN issuer has an information advantage regarding the 
reference entities’ default risks at the beginning of maturity. We hypothesize that this 
information advantage disappears with decreasing maturity, which is also in line with 
Longstaff et al. (2005), who provide evidence for a lower liquidity, i.e., higher information 
asymmetry, of long maturity bonds, and vice versa. Thus, due to the decreasing information 
advantage with decreasing maturity, we expect a decrease in mispricing. Indirectly 
associated with the idea of asymmetric information, Rathgeber and Wang (2011) showed 
that the complexity of the calculation of a CLN’s fair value strictly increases with the 
number of payment days and with the maturity of a CLN. They outlined that several days 
may be required to determine the fair value for a (complex) CLN product with long 
maturity. Consequently, a longer maturity contributes to information asymmetry and with 
that to higher mispricing. 
Secondly, we take up the idea of the product life cycle. Among others, Chen and Sears 
(1990), Baule (2011), Henderson and Pearson (2011) as well as Stoimenov and Wilkens 
(2005) provided evidence for such product life cycle, concluding that, due to multiple 
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reasons already pointed out in Section III.1.2, the mispricing decreases with decreasing time 
to maturity.  
Considering both lines of reasoning regarding the time to maturity and its predicted effect on 
mispricing, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
- Hypothesis H3: Mispricings become more significant as the time to maturity 
increases. 
In addition to the three aforementioned main hypotheses that refer to the change in 
mispricing over time, we additionally seek to control for the remaining effects examined by 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011) and analyze whether the results from their paper are valid on 
both the product’s day of issue and during its entire lifetime. 
First, we adopt the notion that the number of reference entities has an effect on the 
mispricing of CLN contracts. Rathgeber and Wang (2011) found that the number of 
reference entities has a significant effect on mispricing. Among others, this finding owes to 
the fact that the calculation of the fair value for a multiple referenced CLN is very difficult. 
As Hernández et al. (2007) showed for equity-linked notes, this non-transparency regarding 
default probabilities (amplified by the aforementioned problem of asymmetric information) 
and complexity might lead to the fact that CLN issuers overprice multi-referenced CLN 
contracts even more than CLN contracts with only a small number of reference entities. This 
paper seeks to confirm the results of Rathgeber and Wang (2011) using a significantly larger 
data sample: 
- Hypothesis H4: Mispricings become more significant as the number of underlying 
reference entities increase. 
Analogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), our fifth hypothesis refers to the “first sight 
effect” of coupon payments, which are comparable to equity-linked bonds (Wallmeier and 
Diethelm 2009). The notion behind this security is that retail investors often act with 
bounded rationality: They only recognize a high coupon rate and, thus, the expectation of a 
high return instead of the hidden factors behind the high coupon rate (e.g., underlyings with 
extremely high risk). Thus, because the size of the coupon rate might influence the 
attractiveness of and, with that, the demand for CLN contracts, it also affects the 
significance of the overpricing:  
- Hypothesis H5: Mispricings become more significant with higher coupon rates. 
The CLN contracts in our data sample also cover different coupon structures (mixed and 
variable). As the complexity of a CLN contract increase, the more variable payments are, we 
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further included the coupon structure (hereafter, coupon type) as an additional control 
variable. The methodology used to test our hypothesis is presented hereafter. 
III.1.4 Methodology 
 Valuation of CLN III.1.4.1
Since a CLN can be interpreted as a bond with embedded Credit Default Swaps (CDS), the 
key for the valuation of a CLN is to duplicate the CLN cash flow with the help of CDS 
spreads. Hence, according to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we use the CDS spreads to 
calculate implied probabilities of default q. Therefore, we impose the same central 
assumptions, namely: The recovery rate of a senior CDS 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑆 is given and constant. 
Further, there are four payments dates of the CDS in one year, each at the end of the quarter, 
thus leading to premium payment days Tm={t0.25,t0.5,t0.75,t1,…,tm} until maturity in m. In 
order to achieve probabilities for less than a year, we apply a natural cubic spline 
interpolation as smoothing method.  
In order to estimate the fair value of a CLN, our first intermediate goal is to estimate the 
probabilities curve of the implied default probabilities. To do so, based on the 
aforementioned assumptions, we (1) calculate the expected cash flows CF1,1 in the first 
payment year of an one-year CDS and (2) solve the resulting equation for the default 
probability q. Starting point of our calculation is the one-year CDS from the investor’s, i.e., 
risk buyer’s, point of view. As payments occur at four payment days, these payment days 
have to be discounted in order to achieve the present value. By doing so, we receive 
equation (1): 
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with )1(25.0)1( 4|114|11,1 qCDSqRECCF CDS  , as one-quarter of the annual CDS spread will 
be paid on each of the four annual payment days. Thereby, in line with Hull and White 
(2003), the CDS spread CDS1 is set in a way that the swap is priced fairly. 
Based on the a priori estimated yield curve of spot rates rt and the CDS spread CDS1, the 
quarterly probability of default 4
14|1 q11q   for an one-year CDS can be solved by 
means of equation (1). As a result, we receive the cumulative probability of default for the 
end of the first year according to equation (2): 
 q1=1-(1-q1|4)
4 
 (2)   
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As CDS contracts with different maturities share the same underlying reference entity, they 
should also share the same cumulated probability of default during the same period. 
Therefore, we adopt the cumulated default probability qn-1 for the first year by calculating 
the quarterly probability of default qn-1|4 for a CDS with maturity of n years. Next, in line 
with Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we calculate the quarterly probability of default for CDS 
with maturities of n years as long as CDS spreads CDSn are available. Analogous to 
equation (1), we receive:  
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with 
   
)1(25.0)1( 4| 4/4| 4/, tntCDStn qCDSqRECCF   representing the cash flow of the 
CDS with a maturity of n years at the payment date t. Further,   represents the ceiling 
function by Gauss. Equation (3) is appropriate to estimate the implied default probabilities 
qn/4, as the right hand sum has already been calculated by the past n-1 applications of 
equation (3). Thus, equation (3) has solely to be solved for qn/4. The cumulative probability 
of default is defined recursively as: 
    1-n44|nn q-1  )q-(1-1q   (4) 
In our case, we receive a cumulative probability of default q1, q2,…, qn for the end of each 
year. Furthermore, it can be stated that q0=0, since, due to logical consideration, a default at 
the date of issue is assumed to be impossible. Finally, in a last step and in line with 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we estimate a continuous curve of cumulated default 
probabilities by means of 11 data points, which consist of 10 implied probabilities at 10 
different times of maturity as well as the origin that we have already calculated. In line with 
Press et al. (2007), we used a natural cubic spline interpolation as smoothing method. This 
results in a continuous isotonic function of the cumulative probability of default named 
Q(t)=s(q1,q2,… qn).  
After calculating these probabilities of default, we are able to price the CLN as expected 
discounted cash flow under the martingale measure Q (see Jarrow and Turnbull 1995 
respectively Jarrow et al. 1997). In doing so, the CLN is priced arbitrage free with respect to 
the CDS market (see in general Bielecki and Rutkowski 2002).
36
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 We are aware of the joint-hypothesis problem, implying that the CDS contracts may also be mispriced, thus 
leading to a biased result regarding the mispricing of CLN. Nevertheless, following Fama (1991) and most of 
the studies on capital market efficiency, we ignore this problem in our study. 
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Further, because our analyses also included CLN with multiple references, we considered 
the asset correlation of the underlying assets. By doing so, we were able to model multiple 
defaults of the reference entities. A detailed description of the calculation of the default 
probabilities with multiple reference entities, which extends the aforementioned valuation 
model by the possibility to handle joint defaults, is provided by Rathgeber and Wang (2011). 
Our primarily goal is to price a CLN with an annual or semi-annual fixed coupon rate 𝐶𝑓 
maturing in Tm at a face value of N.
37
 The price of issue is Pi. Let the date of issue be T0 and 
the following payment dates be T1,T2,…,Tm. On the basis of the default probabilities curve 
Q(t) derived above, we can estimate the cumulated probability of default Q(T1-T0), Q(T2-
T0),…,Q(Tn-T0) accordingly on each of these days. 
If we impose a certain recovery rate RECCLN, the value FVi of the CLN can be expressed as: 
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whereby 𝜇 = ⌊
𝑡
𝑚
⌋ is the result of the floor function and rTt-T0 is the risk adjusted discount 
rate. The latter is the sum of the risk free rate and the credit spread of the issuer.
 
 
To calculate the overpricing, we evaluate the difference between the theoretical fair price 
FVi and the price of issue in reality. A positive difference indicates overpricing and vice 
versa. Furthermore, we can assume the price of issue to be fair and estimate the implicit 
recovery rate, which fulfills this assumption.  
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(6) 
The relative price difference and the recovery rate RECimp are two major indicators to 
determine if a CLN product is overpriced. Thus, they will serve as dependent variables in 
our subsequent test. 
 Mispricing of CLN III.1.4.2
Our primarily aim is to analyze the mispricing of CLN not only in the primary market, but 
also in the secondary market. Thus, in contrast to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we analyzed 
quoted prices of different CLN not only at one point in time (date of issue), but also across 
the time axis. Hence, as we obtained data for different clusters i (different CLN contracts) at 
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 For a detailed description of the calculation and the specifics of the fair value of CLN with floating coupon 
rates, please refer to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), as we proceed analogously. 
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different points in time t, we had two different analysis dimensions. As this circumstance 
implies the threat of aggregation biases (Keane and Runkle 1990), we tested our data sample 
for the existence of panel data. Thus, we were able to analyze the effects of structurally 
different CLN contracts on CLN mispricing.  
To determine whether the data contained fixed or random effects, we tested the panel 
regressions against an unweighted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. For the random 
effects model, we conducted a Lagrange Multiplier test. The central idea of this test is to 
compare the residuals between the time series for one CLN with the residuals between the 
time series of different CLNs. For the fixed effects model, we conducted a simple F-test. 
Therefore, the F-statistic of both regressions are compared. Subsequently, we used the 
Hausman-Wu test to show that the random effects model dominates the fixed effects model 
for all cases analyzed in this paper (except for one robustness check). This test foots on the 
differences in regression coefficients using the random and fixed effects models respectively 
the standard errors of the coefficients. Because the Hausman-Wu test showed the existence 
of random effects within our data sample, we used a random effects panel regression model 
to test our hypotheses regarding the mispricing of CLN.  
To test our hypothesis, in a first step, we operationalize the mispricing of CLN by means of 
the contracts’ implicit recovery rate RECimp,it for CLN contract i at time t. Thereby, 
according to equation (6), the implicit recovery rate is calculated by means of the above-
mentioned multi-borrower Jarrow and Turnbull model with a given CLN value (in this case 
the market price), resolved for the recovery rate. Furthermore, we assumed a recovery rate 
of 40% for the CDS, which served as the basis for the estimation of the default probabilities. 
This is because according to the Standard North American Corporate CDS Converter 
Specification (ISDA, 2009), the recovery rate of a (fair priced) senior CDS is 40%. As the 
recovery rate of a CLN (in course of the financial crisis) was only 8.8%
38
, we can assume 
that the higher the implicit recovery rate is, the more overpriced the CLN contract is. To put 
it in other words, in case of an implicit recovery rate of 100%, the CLN contract equals a 
risk-free investment, which a CLN in fact never is. The corresponding panel regression for 
the base case is shown in equation (7): 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑝,𝑖𝑡 =∝0+ 𝜏 ∝1+ 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∝2 +𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑖 ∝3+ 𝐶𝑅𝑖 ∝4+ +𝐶𝑇𝑖 ∝5+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (7) 
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 Observing empirical recovery rates was possible for the first time during the financial crisis. According to 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011), four weeks after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, retail investors found that 
the realized recovery rate for a Lehman-referenced CLN was 8.8%. 
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with i indexing the different analyzed panels, i.e., the different n CLN contracts. The 
parameter τ is a variable for the ongoing date in years since April 1, 2008, which is the 
earliest date with a quoted price in our data sample. CRi is the coupon rate of the CLN and 
MATit is the time to maturity in t in relation to the CLNs’ total time to maturity. CTi is the 
coupon type of the CLN i (with CTi=0 for fixed coupon payments and CTi=1 for variable 
coupon payments) and NoRi is the number of reference entities of the CLN i. 𝜐𝑖 is the CLN 
random coefficient. Because we have a random effects model, the random coefficient 𝜐𝑖 is a 
random variable with a fixed mean and a variance. Further, to test the influence of the 
financial crisis, we conducted two random effects panel regressions according to equation 
(7). The first additional panel regression covered all points of time t with quoted prices 
during the financial crisis and the second additional panel regression covered all points of 
time t with quoted prices after the financial crisis. 
We further tested the residuals for autocorrelation within the random effects model. 
Therefore, we used a modified Durbin-Watson test according to Bhargava et al. (1982) in 
association with Baltagi et al. (2003). The test foots on the idea that in a panel only 
autocorrelation between the residuals of the time series (length T) of every single CLN are 
accounted for. This circumstance reduces the number of observation in the first place. 
However, the modified DW-statistics, as displayed in equation (8), is aggregated in the 
second step over all N CLN.  
𝑑𝑤𝑚𝑜𝑑 =
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Due to the special construction of the modified DW statistics, it cannot be analyzed with the 
critical values used in time series analysis. For the panel case, critical values are generated 
which account for this special setting and the random effects (see Bhargava 1982). To 
address the identified autocorrelation, we used a Prais-Winsten estimation for the panel data 
because this approach does not modify the length of the time series. After one iteration, the 
residual’s autocorrelation was reduced to a sufficient extent. For the test of 
heteroscedasticity, we conducted a robust Lagrange Multiplier test according to Montes-
Rojas and Escudero (2010). Following the idea of a Langrange Multiplier test, an auxiliary 
regression model has to be performed testing for a homoscedastic covariance matrix. 
Insofar, the test follows the well-known idea of the Breusch Pagan test. However, due to the 
fact that we observe differently distributed error terms for different CLN (random effects 
model), the homoscedastic covariance matrix (null hypothesis) is constructed in such a way 
III Risk Treatment – Recent Empirical Evidence from the Financial and Industrial Sector 153 
that differently distributed error terms for the different CLN contracts exist in the covariance 
matrix. 
In another test for the influence of the financial crisis on the mispricing of CLN, we replaced 
the date parameter τ by a dummy variable for the points of time during the crisis 
respectively after the crisis. 
To test the robustness of our results, we tested the panel regressions previously shown in 
equation (7) with alternating CDS recovery rates (8.8% and 60%) for the estimation of the 
default probabilities. Further, we tested our results in case of an estimated asset correlation 
equal to 0.  
Additionally, we repeated the panel regression shown in equation (7) with the relative 
mispricing ∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡 as dependent variable, Thereby, ∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡 is calculated using equation (9): 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑉𝑡
− 1, (9) 
with the relative deviation 
𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑉𝑡
− 1 of the market price Pt from the theoretical fair value FVt 
of a CLN in t. The corresponding panel regression is shown in equation (10): 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜏𝛽1 + 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑖𝛽3 + 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝛽4 + 𝐶𝑇𝑖𝛽5 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (10) 
For the calculation of the theoretical fair value FVt, we used recovery rates of 40% 
respectively 8.8% for both the CLN contracts and the CDS, which served as the basis for the 
estimation of the default probabilities. Finally, we repeated the robustness check with a 
recovery rate of 40% and an estimated asset correlation equal to 0. 
The next section presents the data sources for testing the panel regression models. 
III.1.5 Data Sources 
For our analysis, we identified six major German CLN issuers
39
 (which are two issuers more 
than in the paper of Rathgeber and Wang 2011): 
 Commerzbank AG (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang 2011); 
 Deutsche Bank AG (additional issuer); 
 DZ Bank AG (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang 2011); 
 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang 2011); 
 Landesbank Berlin (additional issuer); and, 
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 Analogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we used dummy variables to evaluate possible differences among 
the credit risk of the issuers. 
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 UniCredit Group (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang 2011). 
The following data had to be obtained from each CLN contract to meet the requirements of 
our model: 
 Payment dates including the final payment day; 
 Coupon rate, coupon type and payment structure;  
 Issue price and issuer; 
 Underlying reference entities; and, 
 Market prices of trading days with positive trading volume. 
Except for the different product names given by the specific issuers, all of these CLN 
products are constructed similarly. They only differ from one another in the following 
aspects: 
 Number of reference entities: single or multiple; 
 Type of reference entities: corporate or national sovereign; 
 Coupon type: fixed rate or variable rate (floating rate or a mix of fixed and variable); 
 Payment structure: periodic or only at maturity; and, 
 Issue price and final payment: at, under, or over par. 
Altogether, we observed 90 CLN products issued from April 1, 2008 to February 27, 2012 
covering 13,555 quoted market prices on a daily basis and correlated to a positive trading 
volume (we excluded some of the 136 CLN products from Rathgeber and Wang (2011) 
because data required for our model were not available). Prices for days, which had a 
trading volume equal to 0, were ex ante excluded and are not part of our 13,555 quoted 
prices-spanning data sample. The CLN data of the different CLN were obtained from the 
individual product descriptions, which were retrieved from the issuer’s homepages. The 
daily market prices and the corresponding trading volumes were retrieved from the 
European Warrant Exchange Stuttgart (EUWAX).
40
 Table III.1-1 shows the descriptive 
statistics on the 90 different CLN contracts used in our analysis. At the same time, the 
descriptive statistics show that the composition of the data sample used in the paper at hand 
is comparable to the one used by Rathgeber and Wang (2011).  
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Table III.1-1 Descriptive statistics of analyzed CLN 
The descriptive statistics (Table III.1-2) of the implicit recovery rates of the CLN show that 
4,021 of the quoted prices (which is 29.66% of the entire data sample) implied a recovery 
rate of 40% or higher. For comparison, the recovery rate of a (fair priced) senior CDS is 
40%, the recovery rate of a Lehman-referenced CLN during the financial crisis was only 
8.8%. The highest implicit recovery rate in the sample was 163.72%. Beside these rather 
high implicit recovery rates, we also observed 6,041 quoted prices (44.57%) implying 
negative recovery rates, with the lowest implicit recovery rate of -3,115.30%. In average, we 
observed an implicit recovery rate of -36.98%. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics regarding the quoted prices of the CLN and the 
relative mispricing ∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑡 calculated using equation (4) and a recovery rate of 8.8% show 
that none of the quoted prices were priced with their fair values. In fact, 8,199 of the quoted 
prices (which is 60.5% of the entire data sample) showed a deviation between market price 
and fair value of more than 5%. Only 1,396 quoted prices showed a deviation less than 1% 
(which is 10.3% of the entire data sample). In total, 6,876 (50.73%) of the quoted prices 
were overpriced and 6,679 (49.27%) of the quoted prices where underpriced. The largest 
overpricing within the sample was 70.14% (observed for a CLN issued by Commerzbank) 
and the largest underpricing was 30.76% (observed for a CLN issued by Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg). The average relative mispricing ∆𝐶𝐿𝑁𝑡 in absolute terms within the 
observation period was 9.38%, i.e., CLN were on average 9.38% overpriced. Separated by 
issuers, Commerzbank, DZ Bank AG and Landesbank Berlin showed the largest average 
mispricing at more than 10%. 
In addition to the CLN data, input parameters are also needed to calculate values in 
accordance with our model. To discount the estimated cash flows for each date, we needed 
Issuer: Frequency: Date of Issue: Frequency: Maturity: Frequency: Number of Reference 
Entities: 
Frequency: 
Commerzbank AG 
Deutsche Bank AG 
DZ Bank AG 
Landesbank BW 
Landesbank Berlin 
UniCredit Group 
20% 
21% 
26% 
22% 
1% 
10% 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2% 
3% 
22% 
31% 
22% 
19% 
< 1 year 
1-3 years 
> 3 years 
0% 
3% 
97% 
1 
2-5 
6-10  
> 10  
51% 
47% 
1% 
1% 
2 
Coupon Type: Frequency: Type of References: Frequency: Number of 
Payment Days: 
Frequency: Coupon Rate: Frequency: 
Floating 
Mixed 
Fixed 
23% 
12% 
64% 
Sovereign 
Corporate 
16% 
84% 
1-10 
> 10 
64% 
36% 
< 3% 
3% - 6% 
> 6% 
8% 
78% 
14% 
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the risk-free spot rate on a daily basis. The required parameters for the calculation of the 
spot rates and discount factors were estimated by the German Central Bank using the 
Svensson method (Svensson 1994).  
The CDS spreads of the reference entities were retrieved through the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, which uses historical data from Credit Market Analysis (CMA) as a source. We 
used daily quoted closing rates of senior CDS with maturities from one to ten years, which 
were available for most of our required reference entities since 2008. 
To calculate the joint default probabilities for CLN with multiple underlying reference 
entities, we needed their asset correlation. Therefore, for each underlying corporation, we 
used its daily stock return within the observation period of April 1, 2008 to February 27, 
2012 (or shorter if data were not available for the entire period). As a proxy for the 
correlations of national sovereigns, we took the major stock index of each underlying 
country and calculated the daily stock return. Following Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we 
applied Merton’s model because the credit risk of a sovereign is closely related to its 
economic development, which is represented by the sovereign’s stock index.  
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Table III.1-2 Descriptive statistics of quoted market prices, implicit recovery rate (calculated by means of a multi-borrower Jarrow and Turnbull model with the quoted market 
price as CLN value, resolved for the recovery rate), and the relative mispricing (calculated by means of equation (4)). The average relative mispricing in absolute values does 
only take into account the extent of the relative mispricing, not its sign. 
 
# of 
quoted 
prices 
Implicit Recovery Rate Relative mispricing ∆𝑪𝑳𝑵𝒕 (Recovery Rate 8.8%) 
Average Min Max < 0 > 0.4 > 5% < 1% Average 
Average 
(absolute 
value) 
Median Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Overall 13,555 -0.3698 -31.1530 1.6372 6,041 4,021 8,199 1,396 –0.0282 0.0938 0.0013 –0.3076 0.7014 0.1340 
Issuer 1: 
Commerzbank AG 
2,362 -0.1215 -10.6463 1.0853 987 761 1,721 122 0.0392 0.1138 0.0128 –0.2401 0.7014 0.1583 
Issuer 2: Deutsche 
Bank AG 
12 -0.4498 -1.8454 0.2670 7 0 5 0 –0.0656 0.0702 –0.0190 –0.2274 0.0277 0.0801 
Issuer 3: DZ Bank 
AG 
4,355 -0.2062 -16.1531 1.6372 1,892 1,449 2,976 330 0.0572 0.1232 0.0054 –0.2821 0.5863 0.1635 
Issuer 4: Landesbank 
Baden-Württemberg 
5,087 -0.3776 -31.1530 1.0350 2,269 1,266 2,512 762 0.0073 0.0624 0.0009 -0.3076 0.5406 0.0859 
Issuer 5: Landesbank 
Berlin 
540 -0.1040 -10.8750 1.3718 112 419 474 7 0.1108 0.1369 0.1373 –0.1462 0.4673 0.1160 
Issuer 6: UniCredit 
Group 
1,199 -1.5386 -26.4323 1.1863 774 126 510 171 –0.0467 0.0616 –0.0232 –0.2785 0.1034 0.0726 
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III.1.6 Tests and Results 
 Mispricing in the German CLN secondary market – base case III.1.6.1
Table III.1-3 presents the test results for the entire observation period based on the panel 
regression model from equation (7). 
Table III.1-3 Results for the panel regression for the entire observation period. Values are for regression 
coefficients α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before Prais-Winsten estimation), Hausman-Wu 
test statistic, and explanatory power R
2
 (values in brackets are t-values; ***significance at the 0.1% level; 
**significance at the 1% level; * significance at the 5% level). 
  Entire observation period  
α0 -1.222*** 
 (-1093.200) 
α1 (τ) -2.000*** 
 (-213.400) 
α2 (MAT) 13.993*** 
 (98.400) 
α3 (NoR) 4.130*** 
 (822.200) 
α4 (CR) -191.968 
 (-1.300) 
α5 (CT) 17.229*** 
 (211.800) 
Durbin-Watson  0.215 
Hausman-Wu 7.804 
Adjusted R
2
 0.229 
The parameter values were negative for date and coupon rate. According to the regression 
model, this result indicates that the implicit recovery rate decreased with an increasing 
coupon rate (H5) and during the entire observation period (H1). For the maturity (H3), the 
number of reference entities (H4), and the control variable “coupon type” values were 
positive. Therefore, according to the regression model, this means the longer the maturity 
and the larger the number of reference entities had been respectively the more complex the 
coupon type was, the larger the implicit recovery rate was. In all cases except the coupon 
rate, we observed highly significant results. The explanatory power of the CLN contract 
panel regression was 0.229.  
Further, the Hausman-Wu test statistic reported in Table III.1-3 distinctly shows that a 
random effects model is more appropriate than a fixed effects model. This is not astonishing 
due to several facts. First, we are inspecting time series of different CLNs, as different CLNs 
have different characteristics, which are not accounted for in the regression model according 
to equation (7), e.g., asymmetric information regarding default probabilities between the 
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issuer respectively investor and the reference entities (loan borrowers). Consequently, this 
leads to different mispricings of different CLN. At the same time, we expect to observe the 
same dependence structure on the independent variables, which are stationary in time but at 
different levels. Interestingly, these levels are not fixed, but random instead. The latter can 
be explained by the fact that these characteristics resulting in different levels are 
uncorrelated with the independent variables and not constant in time. 
To account for dynamic effects, we also tried to estimate a panel regression with yearly 
effects. However, the CLN specific effects clearly dominated the model. In addition to that, 
due to the autocorrelation and the applied Prais-Winsten estimation, we estimate the 
equations in differences, which additionally reduced the potential influences of lagged 
variables. 
 Mispricing during and after the financial crisis III.1.6.2
To test hypothesis H2 and, thus, CLN mispricing during and after the financial crisis, the 
first step conducted two further panel regressions: one with CLN data before May 8, 2009 
and one after May 8, 2009. This date was selected because the European Central Bank 
performed the last reduction of the key interest rate with respect to the financial crisis on 
May 7, 2009. Table III.1-4 presents the results of this regression. 
Table III.1-4: Results for the panel regressions regarding the implicit recovery rate during / after the financial 
crisis. Values are for the regression coefficients α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before Prais-
Winsten estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic, and explanatory power R
2
 (values in brackets are the t-values; 
***significance at the 0.1% level; **significance at the 1% level; * significance at the 5% level). 
  During Financial 
Crisis (April 1, 2008–
May 7, 2009)  
After Financial 
Crisis (May 8, 2009–
February 27, 2012) 
α0 0.169*** -1.379*** 
 (53.215) (-1022.400) 
α1 (τ) 0.030 -2.106*** 
 (0.068) (-151.300) 
α2 (MAT) 6.896* 14.073*** 
 (1.679) (101.000) 
α3 (NoR) 1.045*** 4.610*** 
 (32.997) (798.300) 
α4 (CR) -222.543 -194.226 
 (-0.112) (-1.200) 
α5 (CT) 9.501*** 17.691*** 
 (12.041) (203.900) 
Durbin-Watson 0.149 0.227 
Hausman-Wu 0.321 5.044 
Adjusted R
2
 0.287 0.225 
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Highly significant results were obtained particularly after the financial crisis, at least at the 
0.1% level in all cases except for the coupon rate. For the maturity, the number of reference 
entities and the control variable “coupon type,” we observed positive values during and after 
the financial crisis, indicating an increasing implicit recovery rate with an increasing 
maturity, increasing number of reference entities and increasing complexity of the CLN. We 
observed negative values for the coupon rate during and after the financial crisis, indicating 
that both during and after the financial crisis, the implicit recovery rate decreased with 
increasing coupon rate. These findings are in line with the CLN panel regression previously 
shown in Table III.1-3. The parameter values had different signs during and after the 
financial crisis only for the date, indicating that the implicit recovery rate increased 
(statistically not significant) during the financial crisis but decreased (statistically 
significant) afterwards. The explanatory power during the financial crisis was 0.287 and thus 
higher than in the CLN contract panel regression previously shown in Table III.1-3. After 
the financial crisis, the explanatory power was 0.225 and with that almost on the level of the 
CLN contract panel regression from Table III.1-3. 
In a second step, we tested, whether the mispricing of CLN is significantly different during 
and after the financial crisis by conducting a Chow test according to Chow (1960). The null 
hypothesis was that the mispricing of CLN during the financial crisis was equal to the 
mispricing of CLN after the financial crisis. The results of the Chow test at a 0.99 
confidence level rejected the null hypothesis. Hence, the Chow test is an indicator that the 
mispricing of CLN did significantly change through the financial crisis. 
Because only 35 of the 90 CLN in our data sample contain quoted prices during the financial 
crisis (2,545 out of 13,555 quoted prices), the Chow test may only be convincing to a 
limited extent. Thus, the third step conducted a further panel regression including a dummy 
variable for the financial crisis whereby the dummy is equal to one for dates after the 
financial crisis and zero otherwise. The date variable had to be excluded given high 
autocorrelation with the dummy variable. In this case, we (once again) obtained highly 
significant results for all variables except the coupon rate. The explanatory power was 
0.224.  
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Table III.1-5 Results for the panel regression with a dummy for the period after the financial crisis. Values are 
for the regression coefficients α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before Prais-Winsten 
estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic, and explanatory power R
2
 (values in brackets are the t-value; 
***significance at the 0.1% level; **significance at the 1% level; * significance at the 5% level). 
  Dummy Regression 
α0 -1.545*** 
 -1744.900 
α1 (post crisis dummy) -0.343*** 
 (–639.200) 
α2 (MAT) 15.588*** 
 (119.700) 
α3 (NoR) 3.998*** 
 (806.200) 
α4 (CR) -223.814 
 (-1.200) 
α5 (CT) 17.130*** 
 (208.500) 
Durbin-Watson 0.208 
Hausman-Wu 3.198 
Adjusted R
2
 0.224 
The financial crisis dummy parameter showed a highly significant negative sign, indicating 
that the implicit recovery rate decreased to a highly significant extent after the financial 
crisis. In line with the positive result of the Chow test, this result provides further evidence 
for the existence of two structural different regimes: one during the financial crisis and one 
after the financial crisis. The remaining parameters indicated the same sign as in the CLN 
panel regression previously shown in Table III.1-3, i.e., the implicit recovery rate and thus 
the mispricing of CLN decreased with an increasing coupon rate but increased with 
increasing maturity, an increasing number of reference entities, and an increasing CLN 
complexity.  
 Robustness check III.1.6.3
To check the robustness of these results, we conducted six robustness checks. For three of 
the robustness checks, we applied the same procedure as previously described with 
alternative recovery rates of 8.8% and 60% for the CDS, which served as a basis for the 
estimation of the default probabilities (as mentioned above, in the base case, we assumed a 
CDS recovery rate of 40%). In another robustness check, we applied the same procedure as 
previously shown but assumed an asset correlation of zero (and a CDS recovery rate of 40% 
analogous to the base case). During the remaining three robustness checks, we repeated the 
aforementioned regression with the relative mispricing according to equation (4) as 
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dependent variable and different recovery rates respectively an asset correlation equal 0. 
Table III.1-6 shows the results for the robustness checks with alternating recovery rates and 
an asset correlation equal 0: 
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Table III.1-6 Results for the robustness checks with alternating CDS recovery rates for the estimation of the default probabilities and an asset correlation equal 0. Values are for 
the regression coefficients α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before Prais-Winsten estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic, and explanatory power R
2
 (values in 
brackets are the t-value; ***significance at the 0.1% level; **significance at the 1% level; * significance at the 5% level). 
 Recovery Rate 8.8%  Recovery Rate 60% Asset Correlation = 0 
 Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After 
Crisis 
Dummy 
Regression 
Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After Crisis Dummy 
Regression 
Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After 
Crisis 
Dummy 
Regression 
α0 -2.024*** 0.071*** -2.247*** -2.563*** -0.722*** 0.217*** -0.842*** -0.913*** -1.171*** 0.222*** -1.332*** -1.509*** 
 (-1769.4) (22.892) (-1626.6) (-2838.6) (-686.724) (66.216) (-665.247) (-1085.3) (-1056.1) (72.978) (-994.916) (-1715.3) 
α1 (τ / post crisis 
dummy) 
-3.228*** 0.276 -3.618*** -0.496*** -1.282*** -0.148 -1.165*** -0.263*** -2.115*** -0.350 -2.211*** -0.355*** 
 (-359.6) (0.621) (-268.900) (-923.4) (-122.472) (-0.346) (-76.694) (-491.6) (-222.3) (-0.769) (-157.152) (-663.3) 
α2 (MAT) 23.443*** 7.488* 24.151*** 26.198*** 7.946*** 6.502* 7.605*** 8.850*** 13.764*** 5.255 13.922*** 15.486*** 
 (172.2) (1.772) (180.6) (209.0) (49.928) (1.649) (48.909) (61.5) (95.3) (1.194) (98.582) (117.3) 
α3 (NoR) 5.128*** 1.174*** 5.696*** 4.904*** 3.735*** 0.975*** 4.184*** 3.664*** 4.343*** 1.203*** 4.805*** 4.202*** 
 (1079.5) (35.944) (1040.0) (1046.5) (643.017) (32.170) (630.315) (636.7) (847.800) (35.243) (818.346) (831.1) 
α4 (CR) -255.385 -253.580 -249.029 -305.243 -163.120* -203.115 -172.654* -185.648 -195.127 -201.182 
-
196.940** 
-229.260* 
 (-1.3) (-0.124) (-1.4) (-1.5) (-1.721) (-0.107) (-1.933) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-0.094) (-2.488) (-1.8) 
α5 (CT) 23.024*** 11.368*** 24.227*** 22.972*** 14.362*** 8.388*** 14.274*** 14.219*** 16.972*** 9.001*** 17.447*** 16.869*** 
 (299.4) (13.939) (294.7) (296.0) (152.445) (11.149) (142.679) (148.900) (204.500) (10.529) (197.669) (201.3) 
Durbin-Watson 0.208 0.147 0.219 0.200 0.210 0.152 0.224 0.208 0.215 0.150 0.227 0.208 
Hausman-Wu 24.988 1.493 15.096 9.172 2.003 0.135 1.516 1.773 8.350 0.177 5.602 3.767 
Adj. R2 0.216 0.291 0.211 0.208 0.230 0.282 0.230 0.229 0.229 0.251 0.226 0.222 
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Table III.1-6 shows that almost all of the results of the base case were robust against 
changes within the assumed recovery rate: regarding the CLN panel regression and the 
regression with the crisis dummy, all results from the base case were confirmed within these 
three robustness checks. The results of the base case were also confirmed during and after 
the financial crisis for an alternating CDS recovery rate of 8.8%. For a recovery rate of 60% 
as well as an asset correlation equal 0, all parameters were analogous to the base case except 
for the date variable during the crisis. In both cases, in contrast to the base case, the implicit 
recovery rate also decreased during the crisis and not only after the crisis. Furthermore, the 
robustness checks had no impact on the significance of the results from the base case.  
Additionally, we repeated the aforementioned regression with the relative mispricing as 
dependent variable (equation (10)). Thereby, the relative mispricing was calculated 
according to equation (9). We further considered different recovery rates of 8.8% 
respectively 40% for the calculation of the CLN as well as CDS for the estimation of the 
default probability. In a separate robustness check, we further assumed an asset correlation 
equal 0. Table III.1-7 shows the results of these three robustness checks. 
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Table III.1-7 Results for the robustness checks with the relative mispricing as dependent variable, using different recovery rates as well as an asset correlation equal 0. Values are 
for the regression coefficients β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before Prais-Winsten estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic, and explanatory power R
2
 (values in 
brackets are the t-value; ***significance at the 0.1% level; **significance at the 1% level; * significance at the 5% level). 
 Relative Mispricing as dependent variable 
(Recovery Rate 8.8%)  
Relative Mispricing as dependent variable 
(Recovery Rate 40%) 
Relative Mispricing as dependent Variable (Asset 
Correlation = 0) 
 Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After 
Crisis 
Dummy 
Regression 
Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After 
Crisis 
Dummy 
Regression 
Entire 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
After 
Crisis 
Dummy 
Regression 
β0 0.020*** –0.003 
 
–0.020*** –0.056*** –0.089*** –0.069 –0.054*** –0.085*** –0.032*** –0.046*** –0.046*** –0.084*** 
 (12.423) (–0.744) (–46.478) (–121.002) (–122.607) (–13.832) (–90.531) (–142.776) (–14.648) (–9.243) (–84.260) (–147.143) 
β1 (τ / post crisis 
dummy) 
–0.441 –0.072 –0.411*** 0.014*** –0.004 –0.277 –0.129*** –0.017*** –0.545 –0.392 –0.238*** –0.008*** 
 (–0.418) (–0.171) (–6.298) (27.212) (–0.171) (–0.739) (–3.128) (–30.936) (–0.690) (–1.035) (–5.173) (–14.431) 
β2 (MAT) –0.730 –0.374** –0.356*** –0.118*** –0.107*** –0.077 –0.168*** –0.082*** –0.437 –0.233* –0.248*** –0.113*** 
 (–1.149) (–2.670) (–6.198) (–6.145) (–5.674) (–0.649) (–5.127) (–5.835) (–1.088) (–1.937) (–6.624) (–7.476) 
β3 (NoR) 0.460*** 0.248*** 0.747*** 0.646*** 0.358*** 0.165*** 0.468*** 0.368*** 0.375*** 0.226*** 0.607*** 0.505*** 
 (4.329) (11.251) (12.577) (20.193) (25.539) (8.999) (14.967) (23.933) (5.653) (12.049) (16.576) (28.600) 
β4 (CR) 19.311 12.065 35.122 21.161 9.422 –3.797 4.836 8.265 7.531 5.689 10.535 9.103 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.043) (0.054) (0.042) (–0.003) (0.012) (0.038) (0.002) (0.005) (0.021) (0.038) 
β5 (CT) 3.433 1.712*** 1.095 1.512** 1.516*** 1.491*** 1.487** 1.613*** 2.545* 1.399*** 1.551** 1.1635*** 
 (1.345) (3.601) (1.126) (2.768) (6.650) (3.786) (2.960) (6.172) (1.668) (3.484) (2.622) (5.444) 
Durbin-Watson 0.100 0.196 0.082 0.104 0.131 0.234 0.109 0.134 0.124 0.223 0.101 0.127 
Hausman-Wu 5.916 0.840 4.735 2.548 2.761 2.166 6.246 1.534 3.405 1.562 6.727 1.677 
Adj. R2 0.230 0.320 0.094 0.125 0.154 0.273 0.108 0.154 0.230 0.291 0.123 0.171 
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Table III.1-7 shows that the robustness checks with the relative mispricing as dependent 
variable confirms the results of the aforementioned regressions in almost all cases. The two 
major differences are the reversed signs for the coupon rate and the maturity: in case of the 
coupon rate, we observe positive signs in each case except the relative mispricing during the 
crisis in case of a recovery rate of 40%, indicating an increasing mispricing with increasing 
coupon rate. In case of the maturity, we observed negative signs in each case, indicating an 
increasing mispricing with decreasing maturity. We furthermore observed smaller 
explanatory powers than in the base case, especially in case of a recovery rate of 40%. 
III.1.7 Discussion of results 
Overall, consolidating the base case and the robustness checks leads to the conclusion that 
all of our hypotheses except H5 (regarding the “first sight effect”) are verified statistically.  
Our first hypothesis H1 is based on the idea that CLN markets are characterized by strong 
information asymmetry, not least due to the fact that banks have a significant information 
advantage regarding borrower’s, i.e. reference entity’s, characteristics (Sharpe 1990). These 
information asymmetries and the resulting overpricing of CLN contracts on an overall 
market level ought to decrease in course of time due to an increasing “body of knowledge”. 
We can confirm H1 during the entire observation period from 2008-2012, using the implicit 
recovery rate as proxy for the extent of mispricing. Accordingly, irrespective of the maturity 
of single CLN contracts, overpricing of CLN decreased in our data sample. Thus, this 
perception coincides with the recent evidence of McLean and Pontiff (2015), who postulate 
that academic research contributes to decrease market anomalies.  
In a second step, hypothesis H2 examined the influence of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on 
the mispricing of CLN in more detail. In essence, we argued that due to a tremendous 
increase in the number of research papers dealing with the pricing of structured financial 
products after 2007 and due to a stronger regulation of the financial market, especially for 
credit derivatives, information asymmetry within the CLN market declined. We 
operationalized H2 by separately analyzing the implicit recovery rate respectively the 
mispricing during and after the financial crisis. In doing so, we observe a statistically 
significant decrease of mispricing after the financial crisis. In contrast, during the crisis, we 
observe a (statistically not significant) increase in mispricing. This finding is basically in 
line with, for example, Wojtowicz (2014), who stated that, as of today, bounded rational 
investors are increasingly aware of the underlying risks of structured financial products; 
thus, issuers are no longer able to overprice their products to the same extent as they did 
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before or during the crisis. Hence, although it may be also conceivable that mispricing 
increased due to the financial crisis because of a shift toward a market full of “informed 
experts”, we obtain the result, which we ex ante considered to be logical. Moreover, our 
finding regarding the effect of the financial crisis is robust as both, a Chow test and a further 
regression with a dummy variable for the time after the financial crisis, confirm the result 
that mispricing decreased to a significant extent after the financial crisis, thus providing 
evidence for a structural break due to the crisis. 
The third key hypothesis in our study, H3, examined the pricing of CLN not on an 
aggregated market level but on a contract level instead. In particular, we analyzed weather 
the mispricing is correlated to the time to maturity. We confirm H3 for the entire 
observation period from 2008 to 2012 as well as in case of the two identified regimes 
(during and after the crisis). In all cases, we observed an increasing overpricing with 
decreasing maturity. This result strengthens the assumption that information asymmetry 
between the issuer and the investor decreases with decreasing time to maturity, which is 
basically in line with Longstaff et al. (2005). Further, this result is in line with the findings 
of, e.g., Chen and Sears (1990), Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005), or Baule (2011), thus 
providing evidence for the existence of a product life cycle. Our results do not only confirm 
existing contributions in this field of research but rather put them on a broader basis as the 
data sample for this paper covers many more data points (13,555) and a longer period (e.g., 
Baule (2011) only analyzed the period from November 2006 to December 2007). As 
restriction, we have to point out that in case of the relative mispricing as dependent variable, 
we observed an “inverse product lifecycle” with an increasing mispricing with decreasing 
maturity. 
Regarding the complexity of CLN products (which in turn also contributes to information 
asymmetry), we confirm hypothesis H4 that the overpricing increases with an increasing 
number of reference entities. The same result is observed for the control variable “coupon 
type”, i.e., the complexity of the coupon structure. Thus, the two cases confirm the findings 
of Rathgeber and Wang (2011).  
Surprisingly, Hypothesis H5 regarding the “first sight effect” has to be rejected in almost 
each of our tests (except the robustness checks with the relative mispricing as dependent 
variable). We hypothesized that the overpricing increases with higher coupons. In fact, our 
finding contrasts the findings of Rathgeber and Wang (2011) and of Wallmeier and 
Diethelm (2009). One reason for this contradictory and unpredicted result can be the 
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aforementioned higher awareness of investors for the high underlying risks of structured 
financial products after the financial crisis, which is amplified by the high number of 
academic and public coverage. Thus, a high coupon might no longer induce a “positive” first 
sight effect but rather put the investor on the alert for the inherent risk structure.  
To summarize, our results provide evidence that the CLN market shows generally a decrease 
in overpricing in course of time. In particular, the overpricing of CLN during and after the 
financial crisis changed significantly, to the effect that the overpricing decreased to a more 
significant extent after the crisis, which is in line with our expectations based on existing 
literature. Another interesting contribution to the literature is the fact that Rathgeber and 
Wang (2011) only observed overpricing on the date of issue. We now identified that the 
majority of the 13,555 quoted prices was actually underpriced, instead of overpriced 
respectively showed (highly) negative implied recovery rates.  
III.1.8 Conclusion and Outlook 
The market for structured financial products grew in the past years. Hence, a significant 
number of studies analyzed the pricing of these products. This paper significantly extended 
the contribution of Rathgeber and Wang (2011): we analyzed whether CLN contracts are 
priced with their fair value not only on their date of issue but also during their life cycle. 
Thereby, our analysis was based on a widespread data sample covering 13,555 daily quoted 
prices of 90 CLN contracts from five major issuers in the German market, what is also a 
significant extension of Rathgeber and Wang (2011). Analogous to Rathgeber and Wang 
(2011), we applied a market-based valuation model for the calculation of the fair value of 
CLN. This approach is based on the reduced model by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) 
respectively Jarrow et al. (1997), extended by the single factor Merton model to estimate the 
joint default probabilities by means of asset correlations. For the derivation of the default 
probabilities, we used the CDS spreads of the underlying entities. 
One of the major findings of this paper is that CLN are not only overpriced in the secondary 
market but are often underpriced to a large extent. This result is rather surprising in view of 
the fact that Rathgeber and Wang (2011) only observed overpriced CLN products on their 
issue date. Further, we discovered that overpricing CLN significantly decreased after the 
2007-2009 financial crisis due to a decrease in information asymmetry, although CLN 
markets are gradually recovering and demand for structured products is still high. This result 
is also robust for changes in recovery rates or correlation coefficients. The theory of the 
product life cycle, ie, decreasing overpricing with decreasing maturity, was confirmed as 
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well as well as the positive correlation between the complexity of the CLN product and the 
mispricing. The latter finding does not only confirm, but also strengthen the corresponding 
finding of Rathgeber and Wang (2011) because of the extended and widespread data sample 
used in this paper. Surprisingly, the common theory of the “first sight effect”, i.e., an 
investors’ focus on a high coupon rate in expectation of a high return instead of the hidden 
factors behind the high coupon rate, had to be rejected.  
Based on the results of our paper, a few possibilities exist to extend our work. Although our 
data sample is quite large, with 13,555 quoted prices, it does not begin until April 2008. 
Thus, the data sample contains only data “during the financial crisis” and “after the financial 
crisis” but not “prior to the financial crisis”. By extending the data sample with data prior to 
the financial crisis, we were also able to analyze CLN mispricing before the crisis. 
Moreover, the change in interest rates is modeled more specifically to more accurately 
calculate fair prices for CLN with floating coupon payments. Further, the valuation 
framework may be used for CLN products issued on CLN markets other than the German 
market to test whether the hypotheses are universally valid. 
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Abstract: 
A strong increase in the demand for some commodities over the last decade will have a 
major impact on their future supply situation. Of increasing importance, therefore, is an 
assessment of a commodity’s criticality, and especially its supply risk, by appropriate 
indicators. The literature has proposed numerous indicators of the supply risk. Here, we use 
the convenience yield of commodity futures as a supply risk indicator to address some of the 
major shortcomings of existing indicators, especially regarding their predictive power. This 
paper aims to test the applicability of the convenience yield as an indicator of a 
commodity’s future supply risk. Therefore, we calculate historical convenience yields for 3-, 
15-, and 27-month futures contracts for five major industrial metals (aluminum, copper, 
lead, nickel, and zinc) during the period 1999 to 2011. We compare the convenience yields 
at the beginning of the contract period to known indicators at maturity to find that the 
convenience yield has generally predictive power for the static stock lifetime (i.e., inventory 
volume/turnover) and future spot prices. Furthermore, we find that, with some restrictions, 
the convenience yield is an applicable indicator of a commodity’s supply risk. 
Keywords: Convenience Yield, Theory of Storage, Commodities, Supply risk indicators, 
Scarcity 
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IV Summary and Future Research 
In this section, the key findings of this doctoral thesis are summarized (section IV.1), and 
potential starting points for future research are presented (section IV.2). 
IV.1 Summary 
The main objective of this doctoral thesis was to contribute to selected risk management 
topics with a particular focus on the risk management process phases of risk identification 
and risk treatment. Section II provided empirical evidence on an aggregate level by means 
of various meta-analyses, and examined selected topics with respect to the identification of 
risks. In particular, answers were provided to the questions “Why do firms hedge their 
risks?” and “How do soccer’s success-related performance risks affect stock markets?” 
Section III concentrated on selected topics from risk treatment. In particular, section III 
distinguished between the financial and industrial sectors, and analyzed different ways to 
treat sector-specific risks. For the financial sector, CLN were analyzed as an instrument to 
hedge credit default risks, and an answer to the question “Are CLN priced fairly on the 
secondary market?” was provided. For the industrial sector, section III provides an answer to 
the question “Is the convenience yield a good indicator for a commodity’s future supply 
risk?” In the following paragraphs, the key findings of the research papers included in this 
doctoral thesis are presented for sections II and III: 
In section II, several aspects regarding the identification of risks were investigated:  
 Research paper 1 focused on the analysis of corporate hedging determinants by 
aggregating the results of 132 empirical studies, including more than 100,000 
companies, and provided a comprehensive literature review in this field of research 
(Objective II.1). Research paper 1 introduced the methodology of multivariate meta-
analysis, which was predominantly conducted in medical and psychological research so 
far, to the field of financial research (Objective II.2). In addition, guidelines for the 
treatment of various types of biases were provided, such as publication and especially 
the data mining bias (Objective II.3). Finally, with respect to Objective II.4, the main 
purpose of this meta-analysis was to identify key drivers for non-financial firms’ 
hedging behavior, and consequently, their potential risk sources. Thereby, the research 
paper focused on the following specific hedging hypotheses: corporate tax, bankruptcy 
and financial distress costs, asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity, 
coordination of financing and investment policy, and agency conflicts of debt. In light of 
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these hypotheses, the results indicate a strong evidence only for the bankruptcy and 
financial distress hypothesis. For the remaining hypotheses, only weak or no support was 
found. In particular, at least on an overall and multivariate level, major risk sources that 
move firms to hedge seem to be the inability to satisfy investors’ expectations, measured 
in a high dividend yield and the company’s size, a firm’s critical liquidity situation, and 
expenses for research and development (R&D) activities. The latter can be explained by 
the fact that the success of such activities has a major impact on a firm’s future success, 
but simultaneously is anything but certain, leading to, for example, the underinvestment 
problem introduced in section I. The robustness check, by means of the univariate meta-
analysis, confirmed the multivariate meta-analysis’ results. From a methodological 
viewpoint, a core finding is that the univariate meta-analysis tends to strongly 
overestimate single results, as no interactions between the proxy variables are integrated 
in this approach. The robustness check, by means of the vote-counting method, led to 
predominantly inconsistent and insignificant results, as the high number of insignificant 
results from primary studies could not be differentiated, which is a major constraint of 
this approach. Regarding potential biases, research paper 1 showed that studies on 
corporate hedging face the presence of both a data mining bias as well as a publication 
bias, with the latter being more pronounced. Consequently, following the idea of Pigott 
(2012), this bias was addressed by various measures, such as the inclusion of grey 
literature, the conduction of funnel plots, and application of Egger’s regression test. By 
doing so, the results of the original meta-analysis turned out to be robust.  
 Research paper 2 put risk identification in the context of soccer matches, and examined 
how risks related to teams’ sporting success influence financial performance with respect 
to stock returns, and especially volatility. Therefore, in line with the commonly accepted 
process for literature reviews suggested by, e.g., Cooper and Hedges (1994), the research 
paper provided a systematic and holistic review of 42 studies in this area of research. 
The paper also provided overall evidence for soccer’s impact on stock markets on an 
aggregate level, and particularly distinguished between specific hypotheses regarding 
soccer’s influence on stock markets by conducting the vote-counting method (Objective 
II.5). A key result of the vote-counting analysis is that the main risk factors regarding 
soccer clubs’ sporting success are losses and draws (both to a high negative extent). 
Surprisingly, the same does not hold for wins - not in the sense of a threat, but of an 
opportunity - as wins do not affect stock markets in the same magnitude as negative 
outcomes do. Another unexpected result is that, on an aggregate level, important 
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matches seem to have no stronger influence than less important matches, although the 
related positive or negative financial consequences are expected to be much stronger. 
This is contrary to Birkhäuser et al. (2015), as they provide evidence for a positive 
relationship between investor cash flows and sporting success only in important matches. 
Sporting performance also demonstrates an observable influence regarding stock market 
volatility and trading volumes. In addition, as information about soccer matches 
becomes available for all market participants simultaneously, soccer is an adequate 
subject to test the efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral alternative hypothesis. 
Thus, research paper 2 aimed to challenge whether stock markets are efficient or driven 
by behavioral factors in regard to soccer (Objective II.6). Due to the strong reaction of 
investors to unexpected and expected results, which are already reflected in prices, 
research paper 2 rejects the hypothesis of efficient markets and supports the behavioral 
alternative hypothesis instead. Third, based on the systematic analysis of the existing 
literature, the paper pointed out opportunities for future research (Objective II.7; for 
further information, see section IV.2). 
Section III focused on the treatment of risk in both the financial and industrial sectors. One 
exemplary instrument for risk treatment in each sector had been selected and carefully 
analyzed by means of empirical tests. 
 Research paper 3 focused on the treatment of risks in the context of the financial sector. 
In particular, the paper took a closer look at CLN, which are used by financial 
institutions in order to hedge their credit default risks. CLN, which are closely related to 
credit default options, are blamed as one of the major triggers of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis (Hull 2010), and are heavily discussed in financial research and in public debate 
due to the lack of transparency regarding their risk structure. This may hamper their 
applicability for financial institutions to hedge credit risks. In addition, the financial 
crisis itself may have had an influence on the pricing of CLN contracts. Consequently, 
both the mispricing of CLN in general (Objective III.1) and in particular, the influence 
of the financial crisis on mispricing (Objective III.2), were the focus of research paper 3. 
Determinants of mispricing were identified (Objective III.3) and the product life cycle 
hypothesis was examined for CLN contracts (Objective III.4). A data sample covering 
13,555 daily quoted prices of 90 CLN contracts from five major issuers in the German 
market was analyzed. For the calculation of the fair value of CLN, a market-based 
valuation model based on the reduced model by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), and Jarrow 
et al. (1997), was used, extended by the single factor Merton model to estimate the joint 
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default probabilities by means of asset correlations in the case of multi-referenced CLN. 
The major finding of this paper is that CLN in the secondary market are not only 
overpriced (50.73% of the quoted prices), but are often underpriced to a large extent 
(49.27% of the quoted prices). This result extends the findings of Rathgeber and Wang 
(2011), who demonstrated that CLN contracts in the primary market are exclusively 
overpriced. With respect to their applicability for risk management, CLN contracts draw 
an ambiguous picture: for institutional investors aiming to hedge their own risk 
exposure, an investment in an underpriced CLN contract features a suitable opportunity 
to benefit from such a hedging contract. Nevertheless, due to the high number of 
overpriced contracts, corporate hedging by means of CLN has to be treated with care. 
For the issuing bank, which tries to hedge its own credit default risk exposure, the 
previous findings of Rathgeber and Wang (2011) provide evidence that due to the 
significant overpricing in the primary market, hedging of credit default risks by means of 
CLN was an appropriate risk management instrument, at least in the period before the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, a further central finding of research paper 3 is that 
the aforementioned financial crisis significantly decreased the overpricing of CLN due to 
a decrease in information asymmetry, with the results being robust for changes in central 
input parameters. In addition, in the case of the German CLN market, overpricing seems 
to be predominantly driven by product complexity, measured in number of reference 
entities as well as in the coupon type. Finally, in line with existing studies - e.g., 
Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) and Baule (2011) - the product life cycle hypothesis can 
be confirmed in the case of the German CLN secondary market. 
 Research paper 4 focused on the treatment of risks in the context of the industrial sector. 
In particular, the paper derived requirements for a feasible short-term indicator of a 
commodity’s future supply risk, as the assessment of commodity supply risks in terms of 
an early warning system is of high priority for producing firms in order to avoid 
disruptions in the production process, which may cause major financial losses (Objective 
III.5). Therefore, the research paper proposed the convenience yield of commodity 
futures contracts, which also depends on the future inventory level of a commodity 
(Weymar 1966), as an indicator for a commodity’s future supply risk (Objective III.6). 
The predictive power of the convenience yield of commodity futures was tested by 
means of the static lifetime of inventory at the maturity of the contract, as well as the 
spot price at the contract’s maturity, as proxy variables for a future supply situation. To 
test the relationships, trading data was used on 3, 15, and 27-month maturities of five 
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major industrial metals (aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc) for the period of 1999 
until 2011. The paper provides empirical evidence that the convenience yield serves as 
an applicable early warning indicator for future supply risk, at least for aluminum, 
copper, nickel, and zinc. Nevertheless, the indicator works only as long as the inventory 
level is a good proxy for worldwide stocks; e.g., for lead, the indicator does not work, as 
the corresponding LME warehouse stocks are not a good proxy for the worldwide 
stocks, and the supply situation bears at least a small risk of disruption.  
Taken together, it can be concluded that the corresponding research papers included in this 
doctoral thesis contribute to existing literature in the field of risk management with a 
particular focus on two particular phases of the continuous risk management process: risk 
identification and risk treatment. Despite the presented findings, further challenges remain 
and offer starting points for future research. 
IV.2 Future Research 
In the following, potential starting points for future research are highlighted for each 
research paper included in this doctoral thesis. 
Section II: Regarding the identification of risks, there are several aspects for future research 
that are addressed in the following paragraphs:  
Research paper 1 contributes to the identification of risk sources. The results of 132 studies 
analyzing the determinants of corporate hedging were synthesized by conducting a 
multivariate meta-analysis. In addition, to check the robustness of the multivariate results, a 
univariate meta-analysis and a vote count analysis were conducted, analogous to Aretz and 
Bartram (2010) and research paper 2, providing evidence that the univariate meta-analysis 
strongly tends to overestimate the results. However, the results have some limitations and 
may provide starting points for potential future research as well. The most important 
limitations and potentials for future research are outlined hereafter: 
 First, the endogeneity and identification problems, as well as the empirical modeling of 
structural relations, are incorporated only in few primary studies, implying that the 
causality of the variables is not unique. For instance, many determinants of leverage also 
influence hedging strategies, which means that leverage is an endogenous variable with 
regard to corporate hedging. This problem is difficult to address in meta-analysis, as 
only secondary data is available in most cases. Future research should address the 
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problem of endogeneity by, e.g., the “meta-analytic structural equation modeling” (MA-
SEM) approach presented by Cheung and Chan (2005). 
 Second, in order to achieve comparability of research paper 1 to the findings of Aretz 
and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014), the analysis is limited to the four major 
hypotheses of financial hedging mentioned by Aretz and Bartram (2010). Consequently, 
future research could adopt the methodology of multivariate meta-analysis in order to 
test the determinants of operational hedging (Allayannis et al.2001; Kim et al. 2006) or 
other theories of financial hedging, such as risk management as determined by 
behavioristic motives of managers (Pennings and Garcia 2004). To contribute to the 
effectiveness of risk management, related fields of financial research (such as 
determinants of the capital structure or credit spreads) or further sectors can be analyzed 
by means of multivariate meta-analysis. 
 Third, as the proxy variables substantially vary across the studies, research paper 1 
applies a random effects model instead of a fixed effects model. However, the factors 
driving this heterogeneity are not examined. Consequently, in future research, an 
exploratory meta-analysis, or a meta-regression in line with Feld et al. (2013) could be 
conducted (Anello and Fleiss 1995).  
 Fourth, in line with Walker et al. (2008), research paper 1 shows that the lack of reported 
data in primary studies is a huge problem for meta-analysis. Due to the scarcity of data 
reported in primary studies, nearly one-fourth of the primary studies had to be excluded. 
Thus, less potential for future research, but rather an appeal to the financial research 
community, empirical studies using multivariate statistics should increase their 
transparency by reporting the examined data, such as the correlation matrix of the 
independent variables, as it is already common practice in medical and psychological 
research. A broader set of data included in a meta-analysis could improve the 
understanding of corporate hedging determinants and a variety of other research 
questions with mixed empirical evidence in the context of financial research in general, 
and risk management in particular.  
 Fifth, although research paper 1 proposes “learning from other companies” as a concept 
for risk identification, literature lacks contributions that explicitly analyze learning 
spillover effects in terms of risk management. Consequently, in line with Leary and 
Roberts (2014), who provide evidence that the capital structure’s choice of managers is 
influenced by those of their peers due to learning concerns, further research should 
examine how hedging decisions are influenced by peer companies. 
IV Summary and Future Research 180 
Research paper 2 picked up research paper 1’s finding from the literature search process that 
the literature on hedging in companies from the sports sector, and soccer clubs in particular, 
is still underrepresented in comparison to the economic meaning in this particular sector. 
Consequently, against the backdrop of the identification of financial risk with regard to the 
sportive success of a soccer club, the paper aggregates empirical findings of 42 primary 
studies by means of a systematic literature review, accompanied by the application of the 
vote count method. Caused by the nature of literature reviews, several opportunities for 
future research were systematically identified and outlined in detail (see section II.2). 
Moreover, the paper has some limitations that provide room for further research: 
 First, research paper 2 conducted solely a vote-counting analysis. As outlined in detail in 
research paper 1, this semi-quantitative method based on significance levels from 
primary studies has some noteworthy weaknesses. The major weakness is that the 
method still leaves space for subjective interpretations of the author and is less objective 
than the two other approaches conducted in research paper 1. Consequently, further 
research should apply enhanced methods of meta-analysis in order to assess the impact 
of risks in terms of sporting performance on stock markets. However, the conduction of 
univariate as well as multivariate meta-analysis is disabled by the fact that the studies in 
this field of research provide data only to an insufficient extent. Consequently, in order 
to provide robust empirical evidence on an aggregate level, future research can conduct a 
comprehensive empirical study covering a huge data sample and applying multiple 
methodological approaches. In addition, future research can conduct a meta-regression 
analogous to Feld et al. (2013), and various sub-samples, as well as the influence of 
moderating variables – e.g., time periods, countries, tournaments, etc. – can be 
examined. 
 Second, research paper 2 focused on the impact of soccer matches and competitions on 
clubs’ share prices and indices. Other risk factors with relevance for the economic 
performance of a soccer club were neglected. Although sporting success may be the 
reason for each factor influencing the economic performance of a soccer club, as, for 
instance, the number of fans buying franchise articles and visiting matches depends on 
the club’s success, there are still risk factors not directly correlated to sporting success, 
such as reputational risks, IT risks, management failures (Kupfer 2006; Beech and 
Chadwick 2013), or market risks (as in August 2015 the average beta of listed soccer 
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clubs was 0.65
41
). In addition, literature provides insufficient guidance for the treatment 
of these risks by means of concrete financial hedging instruments. Kupfer (2006) and 
Szymanski (2015) briefly describe the use of asset-backed securities in terms of soccer 
clubs without analyzing this topic in detail. The same holds true for Beech and 
Chadwick (2013), who provide a comprehensive overview of sports management in 
general, but neglect to provide concrete guidance with respect to risk management in 
soccer clubs. Future research should examine risks in terms of soccer clubs in more 
detail and propose concrete financial hedging instruments. 
 Third, although there are some studies available on the influence of sporting success on 
associated companies like jersey sponsors, kit suppliers, or large-scale investors 
(Cornwell et al. 2001; Hanke and Kirchler 2013), this topic was neglected in research 
paper 2 because such studies are underrepresented in terms of soccer. In all conscience, 
one of few studies examining the impact of match results on jersey sponsors’ stocks is 
the study of Hanke and Kirchler (2013). Future research should examine these 
interdependencies in more detail in order to gain an overall picture of soccer’s influence 
on economics.  
 Fourth, although soccer may be the sport with the strongest economic potential and 
influence, risk factors regarding the sporting performance are also relevant in other 
sports. To draw an overall conclusion on performance-related risk factors in the sports 
sector, various other types of sports - e.g., American football, baseball, basketball, or ice 
hockey - have to be examined in a similar way as soccer was examined in research 
paper 2. 
Several unresolved issues exist regarding risk identification in general, and in the sports 
sector in particular. In order to link the basic ideas of research paper 1 and research paper 2, 
detailed analyses are necessary on the hedging behavior of sports clubs. By doing so, both 
the body of knowledge regarding the determinants of corporate hedging as well as the body 
of knowledge regarding risk factors in sports clubs will be extended. 
Section III: Regarding the treatment of risks in the financial and industrial sector, several 
aspects for future research also exist, which are addressed in the following:  
In research paper 3, the fair and risk-adequate pricing of CLN in the German secondary 
market was investigated, and this paper took a closer look at the 2007-2009 financial crisis’ 
                                            
41
 Mean value of the beta of 20 listed European soccer clubs; data retrieved from Reuters on August 22, 2015. 
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influence on CLN pricing. Thereby, the contributions of this article must be considered in 
the light of some limitations that provide room for future research. 
 First, the widespread data sample of research paper 3 does not begin before April 2008. 
With that, the data sample contains only data “during the financial crisis” and “after the 
financial crisis”. However, in order to gain a comprehensive impression on how the 
2007-2009 financial crisis affected the pricing of CLN, the period prior to the financial 
crisis has also be to taken into account.
42
 Consequently, future research should extent the 
findings of research paper 3 by means of a data sample also covering the period before 
July 2007 in order to analyze CLN mispricing before the crisis.  
 Second, examining further markets other than the German secondary market can 
increase the explanatory power of research paper 3. For instance, as the popularity of 
structured financial products strongly increased in the United States over the past years 
(Rieger 2012), a closer look at the pricing of CLN (as a concrete kind of structured 
financial product) in the US market may provide additional evidence on pricing, and 
specifically the influence of the financial crisis. Thus, future research should apply the 
proposed valuation framework for CLN markets other than the German market to test 
whether the hypotheses are universally valid. 
 Third, the accuracy of fair CLN price calculation can be enhanced by some changes to 
the valuation model. For instance, in the case of CLN with floating coupon payments, it 
is necessary to take into account the interest rate. However, due to the small number of 
CLN with floating coupon payments within the data sample, research paper 3 renounced 
applying a complex interest rate model for the calculation of fair values. Instead, 
analogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), forward rates, which are derived from spot 
rates on the date of issue, are applied to predict the coupon payments. Thus, future 
research can apply models that are more sophisticated in order to increase the accuracy 
of the calculation of fair prices. 
 Fourth, research paper 3 also examined the influence of a product’s complexity on the 
pricing of the CLN contract. Thereby, complexity was measured by proxy variables, 
such as the number of reference entities, the coupon type, and the time to maturity. In 
contrast to these specific, but possibly incomplete, complexity drivers, the 
comprehensive study of Célérier and Vallée (2014) examines the complexity by means 
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 Nevertheless, the financial crisis did not start from one day to the next and many investors first expected the 
crisis to end sooner. Consequently, as the data sample of research paper 3 also comprises the climax of the 
financial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the paper still allows for conclusions 
on the financial crisis’ impact on the mispricing of CLN contracts. 
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of a detailed text analysis of the product descriptions retrieved from the product 
prospectuses of 55,000 structured products. Future research can adapt the detailed 
procedure of Célérier and Vallée (2014) for the CLN market in order to gain further 
insights on CLN pricing. 
 Fifth, research paper 3 examined the mispricing of CLN contracts on the secondary 
market and, by doing so, also examined the influence of the financial crisis on pricing. 
Thus, some statements regarding the applicability of CLN as an instrument for risk 
treatment, as proposed by Neal (1996), can be derived. However, the body of knowledge 
in terms of CLN still lacks comprehensive studies examining the effectiveness of risk 
treatment by means of this particular instrument. Consequently, this gap should be 
addressed in future research. 
In research paper 4, the convenience yield derived from the term structure of commodity 
futures was proposed as an early warning indicator for a commodity’s future supply risk. By 
using statistical tests, the applicability of the convenience yield as a supply risk indicator 
was confirmed for at least four out of five examined industrial metals. However, the results 
of this article were accompanied by some limitations that provide room for future research. 
 First, although the predictive power of the convenience yield for the static lifetime of a 
commodity as well as its’ spot price is quite high, research paper 4 unveiled a high 
number of critical supply situations that were not predicted ex ante by a high 
convenience yield; however, the number of incorrectly predicted critical supply 
situations is rather low. These prediction errors depend on the specific commodity and 
its characteristics. For instance, for commodities with low inventory levels during the 
observation period yet a high convenience yield predicted a critical supply in the short 
run. For commodities with continuous excess demand and shrinking production 
capacity, the convenience yields with long maturities performed well. An implication of 
these results is that further research should focus on constructing an indicator based on 
convenience yields and, at the same time, address the limitations mentioned above. For 
instance, the convenience yield can be combined with other financial ratios, or “classic” 
supply risk indicators.  
 Second, the applicability of the convenience yield as a supply risk indicator should also 
be tested for other commodities. This research opportunity also contributes to the 
aforementioned construction of an indicator based on the convenience yield: the more 
commodities are analyzed, the better a new indicator can address various commodity 
characteristics. For instance, with regard to the energy turnaround, the convenience yield 
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can also be tested for energy commodities, e.g., gas or electricity. In the case of crude 
oil, the relationship between the convenience yield and the future supply situation was 
already examined by Wimmer (2014). This bachelor thesis, which conducted simple 
regression tests, revealed that there seems to be no predictive power of the convenience 
yield in the case of crude oil, at least with respect to the future spot price. 
To summarize, there is obviously room for further research regarding the treatment of risks 
in both the financial and industrial sectors. In particular, the thesis strongly recommends 
assessing the effectiveness of CLN as an instrument to treat credit default risks in the 
financial sector, and to construct a supply risk indicator that is applicable for various types 
of commodities and is based on the convenience yield.  
Taken together, the research papers presented in this doctoral thesis contribute to the 
selected topics regarding the identification and treatment of risks. Even though this doctoral 
thesis can answer some particular questions regarding various aspects of risk management, 
the field will always remain a relevant and dynamic topic in research as well as in practice. 
Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that this doctoral thesis can contribute to some selected 
questions in risk management research. 
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